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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The appearance of common expressions such as ‘land grabbing’ or ‘ land deal’ appear on a 
regular basis across the mainstream media and popular presses is an indicator of everlasting 
concern about land markets. According to literature, large-scale acquisition of land is not only 
considered as a transnational transaction, i.e., ‘global land grabbing,' but also as ‘inland' 
acquisition or 'domestic land grabbing’ (Cotula, et al., 2009; Borras et al., 2011; Deininger et 
al., 2011; Osabuohien, 2014). Although the term ‘land grabbing’ is more of ‘activist’ 
terminology, ethically controversial large-scale land acquisitions could help in resolving food 
shortages in developing countries (Schiermeier, 2014). The global land acquisition is much 
stronger and more sophisticated than perceived. 
While migrants from Africa, Asia, and Latin America migrate to the USA, Europe, and 
the Gulf States, there is a rush for land in the opposite direction: foreign investors are 
attracted by the land markets in the South (Zoomers, 2010:442). 
 
Large-scale land acquisitions are the contentious issue which involves the buying or leasing of 
large tracts of land mainly in developing countries, either by domestic or transnational 
companies, individuals, and governments. In broader terms, ‘land grabbing’ as contextualized 
in the 21st century refers to large-scale land acquisitions following the 2007-2008 global food 
price crisis (Cotula, et al., 2009; Borras et al., 2011). Securing water resources is usually 
critical to the land acquisitions, and hence has subsequently led to an associated trend of 
‘water grabbing’(Mehta et al., 2013; Rulli et al., 2013). Recent literature associate the term 
‘land grabbing’ as a contemporary phenomenon caused by the combined effects of the global 
stock market crash and the food and energy crisis of 2008/2009 (Cotula, et al., 2009; Whilte 
et al., 2012). However, the expression was also mentioned in earlier works by Karl Marx 
probably for the first time but with a different context associated with the enclosures in 
England:  
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The laborers are first driven from the land, and then come the sheep. Land grabbing on 
a great scale, such as was perpetrated in England, is the first step in creating a field for 
the establishment of agriculture on a great scale (Marx, 1887: 505). 
Some tried to explain that ‘land grabbing’ has emerged as a result of power and production 
shifts. For instance, Margulis et al. (2013: 1) argued that ‘the character, scale, pace, 
orientation, and key drivers of the recent wave of land grabs is a distinct historical 
phenomenon closely tied to major shifts in power and production in the global political 
economy.' 
 
Soaring global prices for agricultural commodities coupled with the desire for meeting 
domestic consumption among net food importing countries exacerbated the demand for large 
swatches of arable land (Cotula et al., 2009; Osabuohien, 2014). Likewise, the rising need for 
clean energy sources among carbon markets as a response to climate variability (Corson & 
MacDonald, 2012) drove companies and governments from advanced and emerging 
economies to mobilize capital and acquire land on large scale basis. Thus, the conflux of 
financial markets, the rising demand for food and energy sources, and the desire to tackle 
climate crises through biofuel have fuelled the growing interest for land (Hassan & Kalam, 
2013). On the other side, governments of developing countries offer land on a large-scale 
basis to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to speed up their national economic growth 
(Lavers, 2012b). 
 
All life, including the life of human beings, ultimately depends on land and its resources. 
From land, food is grown, through and across it, the fresh water people drink is purified and 
delivered, on land protective shelters are raised. Land provides people with the means to live, 
and from the initial steps tread upon it, has been a patient-provider of fundamental resources. 
In addition to its economic significance, land is a central social asset which has an intense 
attachment with the socio-cultural setups of communities (Sani, 2002; Stephenson, 2008; 
Tengberg et al., 2012; Zeppel, 2009). For many governments, the land is a source of state 
revenue and a means to boost gross domestic product (GDP) and national prosperity (Adams 
& Tiesdell, 2010; Boone, 2007).Therefore, land-related decisions and transactions are usually 
sensitive and sometimes became part of the paramount reasons for societal regime changes 
(Paige, 1975; Campbell, 2005; Bahru, 2014). 
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It is however known on the other hand, that our earth’s lands are no longer in a situation to 
keep up with the pressures placed on its limited resources and. Growing misuse and demands 
for its goods and services are resulting in rapidly intensifying land degradation and land 
desertification globally (Wisner, 1988; Hurni, 1990; Nyssen et al., 2004; Mitiku, 2006). 
Environmental changes induced by stressors (e.g., climate change) and dissolution of 
ecosystem stability are further dwindling the ability of the land to respond resiliently to both 
natural and anthropogenic pressures. According to recent reports, our earth loses 24 billion 
tons of fertile soil and 15 billion trees per annum, which costs the global economy about $40 
billion (UNEP, 2016). 
 
Rising large-scale transnational agricultural farmland acquisition results in additional pressure 
to host countries in developing countries such as Ethiopia where it is becoming evident that 
‘the limits of lands, which are suitable for agriculture are being reached’ (Mitiku et al., 
2006:15). The demand for further swatches of arable land persists, both the figures and 
concerns related to on land deals keep rising. The large-scale commercial land acquisition, 
however, is full of debate, hype and scepticism fearing that it may not provide results as 
intended (Hall, 2011). 
 
The mere reflections concerning the land deals are much rhetoric and hype which lack 
analysis of the real situation on the ground. In addition to the usual term ‘land grabbing’, such 
as in Cotula et al. (2009) and many others, it is stated in many other different forms. For 
instance, ‘neo-colonialism’(Robertson & Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010), ‘foreignisation of space’ 
(Zoomers, 2010), ‘green grabbing’(James et al., 2012), and ‘security mercantilism’ 
(McMichael, 2013). Transnational Institute, i.e., TNI (2009) associated the phenomenon with 
a continent and described it as ‘agrarian colonialism’ and ‘another scramble for Africa’. 
Peluso & Lund (2011) associated the term with the broader navigation for power and dubbed 
it ‘control grabbing’. Others also described it as ‘developmental outsourcing’(Hofman & Ho, 
2012), ‘the global farms race’(Collins, 2013), and ‘global land and water grabbing’(Cristina et 
al., 2012). Though much is already described from ideological perspectives and relatively 
better information about its drivers, preliminary evidence is lacking especially from countries 
considered as destinations for the global land deals. Therefore, there is a need for empirical 
investigation particularly on the features of land acquisitions, the interactions between 
commercial companies and local communities, and the post-deal environmental and socio-
economic effects (Cotula et al., 2009; Azadi et al., 2013). 
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1.2 Research into large-scale transnational land acquisition 
Studies on the contemporary large-scale commercial land acquisitions are part of emerging 
areas of study which follow the 2007-2008 world food price crisis. It was first articulated in 
October 2008 when GRAIN (2008) published a report known as ‘Seized! The 2008 land grab 
for food and financial security’, and today it is among the interdisciplinary thematic areas of 
investigation. A substantial overview of the literature appeared (e.g., Cotula et al., 2009; 
James et al., 2012; Zoomers, 2010; Borras et al., 2011) and those stated in the background 
section of this dissertation). Besides, chapters in this dissertation summarized pertinent issues 
of the existing literature, for instance, the chapter on transnational land deals and the quest for 
inclusive land governance. Therefore, the general literature review presented in this initial 
chapter focuses only on the relevant issues of the dissertation which deals with the effects of 
large-scale transnational commercial land deals on environment and livelihood. 
1.2.1 Land deal or land acquisition: What is it? 
In this dissertation, a transitional land acquisition is expressed as 'land deal' or simply 'land 
acquisition.' According to the available plethora of literature, the term is represented using a 
controversial phrase of ‘land grabbing' with many and different explanations. However, the 
most comprehensive one is provided by Borras et al. (2012:851) as: 
...the capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of land and other natural resources through 
a variety of mechanisms and forms involving large­scale capital that often shifts resource use 
to that of extraction, whether for international or domestic purposes, as capital’s response to 
the convergence of food, energy and financial crises, climate change mitigation imperatives 
and demands for resources from newer hubs of global capital. 
 
Although ‘land grabbing’ is commonly assumed to happen only in the global South, some 
analyses show that it also prevails in the global north, for instance Europe (TNI, 2013), USA 
(NFFC, 2012), Latin America and the Caribbean (Borras et al., 2012) and Canada (Khamla & 
Alexandre, 2015). One of the points of contention is about the size of land involved in the 
transactions to be large-scale land deals. Some considered an area of 1000 hectares and above 
such as Borras et al. (2012), while other stick to 200 ha and above (Anseeuw et al., 2012; 
Joshua et al., 2013; Rulli et al., 2013). Some associate the term ‘mega’ as the denotation for 
land greater than 10,000 ha while assigning the term ‘large-scale’ to 500-10,000 ha 
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(Deininger et al., 2011). Therefore, the size depends on research objectives, context, and 
scope. Besides, those who acquire land may not only be companies, but they could also be 
individuals with or without ancestral origin in the country where land is dealt. In the 
dissertation, the focus is on large-scale transnational land acquisition where the term ‘larg-
scale’ refers to the size of land dealt, and it is greater than or equal to 200 ha (Anseeuw et al., 
2012; Joshua et al., 2013; Rulli et al., 2013). 
1.2.2 Drivers of land acquisition 
Many points are stated in the literature about what drives land acquisition. Unlike the features 
and impacts of land acquisition, its drivers have better explored. 
 
Driver 1: Offshore farming. ‘Food insecure’ governments viz. China and the Gulf States that 
depend on imports to feed their citizens, lease or buy vast farmlands abroad. The destinations 
are mainly in Africa, Latin America, and some parts of Asia including countries such as in 
Madagascar, Ethiopia, Uganda, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, 
Argentina, Ukraine, Kazakhstan etc (GRAIN, 2008; Cotula et al., 2009; Zoomers, 2010). 
 
Driver 2: FDI in biofuel and non­food agricultural commodities. The global demand for non-
food agricultural products and biofuels is the second leading cause for the acquisition of land 
on a large-scale basis (Afionis, 2012; GRAIN, 2008; McMichael, 2012). Private investors 
were interested in biofuel and actively involved for securing land in Brazil, Argentina, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Laos, Mozambique, Zambia (Locke & 
Henley, 2013; Sulle & Nelson, 2009). According to EPFL (2012), for instance, more than 
140,000 ha of land was outsourced in Ethiopia for biofuel plantations such as jatropha, palm, 
castor, candlenut, and sugarcane-for-ethanol though how much efficient the sector currently is 
still an attractive area of investigation. 
 
Driver 3: Ecotourism, development of nature reserves and protected areas. International 
organizations and private individuals have actively engaged in dealing large tracts of land in 
‘empty or free’ areas for the conservation of nature and ecotourism. Many of the projects and 
schemes associated with initiatives such as REDD (Reduced emissions from deforestation and 
Forest Degradation). For instance, in Africa (e.g., Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya), Asia (e.g. 
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Indonesia, Laos, and Vietnam), Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Mexico and Costa Rica) (WHRC, 
2009; Zoomers, 2010). 
 
Driver 4: Urban extensions, large­scale infrastructure, and SEZs. The rise in investment and 
internationalization of business operations, many governments are freeing large tracts of land 
to establish Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and associated infrastructures such as ring-roads 
and transport stations (Gopalakrishnan, 2007; Seshadri, 2012). Such pressures for land 
already happened before the recent surge in large-scale land transactions though they created 
further pressure. For example, in 2000 about 10 million people were displaced in Cambodia, 
China, Thailand, and India (Cernea, 2000). According to Zoomers (2010), the greatest 
pressure is in peri-urban zones, and it is kept rising. 
  
Driver 5: Rapidly growing large­scale investment in tourist complexes. Many of the 
developing nations are encouraging investments in the tourism sector as there is a belief that 
the sector contributes to accelerated economic growth. On the other side, corporates in global 
hotel chains are active in looking attractive strategic business locations to establish large-scale 
all-inclusive resorts (Hirsch, 2011). For instance, Hall (2011) explained how Gulf states were 
engaged in massive hunting safari deals, and encroached village lands in Africa where there 
were ongoing land negotiations with the government of South Africa which resulted in the 
displacement of local communities. 
 
Driver 6: Land acquisition by diasporas, i.e., migrants in their countries of origin. Although 
it is susceptible to arguments, international migrants who reside either permanently or 
temporarily in the developed regions of the north such as in USA and Europe are active in 
purchasing or leasing land in countries of their origin (Aderanti et al., 2008; Lavers, 2012a). 
For instance, the Asian diaspora which was estimated around 60 million people (the leading 
ones are China with 35 million, India and the Philippines with 20 and 7 million respectively). 
Latin America and Caribbean diasporas were numbered over 25 million. Similarly, African 
states with millions of diaspora have contributed to the increasing amount of land acquisitions 
back home (Aderanti et al., 2008). 
 
Driver 7: Rapid increase in retirement and residential migration. Despite the fact that it is not 
like the rest of the driving forces which acquire land on a large-scale basis, the increasing 
retirement ( or residential migration) has contributed for the rising rush to land (Zabel, 2012). 
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As a response to the surging costs of living, people who are aged seek comparably 
comfortable places to stay, mostly in a ‘cheap and sunny environment that has a friendly and 
caring population...large groups from the USA settle every year in Central and South 
America’ (Zoomers, 2010: 439). The preferences of living and other factors that influence 
lifestyle decisions could contribute to the further demand for land (Lawton et al., 2013). 
 
According to the Transnational Institute, TNI (2016), the convergence of several crises (food, 
fuel and energy, climate and financial) amid the rise of new hubs of global capital (BRICS 
economies and some middle-income nations) have paved the way for the rise of ‘flex crops 
and commodities’. Flex crops and products are those that have multiple or flexible uses: food, 
fodder, fuel, and other commercial-industrial purposes. Destinations for large-scale land deals 
tend to produce those flex crops, e.g. soya, sugarcane, palm oil, corn, cassava and industrial 
trees (Borras et al., 2016; TNI, 2016 ). 
1.2.3 Features, scale and trends of global land acquisition 
Much has not yet been known about the exact level of land acquisition and distribution 
regarding continent, crop type, and modes of acquisition. The foremost reason for this is that 
most of the land deals were not reported; they were not covered by the media, or they took 
place in secret fearing blames and protection of company goodwill (Edelman, 2013). 
However, even if each land deal were reported, it would still be hardly possible to pin down 
exact numbers for many reasons. 
 
There are meaningful variations among sources regarding the amount of land acquired on the 
transnational basis that is varied among sources even if the timing of data compilation is one 
of the causes for the difference. As one of the first attempts to bring a comprehensive data, 
GRAIN (2008) published a report known as “Seized! The 2008 land grab for food and 
financial security”, it disclosed how an emerging wave of a transnational land acquisition was 
sweeping the world in the name of responding to the global food and financial crises. 
Accordingly, it reported for 491 land deals covering about 30 million hectares (ha) spanning 
over 78 countries. According to the International Food and Policy Research Institute, IFPRI 
(2009), 25 million ha of land was transacted between 2006 and 2009. World Bank (2010) 
estimated 45 million ha for the period 2007-2008, Oxfam (2011) had estimated 227 million ha 
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since 2000 till the time of its report, and Land Matrix (2015) reported 38.92 million ha. There 
are also reports with much bigger figures on the total transnational land dealt. For instance, 83 
million ha of land in developing countries (i.e., 1.7% of world’s agricultural area) according 
to Schaffnit-Chatterjee (2012). Among the prominent institutions which are developing 
databases about land deals includes GRAIN (https://www.grain.org/), Land Matrix 
(http://www.landmatrix.org/), Land Coalition (http://www.landcoalition.org/), and 
Transnational Institute (TNI) (https://www.tni.org/en).  
 
Regarding the drivers of international land acquisition, it is important to put a figure on the 
size of each land use. From the total number of transnational land deals, the share of a 
particular land use driver is computed from databases. According to databases at Land Matrix 
(2015), while food crops (38%) and biofuel (20%) took the bigger share, other drivers 
constitute non-food agricultural commodities (for instance cotton and fiber) (11%), forestry 
(13%) and others (18%). According to recent evidence 36.5 million ha of land has dealt for 
food (9%), non-food(32%), and flex crops (16%), and multi-use, i.e., several crops in 
different categories (43%) (Land Matrix, 2016). According to Land Matrix database, the 
patterns of transnational land acquisitions, former land owner, land cover and land use of the 
deals involved are presented in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. In multinational land acquisition reports, it 
is indispensable to notice how the reports are made, i.e. either on the number of deals 
conducted or on the size of the land marketed. Interms of geographic destinations of deals, 
regarding total land size dealt so far, Land Matrix (2016) reported as Africa (47%), America 
(14.5%), Asia (15.1%), Europe (16.4%), Oceania (6.415). 
 
Table 1.1  Global patterns of transnational land acquisitions 
 
Size (ha) 
Number of 
concluded 
deals  
Concluded deals with 
known implementation 
status 
Projects in start-up phase or in 
operation 
Number Percentage 
200 - 2000 209 157 138 88 
2001 – 5000 155 131 114 87 
5001- 10,000 253 185 164 89 
10001-20,000 143 107 92 86 
20,000-50,000 149 120 103 86 
50,000-200,000 100 81 65 80 
> 200,000 34 23 17 74 
No information 32 17 13 76 
Total 1,075 821 706 86 
Source: Data bases at Land Matrix (2015) 
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Table 1.2  Former landowner, land cover and land use of the global land deals involved 
 
 
 
Concluded deals 
Concluded deals 
with known 
implementation 
status 
Projects in start-up phase or in 
operation 
Former owner Number (‘000ha) Number (‘000ha) Number % (‘000ha) % 
State 133 6,502 115 4,109 100 88 3,719 91 
Private 
(smallholders) 
 
64 
 
1,293 
 
48 
 
674 
 
42 
 
88 
 
566 
 
84 
Private  
(large farms) 
 
92 
 
5,718 
 
85 
 
5,288 
 
79 
 
93 
 
4,656 
 
88 
Community 76 3,405 64 2,542 48 75 1,429 56 
No information 710 22,000 509 14,686 437 86 11,332 77 
Total 1,075 38,918 821 27,298 706 86 21,703 80 
Former cover         
Cropland 169 4,529 153 3,838 138 90 3,093 81 
Forest 77 6,409 71 6,057 63 89 5,914 98 
Shrub/grassland 14 2,570 12 288 8 67 257 89 
Marginal land 49 1,881 44 1,770 33 75 670 38 
No information 766 23,528 541 15,344 464 86 11,768 77 
Total 1,075 38,918 821 27,298 706 86 21,703 80 
Former use         
Smallholder agri 107 4,168 103 4,109 96 93 3,712 90 
Commercial agri 156 3,997 125 3,163 104 83 1,626 51 
Pasture 9 556 7 554 4 57 375 68 
Forestry 35 3,592 31 3,262 29 94 3,245 99 
Conservation 16 273 9 247 7 78 212 86 
No information 752 26,331 546 15,963 466 85 12,533 79 
Total 1,075 38,918 821 27,298 706 86 21,703 80 
Source: Data bases at Land Matrix (2015) 
 
1.3 Aims and research questions 
Even though our understanding of the essence and drivers of land acquisitions has relatively 
improved, there are opportunities for further study. The dissertation is constructed with seven 
specific objectives for which a separate chapter is outlined for each. First, while the concept 
of ‘land grabbing’ per se is so contested and under work-in-progress, literature on global land 
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acquisition or land deals has extensively described possible drivers and trajectories. Some 
argue for inclusive, participatory and win-win land deals without addressing which groups of 
stakeholders [with what power and interest] to take part in the deals. Second, irrespective of 
the name or labeling attached to the phenomenon, it is important to scrutinize the 
sustainability of ‘transnational land deals’ (TLDs) from the perspective of investors, host 
governments and local communities at least using the knowledge that has been generated so 
far. This could be done in consideration with the three dimensions of sustainability, the ‘social 
acceptability’, ‘economic viability’ and ‘environmental conservation’ of the TLDs. 
 
The third objective deals with the features of large-scale transnational land deals (LSTLDs) in 
the South (where Ethiopia is a case in point), and their consequences. There is a usual 
presumption across emerging literature that large-scale transnational land deals (LSTLDs) are 
predominantly driven by global forces (push factors) from the developed north, and hence 
they are the leading in acquiring land in the developing countries of the South. To substantiate 
or disprove assumptions of such type, it is indispensable to explore the features of 
transnational land acquisition from the context of a developing economy in the global south. 
Ethiopia, one of the principal destinations to the translational land acquisition is the case in 
point. In the fourth objective, the effectiveness (i.e., the level of operational progress made by 
investors) is dealt with. The environmental effects of transnational land deals are explored in 
the fifth objective. While the investor-local people interactive (ILPI) outcome is examined in 
the sixth chapter, the livelihood effects of transnational land deals is investigated in the 
seventh chapter. The overall aim of the dissertation is: 
 
To analyze the features and level of inclusiveness of large-scale transnational 
commercial land deals, and investigate their effects on environment and 
livelihood with cases from the Benishangul-Gumuz region (Ethiopia). 
 
This major aim can further be refined in to seven more specific questions. 
 
1.  Which conceptual land deal framework better justify for the governance of 
transnational land deals? 
Many have argued towards participatory or inclusive land deals without addressing which 
groups of stakeholders vested with which power and interests in the deals. Some empirical 
studies propose land deals should be carried out in a more responsible way and should 
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consider the interests of different stakeholders (de Graaf & Slager, 2009; Stephens, 2013). 
The need exists to bridge the gap between ‘generalised’ and ‘contextualised’ knowledge (and 
information) concerning the transnational land acquisition. Most of the generalized 
conceptualisations and sources neglect the importance of powerless and powerful (yet 
uninterested) stakeholders in deals surrounding land use (Amanor, 2012; Anseeuw et al., 
2012). Azadi et al. (2013) described possibilities for win-win land deals or ‘green deals’. A 
‘win-win’ situation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for land deals to become 
inclusive or green deals. To ended with an inclusive land deal, the need exists to broaden the 
groups of stakeholders (i.e., in addition to the investor and investee) according to relevant 
parameters of power and interest for land. The subject is dealt with in the 2nd Chapter of this 
dissertation. 
 
2. Given the three dimensions of sustainability, the ‘social acceptability’, ‘economic viability’ 
and ‘environmental conservation’ of the TLDs have been studied, how much sustainable are 
transnational land deals (TLDs) for investors, host governments, and local communities? 
 
Some scholars such as Margulis et al. (2013:1) argue that ‘the character, scale, pace, 
orientation, and key drivers of the recent wave of land grabs is a distinct historical 
phenomenon closely tied to major shifts in power and production in the global political 
economy.' Azadi et al. (2013), for instance, have recently studied TLDs and divided them into 
four categories; i.e., loss-loss, loss-win, win-loss and win-win deals. According to them, the 
‘win’ or ‘loss’ outcome relates to the two parties in TLDs: the investor(s) and investee(s). In 
addition to their classification, it is important to include a third party and therefore studies 
three main stakeholders as follows: the investor(s), the host country’s government and the 
host country’s local community; mainly local (small-scale) farmers. Accordingly, the ‘win’ or 
‘loss’ for the different stakeholders should be discussed in the framework of sustainability, 
which can be decomposed into three dimensions: the political, socio-economic and 
environmental aspects of sustainability. This research question is investigated in chapter 3. 
 
3. What are the features of large­scale transnational land deals (LSTLDs) in the South (where 
Ethiopia is a case in point), and what are the emerging consequences?  
 
To better understand land deals in a nation, it is important to answer fundamental questions. 
For instance in Ethiopia, the question ‘how and how much commercial farmland has been 
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leased in Ethiopia so far?’ Should be answered. Some authors attempted on it, but all of them 
stated limitations in their pursuit of arriving at an estimated figure. For instance, World Bank 
et al. (2010) estimated a total of 1.2 million ha of Ethiopian land was transferred to 
transnational investors while the Global Land Project (GLP) estimated the entirety of the 
commercialized land in Ethiopia was between 2.9 – 3.5 million ha (GLP, 2010). Others 
reported 2.5 million ha (Vhugen, 2010), 1.19 million ha (Deininger et al., 2011), or 3.5 
million ha (Dessalegn, 2011). So, how much land is dealt in Ethiopia? With what price and 
modalities of acquisition? What are the major crop focus areas in the commercialization of 
land? The recurring transnational land acquisition is understood as part of the global 
agribusiness transactions which are predominantly North-South investment deals (GRAIN, 
2008; Zoomers, 2010). Some presume that the decline of North-South collaborations and the 
ascent of South-South socio-economic cooperation is a precursor for the new configurations 
of global power (Margulis et al., 2013). Which one takes place in the context of Ethiopia? 
With unveiling plenty of issues related to LSTLDs and narrated a typical lessor-lessee 
dispute, explanation is provided for the questions in Chapter 4. 
 
4. How much effective is the commercialization process of farmlands so far concerning 
the expected payoffs from agricultural investment in the Benishangul­Gumuz region of 
Ethiopia? 
 
According to initial databases at the Ministry of Agriculture in Ethiopia in 2013 (MoA, 2013), 
2.11 million ha of the total 11.5 million ha potential land was already given to investors. From 
the amount stated, 600,254 ha is the share of the Western Ethiopian lowland state called the 
Benishangul-Gumuz region (EIA, 2012). From the perspective of the stated region, the 
following key research questions are considered: (i) What are the key institutional 
frameworks which shaped the contemporary land governance in Ethiopia? (ii) How effective 
would the integration and harmonization of large-scale commercial farming with other 
development projects be?, and (iii) How much effective is the land lease process regarding 
integrated land use, and economic, social, and environmental payoffs of agricultural 
investment? All these are issues discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
5. What are the environmental responses on land deals? That is, what are the effects of 
commercial farms on peak discharge and suspended sediment concentration (SSC)? 
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Sustainable hydroelectric power development requires conservation of upstream catchments 
because sediment deposition can be a threat to downstream reservoirs (Adams, 1989; Devi et 
al., 2008). The Government of Ethiopia is constructing Africa's largest hydroelectric power 
station on the Blue Nile River called the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in the 
region where land is on transfer to large-scale commercial farmers. On the other hand, the 
Nile basin is characterised by severe land degradation and variability of river discharges 
(Bewket & Teferi, 2009; Frankl et al., 2011; Nyssen et al., 2004). Given the 
commercialization of large tracts of land in the closer upper catchments, the effects of 
commercial farms on peak discharge and suspended sediment concentration (SSC) in 
catchments around GERD has not yet explored. This research issue is dealt with in Chapter 6. 
 
6. What determines the investor­local people interaction (ILPI) outcomes?  
 
According to literature, the acquisition of large-scale lands by commercial farmers or 
investors sparked life-and-death struggles (Borras & Franco, 2013; Tsegaye, 2015). In 
Ethiopia, preliminary evidence is emerging. For example, Maru & Rutten (2015) explored 
how commercialization of farms on large-scale basis adversely affected local people in 
Oromia region while Tsegaye (2015) put his preliminary observation in the Benishangul-
Gumuz region. However, contributions made so far in Ethiopia or elsewhere, approached 
interactions in large-scale land acquisition unidirectionally. That is, the reaction of local 
populations towards the commercial land acquisition, focusing on ‘reactions from below’, i.e., 
missing the ‘cooperation’ component (Borras & Franco, 2013). However, there could be a 
collaboration between commercial farmers and local people which probably results in positive 
outcomes, for example in the case of win-win (Azadi et al., 2013) and inclusive land deal 
conceptual scenarios (Dereje et al., 2015). Besides, the types of investor- local people dyadic 
interactions and the factors that underpin them remain unknown. Knowledge about the local 
level interaction between large-scale commercial companies and residents is, therefore, 
necessary for a better understanding of global land deals vis-à-vis local development 
processes. Besides, the contribution of local governance systems (in our case a regional 
constitution) in addressing investor-local people interactions is, therefore, unraveled in 
Chapter 7. 
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7. What is the effect of Large­scale transnational land deals (LSTLDs) upon the livelihood of 
indigenous communities? 
 
Previous studies considered the effects of the large-scale land acquisition on the food security 
status of local people and suggested measures. The World Bank et al.(2010) have argued that 
acquisitions can result in win-win outcomes for hosting countries and investors, provided that 
the inward investment is properly managed. Rosset (2011: 21) proposed ‘genuine agrarian 
reform and sustainable peasant agriculture’ as a solution for confronting land grabbing amid 
the food and climate crises. According to Golay & Biglino (2013), large-scale land 
acquisitions should be examined from the standpoint of a right to food as well as the 
responsible governance of the tenure of land, forest, and fisheries. However, even if inward 
investments may be managed properly, they have less poverty-reduction impact and high 
opportunity cost compared with the alternative uses of land by local communities (De 
Schutter, 2011). In the case of Ethiopia, Lavers (2012a) have reported that expropriation of 
land to investors can unfavorably affect the income and food security status of local people 
yet without quantifying the degree of the impact. The contribution from Maru & Rutten 
(2015) is probably the first attempt to determine the level of impacts that large-scale farming 
has upon local communities’ food security and income levels in the Oromia region, Ethiopia. 
However, the situation in one of the regions (i.e., the Benishangul-Gumuz region) which is 
among the prominent destinations in hosting commercial farms in western Ethiopia has not 
yet explored, and it is the subjects of Chapter 8. 
1.4 The study area 
1.4.1 Ethiopia: location and socioeconomic situation 
Ethiopia is a country located in the Horn of Africa (Figure 1.1) and is recognized as one of the 
fastest growing countries with a total area of 1.14 million km2, of which 45% is arable (EIA, 
2013). With a projected population of 99.4 million in 2015, it has a population density of 87 
persons km-2 and an annual population growth rate of 2.4% (United Nations, 2015). Over the 
period of 2004 – 2014, the country has scored a real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
of 10.9% (MoFED, 2010; World Bank, 2015). Taking the national average population growth 
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of the country into account, the average real GDP growth per capita is 8% per annum. In the 
period of 2000 – 2014, the country’s human development index (HDI) has improved from 
0.284 to 0.442, implying 55.6% increase with an annual increamental rate of 3.21% (UNDP, 
2015).  
 
 
Figure 1.1  Location and altitude map the study area (the Benishangul-Gumuz region) 
 
Especially since 2004/2005, Ethiopia is an economically fast growing country with an 
economic growth performance above the world average and sub-Saharan average according to 
the annual growth in its domestic product (GDP) (Figure 1.2). Next to the services sector, 
agriculture is the second largest contributor to the increase in the GDP in the country followed 
by industry (Figure 1.3), and it is visibly how the economy fluctuates with the performance of 
the agriculture sector. It is also seen that that contribution of agriculture to the growth in GDP 
is on the decline as the service and industry sectors are starting to contribute better. The 
growing national economy of the country is accompanied with a fast growing population of 
Ethiopia which demands further employmennt opportunity (United Nations, 2015). Therefore, 
working on more labour intensive or labour absorbing economic sectors has become 
necessary. The desire to speed up the economic growth of the country and to generate 
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employment opportunities for the growing population were among the key drivers to the 
government of Ethiopia to commercialise large swatches of land. 
 
Figure 1.2  GDP and GDP per capita growth. Computed from World Bank ( 2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3  Sectoral contribution to GDP in Ethiopia. Computed from NBE (2016) 
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1.4.2 The Benishangul-Gumuz region 
1.4.2.1 Location 
The Benishangul-Gumz region of Ethiopia is the case study region for the dissertation. It is a 
low-lying peripheral region, located between the plateau of Injibara, i.e., the western 
escarpment of the Ethiopian highlands, and the Sudanese and South-Sudanese borders; 
approximately between 11°00’ – 11°30’N and 35°30’ – 36°00’E (Figure 1.1). The region is 
one of the nine regional states which was established in 1995 according to the federal 
constitution of Ethiopia (GoE, 1995). 
1.4.2.2 Climate and topography 
The average annual rainfall of the region is 1280 mm but varies considerably between 800 – 
2000 mm. The summer rainfall (July-September) accounts for the 85% of the annual 
precipitation. Each with an average monthly maximum temperature of 32 °C and average 
monthly minimum temperature of 17 °C, February, March, and April are the hottest months 
of the year in the region. July and August are colder months both of which with an average 
monthly maximum temperature of 25 °C and mean monthly minimum temperature of 15 °C. 
November is characterised by its lowest monthly average minimum temperature of 14 °C 
though its mean monthly maximum temperature is 27°C. Agro-ecologically, the Benishangul-
Gumuz region is divided into lowlands (kola), covering about 75% with altitude below 1500 
m a.s.l., midland (woina dega), about 24% of the region with 1,500-2,500 m a.s.l. and high 
land (dega) about 1% with altitude above 2,500 m a.s.l. Temperature reaches a daily 
maximum of 20 °C to 25 °C in the rainy season and rises to 35 °C to 41°C in the dry season. 
The daily minimum temperatures range from 12 °C to 20 °C, depending on altitude and 
season. 
 
Topographically, the area consists of areas 580-3,131 meters above sea level (m a.s.l.), and it 
is predominantly lowland. There are few mountainous terrains such as the Belaya and 
Dangure mountains. Among the Ethiopian great rivers, four of them namely the Blue Nile, 
Beles, Dabus, and Didesa cross the region. Kuls (1962) noticed that the area as quite different 
from the highlands which were largely deforested and mostly occupied by bare arable land 
and pasture surfaces, dense savannah woodlands more or less cover the entire lowland closer 
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to Beles river. However, recently vegetation in the area is under severe pressure especially 
following large-scale agro-industrial projects and encroachment (Dereje et al., 2016).  
1.4.2.3 Population 
Several ethnic groups inhabit the region but none of them constitutes more than 50% of its 
overall population. With an estimated area of 50,700 km2 (BoFED, 2011), the Benishangul-
Gumuz region has twenty districts. According to the census in 2007, the regional population 
was 784,345 forming 174, 445 households (CSA, 2010). The regional community groups, 
population size and regional parliamentary seats allotted for each group resided in the 
Benishangul-Gumuz region are summarized in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3 Community groups, population size and regional parliamentary seats allotted for 
each group resided in the Benishangul-Gumuz region 
 
Sources: 1National Population Census Commission (2010); 2Office of the Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional council. Numbers in the brackets indicate percentages. *There is no seat assigned for each 
non-titular ethnic group but seats are assigned aggregately as ‘seats for other ethnic groups’.  
 
According to the regional constitution, there are two groups of communities: the titular and 
the non-titular community (or ethnic) groups; considering the former as ‘native to the region’ 
and others not. Accordingly, while the Bertha, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao, and Komo are titular 
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members of the region, the Amhara, Oromo, Agaw-Awi, Tigrie and many others are non-
titular community groups (GBGR, 2002). 
1.4.2.4 Socio-economic profile 
For ages, shifting cultivation (with a slash and burn practice), subsided with gathering, 
hunting, fishing, and production of honey is the primary livelihood strategy of the indigenous 
communities (Kuls, 1962, Abdussamad, 1995; Dereje et al., 2016). Besides, communities in 
the region engage in traditional gold mining activities and recently some employment is 
generated in commercial farms. Recently, communities have started to practice smallholder 
farming. There are also some communities in the region with full engagement on smallholder 
farming. The Benishangul-Gumuz region is one of the administrative states where most 
dramatic changes are taking place (Lavers, 2012b). Notwithstanding their age-old slash and 
burn land use practices they have started conventional farming methods which are free from 
shifting cultivation. Recently, especially following the acquisition of commercial farmlands 
by investors and the villagization or resettlement program in the region, the communities have 
started a confined and sedentary intensive cultivation. 
 
Among the local communities land resources are communal properties and the rights to access 
them are originated from the clan. For ages, clans were the ultimate or real owners of land 
among the indigenous communities in the region. Within their clan territory, individual clan 
members enjoy possession right over land. They get land to be cleared and cultivated for 2-3 
years, and when a decrease in yield is observed, they leave it fallow for 3-5 years. In such a 
land use process, sometimes clan members may abandon their village temporarily and move 
to a new fertile place within their clan territory. 
 
 As a communally accepted tradition, they do not move to new places indefinitely, rather they 
move and stay for some time and return to their original village which they abandoned and 
left it to regenerate. Within all such moves, though sometimes there is conflict within and 
between clan members, they resolve it through their customary land administration systems. 
The Gumuz also have a superb but almost abandoned culture of alternative (indigenous) 
interethnic conflict resolution techniques, called Tenba. Whenever the Gumuz enter into a 
conflict with Highlanders (Amhara, Oromo, Shinasha, and Agaw), the Gumuz called them-
them all ‘Red’; they involve in another traditional conflict resolution technique called Michu. 
Michu, literally mean friendship, is a historically successful traditional interethnic conflict 
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resolution method which seeks for the establishment of an environment of tolerance and 
mutual understanding. 
1.5 Organization of the dissertation 
The dissertation comprises seven academic papers from which six have either been published 
in international peer-reviewed scientific journals, on review, or submitted. One of the chapters 
(i.e., Chapter 8 ) is under preparation to be submitted to a journal. Each of the papers 
discusses one of the seven previously stated research questions. To assist any reader to go 
through the papers independently of each other, an inevitable overlap may appear in some of 
the chapters regarding basic introductory concepts, literature reviews, and descriptions related 
to study area and methodological designs. Furthermore, bear in mind that the prevalence of 
some differences in abbreviations, spelling, terminology and referencing style reflect the 
preferences of the particular journal where the paper is published or submitted. Schematically, 
the dissertation is organized as follows (Figure 1.6).  
 
 
Figure 1.4  Dissertation outline 
 
Bear in mind also that throughout the dissertation, ‘land deal’ is used interchangeably with 
‘land acquisition’ or ‘land transaction’, ‘companies’ are used interchangeably with ‘investors’ 
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or ‘commercial farmers’, and ‘transnational land deal (TLD)’ refers to ‘large-scale 
transnational land deal (LSTLD)’. 
 
Chapter 2, which is published in Land Use Policy as Dereje et al. (2015), extended the 
stakeholders theory of management to the global governance of transnational land deals. Land 
acquisitions are recommended to occur via inclusive deals that will result in a ‘win-win’ 
outcome (Azadi et al., 2013). Answering key operational questions in this process is 
important, i.e., Who are the key players in the deal? What are their interests? How influential 
are the dealers involved? Land grabbing also highlighted as ‘control grabbing’, which 
presages a grasping ability to control land and the accompanying basic resources to reap 
benefit from holding such resources (Peluso and Lund, 2011; Borras et al., 2012b). 
Understanding the groups of stakeholders and to what extent their interests and power 
influence the deal will aid in formulating inclusive and win-win land deals both in de jure and 
de facto contexts. Investors who acquire land usually enter into land contracts to address their 
strategic business interests and deal strategically, whereas actors on the side of the lessor (i.e., 
local government, local communities, and households) may not have such strategic intent and 
power. Consequently, the need exist to integrate the “power” and “interest” of the dealers in 
acquisition of agricultural land. Extensive review of the scientific literature is carried out both 
in the areas of transnational farm land acquisition and the Stakeholder Theory of Management 
(Freeman, 1984). 
 
In Chapter 3, which is published in Landscape Ecology as Vandergeten et al. (2016), a 
comprehensive investigation is made about the (un)sustainability of ‘transnational land deals’ 
(TLDs). Assessment is carried out from the three dimensions of sustainability, i.e., the ‘social 
acceptability’, ‘economic viability’ and ‘environmental conservation’ of the TLDs have been 
studied. To understand whether and to what extent the TLD is sustainable in each dimension, 
a systematic review was conducted on 73 scientific publications. 
 
Chapter 4, submitted for publication as Dereje et al., 2016a, continues and adds to the features 
of large-scale transnational land acquisition. Which means, how commercial farmland has 
been leased in Ethiopia so far and implications to the dynamics of the conventional 
understanding about north-south transnational land deals? Besides, the demand for large-scale 
land and its supply processes, the pricing, and emerging issues between contracting parties, 
i.e. companies and the government of Ethiopia are investigated. Chapter 5, published in 
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Sustainability (Dereje et al., 2016b), started with how land-related institutional and 
governmental frameworks have shaped the contemporary land governance and land lease 
contracts in Ethiopia. It also adds to the effectiveness of the land lease process regarding 
economic, social, and environmental expectations from agricultural outsourcing. 
 
While chapters 3 to 5 focuses on effects of large-scale transnational land deals from the view 
of sustainability, the subsequent chapters (i.e., chapters 6 to 8) consider the local effects of 
land deals as well as interaction of investors with local people. Chapter 6 which was 
submitted as Dereje et al., 2016c for publication and it concerns about the environmental 
responses to land deals and it is a case study conducted on peak discharge and sediment 
transport of streams. It is a comparative study of catchments with predominantly commercial 
farming and catchments mainly with non-commercial farming. The mission involved in the 
analysis of land use classes, measurement of gullies, suspended sediment sampling (SSS), and 
calibration of suspended sediments in a soil laboratory.  
 
Chapter 7, based on Dereje et al. (2016d) and which is submitted to a journal, explores 
transnational land deals from a regional perspective and investigates investor-local people 
interactions and the factors that underpin them. The empirical analysis utilizes survey data 
from the Benishangul-Gumuz region, a topographically low-lying region of Ethiopia. 
Descriptive statistics and ordinal regression model (ORM) were used to generate results. By 
doing so, the chapter reveals whether commercial farmers are in a collaborative, 
confrontational, disputed, confirmatory or latent relationship with local people. Factors that 
determine investor-local people relationship are explored. Chapter 8, is a working paper and 
to be submitted for publication as Dereje et al. 2016e, analysed the effects of land deals upon 
the income levels and food security status of local/ indigenous communities and stated key 
research issues for further investigation. 
 
Finally, chapter 9, relates the main findings of the previous chapters to the stated seven 
research questions. Furthermore, themes which can be considered for further analysis are 
described. The chapter ends with remarks for policy amendment about land use and 
agricultural investment management in Ethiopia in general and the Benishangul-Gumuz 
region, western Ethiopia in particular. 
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Abstract The literature on global land deals or land acquisition has extensively described the 
possible drivers, trajectories, and their impacts. In addition, the concept of a ‘land grab’ per se 
is heavily contested and viewed as a work in progress. Many have argued on the topic of 
inclusive land deals without addressing which groups of stakeholders are vested with 
particular powers and interests in the deals. After reviewing this phenomena in contemporary 
global land deals and the stakeholder theory of management developed in the 1980s, this 
chapter proposes a conceptual land deal framework. Accordingly, the actors in land deals are 
characterised and disaggregated into seven generic groups, i.e., “inactive”, “discretionary”, 
“exigent”, “dominant”, “dangerous”, “dependent”, and “definitive”. The chapter concluded 
that to address the governance challenges in land deals, a need exists to resolve 
conceptualisation deficiencies related to inclusive land deal frameworks. Thus, this work 
suggests that extending the stakeholder theory of management to the global governance of 
transnational land acquisition can significantly aid in resolving conceptualisation limitations 
for inclusive transnational land deals. Hence, a new inclusive land deal framework was 
developed that attempts to integrate the biophysical environment, stakeholders, governance, 
and institutions. Furthermore, this chapter recommends that contextualisation of the suggested 
“land deal power-interest clustering (LD-PIC)” and “legitimacy-interest-power (LIP)” 
frameworks to those already signed and ongoing land deals using real-world data is a timely 
concern. 
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2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Large-scale agricultural land acquisitions 
Following the food and fuel price spikes in 2007-2008, a global interest in farmlands has 
arisen. As a result, transnational land acquisitions have gained the attention of governments, 
international development institutions, media, and non-governmental organisations in recent 
years. Aspirations for capital export, demands by food importing nations to secure reliable 
supplies of food, an increasing desire for alternative sources of energy, and land speculation 
are among the factors that contributed to the increase of agricultural production (GRAIN, 
2008; Cotula et al., 2009; Anseeuw et al., 2012; Borras et al., 2012a). 
 
De Schutter (2011) and Azadi et al. (2013) restated the reasons behind large-scale land 
acquisitions as: (a) a rush towards alternative fuel energy extraction from agro-fuels for which 
developed countries have encouraged transnational land acquisitions, (b) increasing 
population and urbanisation accompanied by the collection of natural resource bases in certain 
countries, (c) access to freshwater (a scarce resource), (d) rising demand for raw materials 
from tropical countries (primarily fibre, wood, etc.), (e) the increasing need among companies 
in the developed world to earn certified emission reduction credits from carbon storage 
projects, and (f) continued speculation on the future market prices of farmland, regardless of 
location.  
 
Large-scale agricultural land acquisitions have repeatedly raised ‘land-grab’ concerns and 
have resulted in the destruction of natural ecosystems and displacement of local communities 
(FAO, 2009; Deininger et al., 2011; Cotula, 2011; Azadi et al., 2013). Although the 
contemporary views on large-scale agricultural land acquisitions are contested, many of the 
arguments revolve around the disputed and evolving concept of ‘land grabbing’. Many have 
argued that ‘land grabs’ target large-scale acquisition of land in Africa, Central America, and 
South and East Asia (Cotula et al., 2009; Desalegn, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2012). Others 
argue that the geographic scope of land grabbing is not only confined to the stated regions but 
also extends to such areas as the previous Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Melanesia, Australia, and New Zealand (Visser and Spoor, 
2011; Anseeuw et al., 2012). According to Amanor (2012), the acquisition of land extends 
beyond the phenomenon of global ‘land grabbing’ to the consolidation of power over the 
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trans-regional value chain in particular and a component of the global ‘mission’ to control 
food and biofuel supply chains. Others (e.g., Harvey, 2003) have conceptualised transnational 
land acquisitions within the widely evolving global capitalist development framework and the 
distinct relationships among political economies working towards the confrontation of 
converging global crises in food, energy, financial capital, and climate change (Hall, 2011; 
White et al., 2012). Furthermore, land acquisition is considered a component of the combined 
outcome of globalisation, the international upsurge in foreign direct investment (FDI), and the 
liberalisation of land markets (Zoomers, 2010). 
 
Land acquisitions are recommended to occur via inclusive deals that will result in a ‘win-win’ 
outcome (Azadi et al., 2013). Answering key operational questions in this process is 
important, i.e., Who are the players in the deal? What are their interests? How influential are 
the dealers involved? Without at least modest answers to such questions, merely advocating 
‘win-win’ land deals may not result in an actual ‘win-win’ situation. Land grabbing also 
highlighted as ‘control grabbing’, which presages a grasping ability to control land and the 
accompanying basic resources to reap benefit from holding such resources (Peluso and Lund, 
2011; Borras et al., 2012b). This outcome is one of the manifestations of control grabbing, 
implying seizure of large tracts of agriculturally sound land, land grab, water grab/seizure of 
water (re)sources (Ganho 2011; Kay and Franco 2012) and green grabs/seizure of resources 
for the purpose of the natural environment (Fairhead et al., 2012). Understanding the groups 
of stakeholders and to what extent their interests and power influence the deal will aid in 
formulating inclusive and win-win land deals both in de jure and de facto contexts. Lessees 
who acquire land usually enter into land contracts to address their strategic business interests 
and deal strategically, whereas actors on the side of the lessor (i.e., local government, local 
communities, and households) may not have such strategic intent and power. Consequently, 
the need exist to integrate the “power” and “interest” of the dealers in acquisition of 
agricultural land.  
 
This chapter first reviews the contested and evolving explanations offered for ‘land 
acquisition’ and methodologies for global land acquisition, land deals, or land grabs. Second, 
this work proposes the adaptation of strategic management theories, particularly the 
stakeholder theory of strategic management, to devise tools that are essential for responsible 
global governance of transnational land acquisition. This proposal attempts to develop two 
inclusive conceptual land deal frameworks, i.e., “land deal power-interest clustering (LD-
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PIC)” and “legitimacy-interest-power (LIP)”. In addition, this approach proposes the creation 
and advancement of tripartite modelling of transnational land based on the power and 
legitimacy of the actors and the urgency of the needs that each actor strives to fulfil. Finally, 
this chapter suggests issues for further review and data-based investigation. In short, this work 
attempts to contribute to the ongoing debates on how to ensure that global agricultural land 
acquisition is a more ethical and responsible investment and how to establish the power of 
local governance and local communities within the global land deal framework. Throughout 
this chapter, the word “actor” is used interchangeably with “stakeholder”. 
2.1.2 Land grabbing: Contested and ‘‘work-in-progress’’ definitions 
 According to a large body of literature, there is a propensity for referring to transnational land 
acquisitions as ‘land-grabbing’ without setting a comprehensive definition for this term. What 
is ‘land grabbing?’ The contested yet most commonly applied definition of land grabbing is 
large-scale farm land acquisition for agricultural production by non-local or foreign investors, 
whether through lease or purchase arrangements (GRAIN, 2008; Cotula et al., 2009; Daniel, 
2009). According to Borras and Franco (2010), the term ‘land grabbing’ was preferably stated 
as ‘transnational commercial land transactions’ because the concept includes both domestic 
and transnational deals, underscoring the commercialisation feature of transactions 
irrespective of the size and markets for production outputs. In contrast, Graham et al. (2011) 
described ‘land grabbing’ as controlling and/or possessing land for commercial or industrial 
agricultural production that is not proportionate in size compared with the mean landholding 
in a given area, country, or region. 
 
According to Hall (2011), the phrase ‘land grabbing’ is activist terminology that conceals 
larger legitimate or structural differences and the broad impacts of commercial land 
transactions among beneficiaries, elites, government officers, partners of different powers, 
and various intermediaries. FAO-funded studies on land grabs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean arguably stated the definition of land grabbing. Accordingly, land acquisitions are 
considered as land grabs if three conditions exist in the deals: (a) the size of the deal is 
sufficiently large with a commonly accepted threshold of one thousand hectares per deal; (b) 
the need exists for direct participation of foreign governments/companies, and (c) investment 
on the newly acquired land is expected to have a negative impact on the food security status 
of the host country (Borras et al., 2012a, b). 
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The majority of the literature labels and characterises transnational land acquisition as ‘land 
grabbing’. The characterisation of ‘land grabbing’ is also notably (food) crisis-centred and 
farmland-centred as well as heavily centred on emerging players of global regimes (i.e., 
China, India, South Korea, and the Gulf states) and excessively centred on land acquisitions 
in Africa. For instance, in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean region, initiatives for 
food security, ventures for energy security, emerging strategies for mitigating climate change, 
and promising trajectories for global capital mobilisation are considered as the four key 
mechanisms of land acquisition. Land acquisition in Latin America and the Caribbean is 
characterised by its intra-regional nature, i.e., many of the companies that acquired land are 
Latin-based and are allied with central state and international capital sources (Borras et al., 
2012b). Consequently, it is important to proceed broadly from the (food)-crisis-centred 
definition of land grabbing, but it is also important not to define it too broadly. This statement 
leads us to address the distinct features of contemporary transnational land acquisition. 
 
According to Mehta et al. (2012), water is both the target and driver of large-scale land 
acquisition because its hydraulic complexity poses a challenge in describing the entire process 
of water grabbing and its associated impacts on the environment and different social groups. 
This group defined water grabbing as ‘a situation where powerful actors are able to take 
control of, or reallocate to their own benefits, water resources already used by local 
communities or feeding aquatic ecosystems on which their livelihoods are based’ (Mehta et 
al., 2012: 197). However, it is quite difficult to determine the effects of water re-allocations, 
particularly due to inter-annual variability and surface water-ground water interactions. The 
absence of meaningful institutional linkages between water and land management has eased 
‘encroachment’ of the two resources. The existing ambiguous processes of global land and 
water governance have intensified local-level complexities and uncertainties whereby the 
powerful actors in deals can maximise their interests through such complexities and 
uncertainties to the extent of expelling poor and marginalised people (Franco et al., 2013).  
 
The size or scale of land acquired is one of the points of controversy in conceptualising and 
reframing ‘land grabbing’. Deininger et al. (2011), Oxfam International (2011), and Anseeuw 
et al. (2012) couched this scale as ‘large-scale land acquisition’, implying deals greater than 
1000 hectares. However, in the work of Borras et al. (2012b), land grabbing involves large-
scale land deals in two broadly interlinked but distinct dimensions of the size of land 
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transacted and/or the amount of capital entailed. In addition to the size of land in deals, the 
amount of capital involved is considered in (re)defining land grabbing, a definition that is 
labelled as ‘land measurement-oriented accounting’ of farm land acquisition. For example, the 
figures stated are 80 million hectares in Anseeuw et al. (2012), 227 million hectares in Oxfam 
International (2011), and 45 million hectares in Deininger et al. (2011). None of these entities 
have stated a comprehensive threshold of capital that could be used to define land grabbing.  
 
To summarise, transnational land acquisition has passed through an evolving definition and 
conceptualisation in the literature. Many authors preferred that these phenomena were 
referred to as ‘land grabbing’, a much debatable notion per se, whereas others considered this 
expression to be ‘activist’ terminology. Few works in the literature have set preconditions or 
criteria for labelling transnational land acquisition as ‘land grabbing’. Certain of the criteria 
considered are the size of the land in the deal, the level of participation of foreign actors, and 
the size of capital investment, although a threshold for the “size” of capital has not been 
stated. The concept is further extended to include other resources (i.e., water) and hence is 
known as ‘water and land grabbing’. The redefinition and (re) conceptualisation of these 
terms are pursued in the concept of acquiring land on transnational basis. 
2.2 Method and Theory 
2.2.1 Methodologies for understanding global land deals 
‘Land grabbing’ is a hot socio-political issue throughout the world and ‘getting the facts right’ 
is crucially important. To do so, it is highly important to devise effective methodologies. 
Although several global efforts have been carried out to aggregate data on land deals and 
characterise these transactions, all have struggled with methodology (Edelman, 2013; Oya, 
2013a, b; Thaler, 2013; Rulli & D'Odorico, 2013a,b; Scoones et al., 2013a). The literature has 
identified immense uncertainty with respect to what is counted and questioned the methods 
used to aggregate ‘land grabs’, and hence, the need exists for development of the second 
phase of land deal/’land grab’ research by abandoning the aim of solely deriving aggregate 
amounts of land deals (Rulli & D'Odorico 2013a,b; Scoones et al., 2013a).  
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In their discussion on the ‘politics of evidence’, Scoones et al. (2013a, b) argued for a second 
phase of land grab research that is free from imprecise calculations and addresses important 
questions, i.e., what is actually occurring on the ground, who are the losers and winners, and 
why. Research that can extend beyond the fixation on ‘killer facts’ (i.e., those unproven grab 
numbers) and can provide statements accompanied with traceable datasets is sorely needed 
(Scoones et al., 2013b). In addition to the type and frequency of data collection, the question 
of ‘what type of evidence is appropriate?’ is one of the long-running methodological points of 
debate in the global land deal discourse (Scoones et al., 2013a), and researchers must think 
beyond qualitative versus quantitative debate. Although mixed methods/approaches are duly 
acknowledged, general rethinking of the form, reliability, medium for collection, and 
portrayal of evidence is required. Researchers must share their data in a transparent manner, 
become accountable for their findings, reach out to different audiences, and facilitate dialogue 
and debate among concerned parties (Edelman et al., 2013; Scoones et al., 2013).  
2.2.2 Extending the Stakeholder Theory to land use 
Extensive review of the scientific literature is carried out both in the areas of transnational 
farm land acquisition and the Stakeholder Theory of Management (Freeman, 1984). The 
parties involved in both the substantial and procedural matters of transnational land deals are 
explored and categorised by extending the stakeholder theory of management to land use. 
Conceptual limitations of the usual land deal framework are identified, and points of 
improvement are solicited such that the customary binary ‘win-win’ land deal framework can 
be rejuvenated as a multifaceted ‘inclusive’ land deal framework. Stakeholder theory attempts 
to address morals and values in the operation of strategically driven investment ventures and 
was initially described in Freeman's (1984) work of ‘Strategic Management: A Stakeholder 
Approach’, which was followed by a number of publications in academic, research, and 
governance areas (Donaldson et al., 1995; Friedman and Miles, 2002; Jonker and Foster, 
2002).  
 
The stakeholder theory was extended from an intra-organisational and stockholder (i.e., 
shareholder) framework to a framework of participatory planning and decision-making 
framework in other areas, i.e., corporate social responsibility (Clarkson, 1995; Hillman, 
2001), ethics (Agle et al., 1999), information communication technology (ICT) (Pouloudi, 
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1999), environmental management (Jonker and Foster, 2002), academics and education sector 
management (McDermott and Chan 1996; Miles, 2011; 2012), public policy (Snider et al., 
2003), management of construction projects (Bourne and Walker, 2005), health (Lim et al., 
2005), and public works procurement (Austen et al., 2006). Continuing the thread to the 
contemporary challenge of global governance of land grabbing (Borras et al., 2013), we 
introduce the application of the stakeholder theory in explaining the diverse stakeholders in a 
land deal. 
 
In line with the power that transnational companies wield together with the powers of other 
stakeholders, these companies (as in any type of business ventures) apply their own strategic 
techniques in pursuing their own business interests and affiliation. One of the most important 
requirements that should be considered during the business strategy-making process for 
companies is their ability to identify intra-institutional success factors. By the same token, in 
the age of global land grabbing, companies are involved in the transnational acquisition of 
farmlands, but land has a number of competing functions. The influence of other stakeholders, 
(i.e., government, local communities, international community, elites and researchers, 
political parties, etc.) is quite noticeable. In line with Mitchell et al. (1997), it is essential to 
cultivate a comprehensive mindset if a win-win transnational land deal is to be established. 
Inclusive understanding of the key actors and players and successively taking into account 
their interests and power bases aids in maintaining the efficacy of handling and managing the 
competitive interests of land use among competing stakeholders with different abilities to 
influence land deals. 
 
Each party in a land deal has a unique set of stakeholder(s) with which to work and likely a 
unique or similar set of reactions to a particular set of land use propositions. It is a tradition of 
land-seeking transnational companies to pay due attention to such stakeholders’ interests 
(Mason et al., 2007). Companies use their own tactical measures to influence land deals and 
maintain long-term viability of earnings while strengthening their power through their 
investment operations. According to McMichael (2013) and Araghi (2003), transnational 
acquisition of land is considered as “security mercantilism in international relations” through 
which current food regime power restructuring is manifested within its global economic, 
political, and social coordinates.  
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2.3 Results and Discussion 
2.3.1 The land deal power-interest clustering (LD-PIC) framework 
Understanding competing interpretations and political views without a comprehensive land 
deal framework to incorporate the diversified interests of land use and powers of stakeholders 
is a major challenge (Borras et al., 2013; Margulis et al., 2013). The indispensable role of 
strategic management tools in mapping possible power-interest combinations is crucial to the 
prevailing multi-polar governance challenges of transnational land grabbing. Consequently, 
we described the relevance of the ‘power-interest grid’, a conceptual map that disaggregates 
the stakeholders, their vested power, and the magnitude of interests they are likely to reflect 
(James et al., 1986; Freeman, 1994; Agle et al., 1999; Ackermann and Eden, 2003) (Figure 
2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1  Land deal power-interest clustering (LD-PIC) framework 
(Adapted from the strategic management literature by James et al., 1986; Freeman, 1994; 
Mitchell et al., 1997; Ackermann and Eden, 2003) 
 
This tool is supportive in narrowing down a large number of conceivable stakeholders to a 
manageable array with which to set the foundation for a win-win land deal. Focusing on the 
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key actors or stakeholders with substantive procedural matters for win-win land deals is 
analogous to effective stakeholder management strategic deliverables. The LD-PIC is useful 
in classifying land deal stakeholders that take on central actor roles by supporting or 
sabotaging the intent of win-win land deals. 
 
For example, in the strategic management literature, Rowley (1997) and (Bronn, 2003) 
constructed aggregations of stakeholders into ‘actors’ or ‘parties’ (i.e., those context setters, 
players, and ‘stakeholders’ who are neither context setters nor players but other groups who 
have a stake in the deal or process). The LD-PIC framework can be described as one of the 
possible extensions of the Stakeholder Theory and attempts to explain and forecast multi-
agent or organisational functions with respect to stakeholder influences in the contemporary 
era of global ‘land grabbing’ or transnational land acquisition. Although confusion often 
occurs relative to the theory itself, adaptation of the stated theory to real-world scenarios is 
important in developing platforms for issues that contain many interests and stakeholders with 
diverse interests and disparities of power (Miles, 2011). 
 
An understanding the position and power of different stakeholders in land deals plays a 
crucial role in ensuring the accountability of companies that acquire land globally (Cotula, 
2011). Power is the potential for obtaining a desired result in relationships in which there are 
competing or opposite interests (Winkler, 2009). Although a party in a deal may hold power 
at a certain time, this does not necessarily mean that it holds that power indefinitely over time 
and space. This statement does not imply that there might not be changes in power throughout 
a given relationship (Elkin, 2007). Power also can be conceptualised as the ability of a 
stakeholder to exert influence on its survival (or interests) based on the ownership of and/or 
access to relevant resources (Winkler, 2009). However, interest is the aspiration or a feeling 
of wanting to be considered or wanting to take part in a valuable process (in this case, land 
and its accompanying resources), although selected works in the literature have labelled this 
as ‘urgency’ (Agle et al., 1999). Furthermore, amalgamating the power and interest of 
stakeholders with their degrees of legitimacy is important in analyzing the stakeholders in a 
land deal in a more comprehensive manner.  
 
Legitimacy is a generalised assumption or a perception that the actions of a party or 
stakeholder are appropriate, desirable, or proper within a given socially constructed system of 
beliefs, definitions, norms, and values. Legitimacy determines whether a land use claimant or 
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stakeholder is proper, desirable, or suitable to the social beliefs, norms, and values used in the 
given context. It is also argued that the legitimacy of a stakeholder is granted by a given 
society (Agle et al., 1999). 
 
2.3.1.1 Low power/high interest cluster: The ‘Objects’ 
Parties or stakeholders with comparably low power but high interest can be categorised as 
‘Objects’. These entities are positioned with high interest, which could be positive or negative 
depending on their reason for existence (i.e., mission) and vision. In the conventional business 
world, mapping of all stakeholders is a strategic business prerequisite. Accordingly, this 
process selects appropriate approaches to meet unilateral or bilateral interests. To this end, the 
‘Objects’ cluster constitutes the ‘keep them informed’ group, a group that has a high interest 
in the actions of the companies but holds relatively low power and requires much 
communication work from the ‘players’ group (James et al., 1986; Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Local communities which are losers of most of the land deals are usually under this group. 
 
Due to their low power, these groups play a passive role in a land deal, and hence we refer to 
them as the ‘Objects’, although they are referred to as ‘Subjects’ in much of the strategic 
management literature (ibid). However, companies are not complacent, and the aggregated 
effect of many disgruntled stakeholders can grow. In a similar analogy, to incorporate or 
consider such parties in transnational land acquisitions and work for an Inclusive Land Deal 
(ILD) arrangement, it is crucial to encourage coalitions to increase the power of the members 
of this group and engage them in the deal (Bernal, 2011).  
 
A number of land deal cases have resulted in highly displeased stakeholders, and many of 
these situations are characterised by bi-lateral land deals that neglected a number of pertinent 
actors who were actually ‘powerless’. For instance, the acquisition of land by Dominion 
Farms (a Texas-based company) in Western Kenya resulted in conflicting land rights and land 
use, and Dominion farms was subjected to many critical investigations and reviews (FIAN 
International, 2010; Galaty, 2012). In 2003, an agreement was made between Dominion and 
the county councils ‘to develop’ 17,000 hectares of swampland adjacent to Lake Victoria for 
the duration of 25 years with a possible extension period. During the deal, local community 
members who used the land for pasture, fishing, and crop production (especially during the 
dry season) were not considered and were treated only as ‘subjects’ in the deal and received 
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communication later in the process through local religious channels. The company followed 
legal procedures and negotiated with trustees, although there was severe resistance against the 
agreement from local community groups (Ochieng, 2011).  
 
Despite the fact that many blame the company for ‘grabbing’ the land, which has livelihood 
importance for the local community, others named the government as a responsible ‘player’ in 
the deal. A number of land use conflicts and fears resulted from this non-inclusive land deal, 
and the company has invested significant resources to settle local grievances, disputes, and 
court cases. Furthermore, an unusually long ranging conflict has occurred between local 
country councils on the subject of sharing the amount of land between the residents and the 
company (Anseeuw et al., 2012). However, local community groups were supported by 
different stakeholders and became relatively powerful in pursuing cases against the relevant 
institutions for settlement. If the company had passed through the appropriate steps of 
identification and inclusion of all relevant stakeholders together with their varied interests and 
power from the beginning of the deal, all of those conflicts might not have occurred. Despite 
the fact that the Texas-based company faced all these challenges in Kenya, it expanded its 
operation into the Taraba state of Nigeria and Liberia, where it succeeded in acquiring 30,000 
hectares and 17,000 hectares of land, respectively, with state backing and ‘context setting’ 
(GRAIN, 2012).  
2.3.1.2 High power/high interest cluster: The ‘Players’ 
Stakeholders or parties with high power and high interest are categorised as ‘players’. These 
parties are the key actors in land deals who receive much attention from the ‘Leaders and 
context setters’ group. In many land deals, due focus is given to this group, followed by the 
‘leader and context setters’ cluster. The literature states that ‘players’ in a deal may 
deliberately act via sabotage to fulfil their strategic aspirations, although their success or 
failure is meaningfully affected by the behaviour, position, and strategic interest of the 
‘leaders and context setters’ (Donaldson et al., 1995). Using their high power and high 
interest, the genuine role of ‘players’ in transnational land acquisitions is to influence dealers 
to adhere to the recommended guidelines of corporate social responsibility and integration of 
environmental and social governance standards. Although the state is usually invoked as a key 
player in land acquisition, Wolford and Borras (2013) argued that states never function with 
the same voice, and hence unbundling of the state is argued as helpful in viewing government 
and governance as people, processes, and relationships.  
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Among those real-world cases, in 2008, the Swiss-based energy company Addax Bioenergy 
obtained 14,300 hectares of land in the form of long-term lease agreements for 50 years in 
central Sierra Leone. An agreement was made to produce bioenergy (i.e., ethanol) for export 
to Europe and generation of electric power for the local energy market (for energy users in 
Sierra Leone). To meet its business objective, the company reached an agreement with a 
number of powerful and interested ‘players’ in acquiring the African land. The African 
Development Bank (AfDB), the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO), the 
UK-based emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF), the German Development Finance 
Institution (DEG), the Belgian Development Bank (BIO), the South African Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC), and Cordiant managed the ICF Debt Pool to provide the 
company a debt financing agreement of €142 million. Furthermore, Swedfund (the Swedish 
Development Fund) and the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO) joined the 
company as shareholders, elevating the overall size of the investment to an estimated €267 
million (Addax Bioenergy, 2012). However, the other Swiss-based investigation group of 
Brot für Alle carried out a basic analysis of Addax’s operations and exposed that the company 
would reap a return of US$53 million per year, which is close to 98% of the value added by 
the company’s operations.  
 
Those stakeholders who hold high power and high interest in a deal do have high bargaining 
power, which leads them consciously or unconsciously into a suppressive and exploitative 
transaction. For example, relative to the Addax company case, its low-paid employees 
(approximately 2000) would receive only 2% of the value-added, and the owners of the land 
leased by Addax would receive approximately 0.2% of the added value. Thus, the company 
provides less than US$1 per month for each person affected by its operations or projects, 
according to a similar recent report by GRAIN (2012). Furthermore, the Government of Sierra 
Leone acted as the prominent supporter of the community resettlement plan developed by 
Addax for expansion of its sugar cane plantations.  
2.3.1.3 High power/low interest cluster: The ‘Leaders and context setters’ 
The composition of stakeholders that can influence the overall context of a deal could be 
contextualised as the ‘leaders and context setters’ cluster. Parties or stakeholders in this group 
must be assured with a ‘keep them satisfied’ tactical endeavour for the ‘players’ to fulfil their 
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desired investment interests (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Gardner et al., 1986). A number 
of real-world cases can be classified into this group and are described as follows.  
 
The World Bank: The World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency supplied a 
company, i.e., Chayton Capital, with US$50 million for political risk insurance in farm 
holdings in Botswana and Zambia (GRAIN, 2012). The World Bank advocates ‘nine billion 
reasons’ to invest in agriculture. Furthermore, in 2012, the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), which is the World Bank’s private sector component, invested US$4.2 billion in large- 
and small-scale agribusiness and forestry enterprises engaged in growing food and fibre, 
which were expected to employ workers and assist in feeding the world (World Bank Group 
on Land and Food Security, 2012). However, although the World Bank is blamed for its 
support for ‘land grabbers’ and for dealing with the national governments of developing 
countries (as ‘context setters’), it has rejected this blame. For instance, the World Bank has 
rejected Oxfam’s call to suspend its involvement in large-scale transnational land acquisition 
in developing countries, particularly that of Africa (World Bank, 2012): ‘A moratorium 
focused on the Bank Group targets precisely those stakeholders doing the most to improve 
practices – progressive governments, investors, and us. Taking such a step would do nothing 
to help reduce the instances of abusive practices and would likely deter responsible investors 
willing to apply our high standards,’ The World Bank has officially replied (p. 4). Payne and 
Murrin's UK company, which began operating their African Agricultural Land Fund in 2007, 
acquired 30,000 ha of land in Mozambique and other African countries with support from the 
Toronto Dominion Bank of Canada and the ISA endowment fund of Vanderbilt University 
(GRAIN, 2012).  
 
The European Union: The European Union supports ‘pro-land deal’ policies. For instance, the 
EU’s ‘Everything but Arms (EBA) trade policy’ is an agreement stating that imports to the EU 
from the least developed countries are freed from any restriction or duty, except for 
ammunitions and arms (European Commission, 2000). This component of the EU’s trade 
policy was formulated with the intention of supporting developing countries; however, this 
policy could also indirectly encourage ‘land grabbing’. Companies in Europe and other 
countries will go to developing states such as Ethiopia and acquire cheap land, cheap 
investments, and trade licenses and will ultimately benefit from the EU’s ‘Everything but 
Arms (EBA)’ import policy. It is a public fact that many companies from the EU member 
countries, e.g., Dutch and German companies, have acquired large amounts of land in 
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Ethiopia by dismantling local communities who have lived on ‘their’ land for hundreds of 
years. In contrast, the governments of developing countries argue that local communities are 
dislocated for the good reason of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and not ‘land 
grabbing’. This policy encourages agricultural land acquisition by European, Arab, Chinese, 
and Indian profit-oriented companies to rush for large-scale agricultural lands in developing 
countries in the global South (Transnational Institute, 2012).  
 
The case of the EU’s international investment policy: In bilateral investment treaties, the EU’s 
investment policy constitutes such terms as ‘stabilisation’, which are intended to immunise 
European companies from any changes made to the laws of the host countries, i.e., developing 
countries (European Commission, 2006). Accordingly, European companies are encouraged 
and even have fundamental power to influence the state laws of host countries.  
 
The case of the EU’s renewable energy directive: The EU has declared that by the year 2020, 
the share of renewable energy consumption in the EU will be increased; one example is 
biofuel (European Commission, 2012). With policies of such types, we argue that the EU and 
related institutions in other intergovernmental and regional organisations are among those 
actors or “context setters” who intentionally and/or unintentionally set favourable contexts for 
companies and other actors to acquire cheap land in developing countries.  
2.3.1.4 Low power/low interest cluster: The ‘Crowd’ 
The ‘crowd’ cluster constitutes stakeholders with low interest in a deal combined with low 
power to influence the deal. The ‘crowd’ is a group that constitutes those stakeholders who 
have little impact on the process of land acquisition. For the ‘crowd’, substantive and 
procedural factors might apply that result in their possession of low power and interest in the 
land. For instance, factors such as availability of smallholder local development schemes, 
direct or indirect control of local administrative institutions, land tenure arrangements, the 
location pattern of investments and villages, informal land transactions, etc. are among the 
factors that could result in certain local people with low power and interest at a given time 
(McCarthy, 2010). The cluster constitutes the ‘minimal effort’ strategic wing of companies in 
designing their competitive business schemes, thus requiring minimal investment to win the 
interest of these groups (Mitchell et al., 1997; Bernal, 2011). These actors can be treated as 
potential rather than actual stakeholders in a land deal, and it may be necessary to raise their 
interest in the case of long-run land deals or acquisitions over a longer period of time. The 
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‘crowd’ is the group or cluster of stakeholders who, at this stage, do not pose significant land-
deal-related issues that require further discussions compared with the other groups in the land 
deal power-interest clustering (LD-PIC) framework.  
 
Most non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations, certain of the local 
administrative structures, members of district or provincial legislatures, and members of 
parliament in the recipient communities of land deals are reasonably categorised in this group. 
Others, particularly those with high power, receive much attention in many of the 
contemporary land deals that occur in many developing countries. The strategy used to build 
capacity, generate interest, raise awareness, and communicate the ground-level perceived 
effects of investments plays a vital role in ensuring that this group is reactively responsive to 
non-inclusive land deals (UNCHS, 2001). However, the low level of interest and lower power 
of this group might change rapidly due to institutional, policy, governance, or demographic 
changes over time.  
2.3.2 Legitimacy, interest, and power of the land deal framework 
Disaggregation of the concept of ‘stakeholder’ (an overused term in the transnational land 
deal literature) into a meaningful classification is an important step. A good point of departure 
in this case is the power, legitimacy, and urgency or salience model (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
This model clusters stakeholders according to business corporate performance and managerial 
values from which the legitimacy, interest, and power (LIP) modelling of parties in land deals 
can be reframed (Figure 2.2). The term is further extended into subcategories of potential 
actors in a land deal described as latent, discretionary, dependent, exigent, dominant, 
dangerous, and definitive. 
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Figure 2.2  Legitimacy-interest-power (LIP) land deal framework 
 (Adapted from Mitchell et al, 1997) 
 
Inactive stakeholders hold the power to enforce their interests over others, yet they lack 
urgency and legitimacy, and hence, their power to influence deals and acquisitions remains 
dormant. Discretionary stakeholders have the legitimacy to present claims in a deal, but they 
are not interested in doing so primarily because they likely lack power or other contextual 
explanations. The exigent sub-group constitutes stakeholders with urgent claims, yet they 
have neither legitimacy nor power to enforce them in a deal. Dominant stakeholders are those 
with legitimate claims and power to influence a deal as well as resource entitlement that allow 
them to wield a stronger influence in a deal. Parties with power and interest but no legitimacy 
are strategically known as ‘dangerous’ stakeholders because they may opt for coercion or 
violence if they are not appropriately engaged in a deal or dissatisfied with the consequences 
of the deal. Dependent stakeholders do not have power, although they have interest and hold 
legitimate claims in a deal. If the power of this group is improved through different capacity-
building schemes, they can easily negotiate with other stakeholders and influence a deal or 
resource acquisition. Finally, definitive stakeholders hold the power and legitimacy to push 
their interests in a deal. The important questions are states as follows: Who are those three 
broader groups and the seven distinct clusters of stakeholders in a given land deal made in a 
certain country, region, or location? Who lacks legitimacy, interest, or power in the deal? 
What should be done and for whom such that land deals and acquisitions will end not only in 
a win­win outcome but also inclusive decisions?  
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Parties or stakeholders that exhibit only one of the three characteristics (stakeholders 
numbered 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 2.2) might be re-categorised as latent stakeholders in such 
sub-classifications as inactive, discretionary or exigent/demanding with analogies to the 
upper-level classification. Stakeholders who display two of the three characteristics (those 
numbered 4, 5, and 6) are categorically expectant stakeholders known as dominant, 
‘dangerous’, or dependent, respectively. Those parties or stakeholders who are interested in 
the subject(s) in a deal, have the power to influence the deal, and hold legitimacy in the deal 
and its related matters are definitive stakeholders. A key issue in many of these discourses is 
the maintenance of an appropriate triangulated balance among the tripartite elements of 
legitimacy, interest, and power.  
 
An inclusive land deal (ILD) is envisioned to further address the economic, ethical, legal, and 
discretionary responsibilities or matters embedded in the different stakeholder groups and 
sub-groups explained thus far. Economic inclusiveness: The ‘profitability of the deals’ or 
businesses following the land acquisition should seek to generate acceptable benefit or return 
for the acquired land. Ethical inclusiveness: Responsibility exists in a land deal to cooperate 
in policies that are fair, just, and right, and refrain from harm, i.e., the duty to choose wisely 
among several alternative uses of land and/or accompanied resources. Legal inclusiveness: 
This category includes ‘the legal contexts of the deals’, which involves obeying the pertinent 
laws that codify right and wrong. Discretional inclusiveness: Companies and others who 
acquire land are expected to act as good (corporate) bodies by deploying their resources for 
the improvement of other stakeholders’ well-being and quality of life, e.g., devoting resources 
to improving the livelihood of local communities.  
2.3.3 From ‘win-win’ to an inclusive land deal framework 
The governance of transnational land acquisition becomes a challenge in a changing 
international agricultural context with competing political perspectives and strategies, making 
the existing governance landscape more complicated (Borras et al., 2013). Land acquisitions 
can pose major threats to the livelihood of family farming and the rural poor that are 
ultimately disadvantageous to countries that supply land and therefore cast criticism on such 
commercial land deals (Bues, 2011). However, certain factions believe that such investments 
should not be generally condemned. Many investors who obtain land in certain developing 
countries face unknown performance in sustainable land use and forest resources, and most do 
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not work with local labour and technology, and ship their production back to their home 
countries (Desalegn, 2011; Dereje et al., 2013). From this view, such investments might 
endanger the amount of available food and increase food insecurity among the recipient 
communities. In particular, the large number of subsistence poor farmers who depend on land 
to feed their families will be affected by land scarcity and rising land prices (Azadi et al., 
2013). Limited empirical studies have shown the effects of large-scale land acquisitions on 
family farming and small-scale food production (Gobena, 2010; IFAD, 2011). 
 
Small-scale farmers or family farmers produce 80% of the food consumed in developing 
countries, but their agricultural operations are threatened and under continued upheaval due to 
land tenure, land governance, and transnational land acquisition (ILC, 2014). Family farming 
must be considered as one of the cornerstones of sustainable rural development and should be 
conceived of as an integral component of the global food value chain. Resolving the 
predicaments of family farming and harmonising this factor with large-scale land transactions 
is essential.  
 
A proper identification and inclusion model for the relevant stakeholders in land deals is 
lacking, which further contributes to governance complexities and non-inclusive and selective 
participation of parties in deals that end with long-term transfer of farmlands. Win-win land 
deals can be mostly sustainable (green) deals and are hence recommended (Azadi et al., 
2013); the conventional context of win-win deals implies that these agreements are made 
between two dealers or two stakeholders, but the main issue in the case of land deals goes 
beyond that explanation. Numerous further stakeholders exist with diverse and often 
conflicting interests and differentiated powers and aspire to play a role in given land deal, yet 
they are marginalised. However, it is not sound to develop a ‘one-size-fit all’ inclusive land 
deal (ILD) conceptual model in a contemporary land (use) market that differs in various 
parameters of location, land use, crop type, and socio-political and cultural contexts (GRAIN, 
2008; Akram-Lodhi, 2012). Furthermore, ‘land grabbing’ is a ‘work-in-progress’ concept 
according to which the inclusive land deal models may involve real-world cases and tailored 
frameworks. Inclusive land deals can be sustainable land deals or green deals, which are not 
easy to construct and hence could be inevitably complex in practical terms. Win-win land 
ideas, as described in Azadi et al. (2013), are a necessary but not sufficient criterion for land 
deals to be characterised as sustainable or green deals. As green deals, land deals must 
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simultaneously consider the systematic and multidirectional interactions of the biophysical 
environment, institutions, and stakeholders (Figure 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.3  Sketch of the inclusive land deal (ILD) framework  
 
Our proposed inclusive framework depicts an inclusive land deal as a function of three grand 
indices, i.e., biophysical environment, governance and institutions, and stakeholders, in which 
each is the focus of different areas of expertise. In short, the framework can be equated as 
follows: 
  ILD = f (bpe, gins, sths, Lu) +e; where 
  ILD: Inclusive land deal, 
  bpe: Biophysical environment, 
  gins: Governance and institutions, 
  sths: Stakeholders, 
  Lu: Land use, and 
  e: Effect of latent factors 
Consideration of transnational land deals relative to the biological and physical environment 
that constitutes the flora, fauna, climatic situations, geological make-up, soil condition, 
infrastructure, and stability of the area, etc. are among the efforts considered in the inclusive 
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deals. The ILD should not only protect and preserve the biophysical environment but also 
should be viewed from the context of power and interest in moving transnational capital for 
better benefit maximisation through the use of the biophysical resources of the host countries 
and communities. Transnational acquisition of land must be viewed from the broader context 
of occupying land and its accompanying resources, i.e., water for small-scale land-holding 
peasants and local households (Ganho, 2011; Kay and Franco, 2012). Excessive focus on the 
land per se runs the risk of overlooking the basic drivers behind transnational land acquisition, 
i.e., greed for power in the global food and input supply chain and harnessing control over 
biophysical prerequisites to further capital accumulation. 
 
Governance and institutions are the most important variable in the ILD framework, which is 
clear but illusive in many of the contemporary land deals. Accountable, consensus-oriented, 
effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, participatory, and responsive and transparent 
governance of land use and its associated resources are prerequisites for an inclusive process 
in transnational land deals. Assessing the adherence of transnational land deals to the 
principles of accountability, transparency, and responsible agricultural investment contributes 
to ensuring sustainable land use rather than simple focus on the exchange of land ownership 
or land use. Assessment of the contexts and improvement factors related to land (i.e., policies, 
legislations, laws, directives, and market) in such an approach could aid in facilitating good 
governance and transactions of land. As discussed in the previous sections, the stakeholders 
must be considered, and their genuine participation is a requirement for inclusive deals. 
Protection of vulnerable groups, i.e., local economies, social fabric, and cultures, is also a 
basic need. The right to food and nutritional sovereignty as well as respect for the available 
social norms and practices are among the components of responsible agricultural investments. 
Finally, synchronising the interplay among the biophysical environment, stakeholders, 
governance, and institutions in the context of competitive land use is essential.  
2.3.4 Adapting the proposed frameworks: Checklist questions 
The need exists to bridge the gap between “generalised” and “contextualised” knowledge (and 
information) concerning transnational land acquisition. Most of the generalised 
conceptualisations and sources neglect the importance of powerless and powerful (yet 
uninterested) stakeholders in deals surrounding land use (Amanor, 2012; Anseeuw et al., 
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2012). The important questions are: Who are the three broader groups and seven distinct sub-
groups of stakeholders in a land deal? Who lacks legitimacy, interest, or power in the deal? 
What should be carried out by whom and for whom such that land deals and acquisitions will 
end up with not only win-win outcomes but also inclusive decisions? For land deals to 
become inclusive resource use agreements and to be governed in line with meaningful 
environmental and social governance standards, these following fundamental questions 
should be addressed in real-world contexts, land use types, and socioeconomic and political 
settings.  
2.4 Conclusion 
Recent works on transnational land acquisition argue towards win-win land deals or ‘green 
deals’ (Azadi et al 2013). However, a ‘win-win’ situation is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for land deals to become inclusive or effective green deals. To obtain an inclusive 
land deal, the need exists to broaden the groups of stakeholders (i.e., in addition to the 
investor and investee) according to various but relevant parameters. By extending the 
evolving stakeholder theory of management to the emerging governance challenges of 
transnational land deals, we propose a new concept known as the land deal power-interest 
clustering (LD-PIC) framework. Stakeholders in a transnational land acquisition are 
categorised into either four or seven generic groups depending on the power, interest, and 
legitimacy with which they are vested. First, according to the LD-PIC, actors in land deals can 
be categorised into four groups, i.e., subjects, players, leaders­context setters, and crowd. The 
first group of ‘subjects’ are those groups of stakeholders with high interest in the land 
considered in a deal but with low power to influence both the process and outcome of the 
deal. In contrast, the second group of ‘players’ are those stakeholders who have high power 
and high interest, including the designers and real actors of deals that use the contexts set by 
the third group of leaders and context setters. The leaders and context setters group consists of 
stakeholders with low interest in the deals but comparatively high power in influencing the 
context of the deal. The last yet not least group of the ‘crowd’ are stakeholders with low 
power and low interest relative to land deals.  
 
By adapting the concept of ‘legitimacy’ into our LD-PIC framework, we introduce the 
legitimacy, interest, and power (LIP) land deal framework. Accordingly, seven distinct groups 
of stakeholders are created from the context of transnational land acquisition, i.e., inactive, 
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discretionary, exigent, dominant, dangerous, dependent, and definitive. Although all of these 
groups of stakeholders do exist, unfortunately, the land use agreements that have been made 
thus far have occurred between only two parties, i.e., the leaser and lessee. However, if an 
inclusive land deal is assumed, the interplay between the leaser and lessee and also among 
these seven groups of stakeholders as well as its implications for sustainable land use must be 
properly understood. Considering the systematic and multidirectional interactions of the 
biophysical environment, institutions, and stakeholders, we offer an inclusive land deal (ILD) 
framework. The framework portrays the inclusive land deal as a function of three grand 
variables: biophysical environment, governance and institutions, and stakeholders. Finally, 
understanding and improving the theoretical realm of the ILD framework of stakeholders is a 
current issue, and it is crucial to apply or use this framework in the further steps of assessing 
specific land deals, land use, crops, governance, institutional, and location cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 52 
References 
Ackermann, F., Eden, C. (2003). Powerful and interested stakeholders matter:Their 
identification and management. American Academy of Management Conference, 2003-
08-01, Seatle, USA.  
Addax Bioenergy. (2012). Prospect of Biofuels in Sierra Leone | Self-Publishing at GRIN. 
available from http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/230290/prospect-of-biofuels-in-sierra-
leone [accessed on 14 February 2013]. 
Agle, BR., Mitchell, RK., Sonnenfeld, JA. (1999). Who Matters to CEOs? An investigation of 
stakeholder attributes and salience, corporate performance, and CEO values. Academy of 
Management Journal 42(5), 507–525. 
Akram-Lodhi, AH. (2012). Contextualising land grabbing: contemporary land deals, the 
global subsistence crisis and the world food system. Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du développement 33(2), 119-142. 
Amanor, KS. (2012). Global resource grabs, agribusiness concentration and the smallholder: 
two West African case studies. Journal of Peasant Studies 39(3-4), 731–749.  
Anseeuw, W., Boche, M., Breu, T., Giger, M., Lay, J., Messerli, P., Nolte, K. (2012). 
Transnational Land Deals for Agriculture in the Global South Analytical Report based 
on the Land Matrix Database, Bern/Montpellier/Hamburg: CDE/CIRAD/GIGA. 
Available at: http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication/1254/ (Accessed 
11.02. 2013)  
Araghi, F. (2003). Food regimes and the production of value: Some methodological issues. 
Journal of Peasant Studies 30(2), pp.41–70.  
Azadi, H., Houshyar, E., Zarafshani, K., Hosseininia, G., Witlox, F. (2013). Agricultural 
outsourcing: A two-headed coin? Global and Planetary Change 100, 20–27. 
 Bernal, AM. (2011). Power, Powerlessness and Petroleum: Indigenous Environmental 
Claims and the Limits of Transnational Law. New Political Science 33(2),143–167. 
Borras, SM., Franco, JC. (2010). Towards a Broader View of the Politics of Global Land 
Grab : Rethinking Land Issues , Reframing Resistance, 1001 LD Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands 
Borras, SM., Kay, C., Gómez, S., Wilkinson, J. (2012a). Land grabbing and global capitalist 
accumulation: key features in Latin America. Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du développement, 33(4), 402–416. 
Borras, SM., Franco, JC., Gómez, S., Kay, C., Spoor, M. (2012b). Land grabbing in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Journal of Peasant Studies 39(3-4), 845–872. 
Borras, SM., Franco, JC. Wang, C. (2013). The Challenge of Global Governance of Land 
Grabbing: Changing International Agricultural Context and Competing Political Views 
and Strategies. Globalizations 10(1),161–179.  
Bourne, L. Walker, DHT. (2005). Visualising and mapping stakeholder influence. 
Management Decision 43(5), 649–660.  
Bronn, SP. (2003). A reflective stakeholder approach: Co-orientation as a basis for 
communication learning. Journal of Communication Management 7(4), 291–303. 
 53 
 
Bues, BA. (2011). Agricultural Foreign Direct Investment and Water Rights : An Institutional 
Analysis from Global Land Grabbing. In Global Land Grabbing. Sussex: Land Deals 
Politics Initiative (LDPI). 
Clarkson, ME. (1995). A stakeholder framework for analysing and evaluating corporate social 
performance. Academy of Management Review 20(1), 92–117.  
Cotula, L. (2011). Land deals in Africa:What is in the contracts?, London WC1H 0DD, UK: 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).  
Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R. And Keeley, J. (2009). Land grab or development 
opportunity ? international land deals in Africa Land grab or development opportunity ?, 
London/Rome: FAO, IIED and IFAD. 
Daniel, S., Mittal, A. (2009). The Great Land Grab: Rush for World’s Farmland Threatens 
Food security for the Poor M. Moore, ed., oakland, ca 94619, USA: The Oakland 
Institute. 
Dereje, T., Witlox, F., Azadi, H., Mitiku, H., Nyssen, J. (2013). International land deals , local 
people ’ s livelihood , and environment nexus ( How to create win-win land deals in 
Ethiopia ?). In Geophysical research abstracts. Veinna, Austria: General Assembly of the 
European Geosciences Union, p. 1. Available at: http://meetingorganizer.copernicus.org 
/(Accessed 12.10. 2013). 
De Schutter, O. (2011). How not to think of land-grabbing: three critiques of large-scale 
investments in farmland. Journal of Peasant Studies 38(2), 249–279.  
Desalegn, R. (2011). Land to investors: large-scale land transfers in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. 
available from http://www.landgovernance.org/ [accessed on 15 October 2012]. 
Donaldson, T., Preston, LE., Preston, LE, (1995). The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: 
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications. Academy of Management Review 20(1), 65–91.  
Edelman, M., Oya, C., Jr, SMB. (2013). Global Land Grabs : historical processes , theoretical 
and methodological implications and current trajectories. Third World Quarterly.34(9), 
517–1531. 
Elkin, J. (2007). A Review of the Stakeholder Theory. In A. Geare, ed. Otago Management 
Graduate Review 5,17–26. Department of Management, University of Otago. 
European Commission. (2000). EU Trade Concessions to Least Developed Countries: 
Everything but Arms Proposal. Possible Impacts on the Agricultural Sector, Brussels. 
available from http://www2.weed-online.org/eu/texte/first_eba_ias.pdf [accessed on 11 
January 2013]. 
European Commission,. (2012). Renewable Energy: a major player in the European energy 
market. available from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/ accessed on 3 January 2013]. 
European Commission. (2006). Upgrading the EU Investment Policy. , (May), pp.1–4. 
available from http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/tas_upgrading_eu.pdf [accessed 10 January 
2013]. 
Fairhead, J., Leach, M., Scoones, I. (2012). Green Grabbing: a new appropriation of nature? 
Journal of Peasant Studies 39(2), 237–261. 
 FAO. (2009). How to Feed the World in 2050, available from 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/expert_paper/How_to_Feed_the_Wor
ld_in_2050.pdf [accessed on 20 January 2013]. 
 54 
FIAN International. (2010). Land grabbing in Kenya and Mozambique:A report on two 
research missions – and a human rights analysis of land grabbing, 69115 Heidelberg, 
Germany.  
Franco, J., Mehta, L.. Veldwisch, G.J. (2013). The Global Politics of Water Grabbing. Third 
World Quarterly. 34(9), 1651–1675 
Freeman, RE. (1984). Strategic management 1st Ed., Copp Clark Pitman, Toronto: Associated 
Companies.  
Freeman, RE. (1994). The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions. Business 
Ethics Quarterly 4(4), 409. 
Friedman, AL., Miles, S. (2002). Developing Stakeholder Theory. Journal of Management 
Studies 39(1), 1–21.  
Galaty, BJG. (2012). “ Unused ” Land and Unfulfilled Promises : Justifications for Displacing 
Communities in East Africa Global Land Grabbing II. Paper presented at the 
International Academic Conference on Global Land Grabbing II, 1–14.  
Ganho, PW., AS. (2011). Is Water the Hidden Agenda of Agricultural Land Acquisition in 
sub-Saharan Africa? Global Land Grabbing. In Global Land Grabbing. Land Deal 
Politics Initiative (LDPI) in collaboration with the Journal of Peasant Studies and hosted 
by the Future Agricultures Consortium at the Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex. 
Gardner, J., Rachlin, R., Sweeny, A. (1986). Handbook of Strategic Planning, 99th ed., New 
York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Gobena, M. (2010). Effects of Large-scale Land acquisition in Rural Ethiopia: The Case of 
Bako-Tibe Woreda Thesis No xx. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Sweden 
Examiner 
Graham, A., Aubry, S., Künnemann, R. (2011). The Role of the EU in Land Grabbing in 
Africa - CSO Monitoring 2009-2010 “ Advancing African Agriculture ” ( AAA ): The 
Impact of Europe ’ s Policies and Practices on African Agriculture and Food Security 
Global Land Grabbing. Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land 
Grabbing I 
GRAIN. (2008). The 2008 land grab for food and financial security, available from 
http://www.grain.org/system/old/briefings_files/landgrab-2008-en.pdf [accessed on 20 
January 2013]. 
GRAIN. (2012). Who ’s behind the land grabs?A look at some of the people pursuing or 
supporting large farmland grabs around the world, 08010 Barcelona, Spain.  
Hall, R. (2011). Land grabbing in Southern Africa: the many faces of the investor rush. 
Review of African Political Economy 38(128),193–214.  
Harvey, D. (2003). The New Imperialism, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP: Oxford 
University Press.  
Hillman, AM. (2001). Stakeholder value, stakeholder management, and social issues: What is 
the bottom line? Strategic Management Journal 22(2), 125–139.  
IFAD. (2011). Enabling poor rural people to overcome poverty, Rural Poverty Report 2011, 
00142 Rome, Italy.  
ILC. (2014). Internation Year of Family Farming IYFF-2014: Feeding the World. Caring for 
the Earth. 2014 The International Year of Family Farming, (January), available from 
 55 
 
http://www.familyfarmingcampaign.net/archivos/comunicacion/_poster_cientificoen.pdf 
[accessed on 17 January, 2013] 
Gardner, J., Rachlin, R., Sweeny, A. (1986). Handbook of Strategic Planning, 99th ed., New 
York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Jawahar, IM. (2001). Twards a descriptive stakeholder theory. The Academy of Management 
Review 26(3), 397–414. 
Jonker, J., Foster, D. (2002). Stakeholder excellence? Framing the evolution and complexity 
of a stakeholder perspective of the firm. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management 9(4), 187–195.  
Kay, S., Franco, J. (2012). The global water grab, a primer, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
available from http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/ [accessed on 14 December 2012] . 
Klaus Deininger , Derek Byerlee, Jonathan Lindsay, AN., Harris, MS. (2011). Rising global 
interest in farmland, can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits?, 1818 H Street NW, 
Washington DC 20433: The World Bank.  
Austen, S., Seymour, R., Brown, K., Furneaux, C., McCabe, A. (2006). Multi-Outcome 
Construction Policies : Literature Review on Stakeholder Theory, Brisbane Qld 4000, 
Australia.  
 Lim, G., Ahn, H., Lee, H. (2005). Formulating strategies for stakeholder management: a 
case-based reasoning approach. Expert Systems with Applications 28(4), 831–840.  
Margulis, ME., McKeon, N., Borras, SM. (2013). Land Grabbing and Global Governance: 
Critical Perspectives. Globalizations 10(1), 1–23.  
Mason, C., Kirkbride, J., Bryde, D. (2007). From stakeholders to institutions: the changing 
face of social enterprise governance theory. Management Decision 45(2), 284–301.  
McCarthy, J. (2010). Processes of inclusion and adverse incorporation: oil palm and agrarian 
change in Sumatra, Indonesia. The Journal of peasant studies 37(4), 821–50.  
McDermott, MC., Chan, KC. (1996). Flexible intelligent relationship management: the 
business success paradigm in a stakeholder society. The Learning Organization, 3(3), 5–
17.  
McMichael, P. (2013). Land Grabbing as Security Mercantilism in International Relations. 
Globalizations 10(1), 47–64.  
Mehta, L., Veldwisch, GJ., Franco, J. (2012). Introduction to the Special Issue: Water 
Grabbing? Focus on the (Re) appropriation of Finite Water Resources. Water 
Alternatives. 5(2),193–207 
Miles, S. (2012). Stakeholder: Essentially Contested or Just Confused? Journal of Business 
Ethics 108(3), 285–298.  
Mitchell, RK., Agle, BR., Wood, DJ. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification 
and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. The Academy of 
Management Review 22(4), 853–886. 
Ochieng, J. (2011). Kenya: Dominion Farms chief fears for his life. The global rush for farm 
land and peoples’ struggles against it, available from http://farmlandgrab.org/19284 
[accessed on 9 October 2012]. 
Oxfam International (2011). Land and power wave of investments in land, Oxford, OX4 2JY, 
UK: Odfam International.  
 56 
Oya, C. (2013a). Methodological reflections on 'land grab' databases and the 'land grab' 
literature 'rush'. Journal of Peasant Studies 40(3), 503–520. 
Oya, C. (2013b). The Land Rush and Classic Agrarian Questions of Capital and Labour : a 
systematic scoping review of the socioeconomic impact of land grabs in Africa. Journal 
of Peasant Studies 34(9), 1531–1557. 
Peluso, NL., Lund, C. (2011). New frontiers of land control: Introduction. Journal of Peasant 
Studies. 38(4), 667–681. 
Pouloudi, A. (1999). Aspects of the Stakeholder Concept and their Implications for 
Information Systems Development. In Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences - 1999. Hawaii: Maui HI, pp. 1–17.  
Rowley, TJ. (1997). Moving beyond Dyadic Ties: A Network Theory of Stakeholder 
Influences. The Academy of Management Review 22(4), 887. 
Rulli, MC., D'Odorico, PD. (2013a). The politics of evidence : a response to Rulli and 
D’Odorico. Journal of Peasant Studies 40(5), 913–914. 
Rulli, MC., D'Odorico, PD. (2013b). The science of evidence : the value of global studies on 
land rush. Journal of Peasant Studies 40(5), 907–909. 
Scoones, I., Hall, R., Borras S., White, B., Wolford, W. (2013). The politics of evidence: 
methodologies for understanding the global land rush. Journal of Peasant Studies. 40(3), 
469–483 
Snider, J., Hill, RP., Martin, D. (2003). Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: 
A View from the World’s Most Successful Firms. Journal of Business Ethics 48(2), 175–
187. 
Thaler, K. (2013). Large-scale land acquisitions and social conflict in Africa. In Food 
Sovereignty : A Critical Dialogue. International Conference, Yale University, September 
14-15, 2013. 1–15. 
Transnational Institute. (2012). The European Union and the Global Land Grab, available 
from www.tni.org/files/download/european_union_and_the_global_land_grab [accessed 
on 20 October 2012]. 
UNCHS. (2001). Tools to Support Participatory Urban Decision Making Urban Gove. D. 
McCallum, ed., Nairobi: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements - UNCHS 
(Habitat).  
Ven, B. (2008). An Ethical Framework for the Marketing of Corporate Social Responsibility. 
Journal of Business Ethics 82(2), 339–352.  
Visser, O., Spoor, M. (2011). Land grabbing in post-Soviet Eurasia: the world’s largest 
agricultural land reserves at stake. Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(2), 299–323.  
White, B., Borras, SM., Hall, R., Scoones, I., Wolford, W. (2012). The new enclosures: 
critical perspectives on corporate land deals. Journal of Peasant Studies. 39(3-4), 619–
647. 
Wilkinson, J., Reydon, B., Di Sabbato, A. (2012). Concentration and foreign ownership of 
land in Brazil in the context of global land grabbing. Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du développement, 33(4), 417–438.  
Winkler, I. (2009). Stakeholder salience in corporate codes of ethics using legitimacy , power 
, and urgency to explain stakeholder. Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and 
Organization Studies 14(1), 4–13.  
 57 
 
Wolford, W., Borras, SM., Hall, R., Scoones, I., White, B. (2013). Governing Global Land 
Deals : The Role of the State in the Rush for Land. Development and Change. 
44(2),189–210 
World Bank. (2012). World Bank Group Investment Climate Advisory Services – Activities 
Related to Land, Annex 2: World Bank Group Statement on Oxfam Report, “Our Land, 
Our Lives,” available from https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/donor-
partners/upload/2013-IC-FIAS-and-Land.pdf [accessed on 3 February 2013]. 
Zoomers, A. (2010). Globalisation and the foreignisation of space: seven processes driving 
the current global land grab. Journal of Peasant Studies 37(2), 429–447. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
 
Chapter 3 Agricultural outsourcing or land 
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[This chapter was developed based on the MSc thesis of Erika Vandergeten (2014) that was 
realised in the framework of this PhD thesis, and under close supervision of the author] 
 
Abstract Theoretically ‘land grabbing’ is not a new phenomenon. Since the 1990s, some 
capital-rich countries have started to buy or lease foreign lands to be able to produce food and 
biofuels. This study aimed at investigating the (un)sustainability of ‘transnational land deals’ 
(TLDs) for investors, host governments and local communities. Given the three dimensions of 
sustainability, the “social acceptability”, “economic viability” and “environmental 
conservation” of the TLDs have been studied. To understand whether and to what extent the 
TLD is sustainable in each dimension a systematic review was conducted on 73 journal 
articles. Results showed that tenure arrangements and livelihoods were the main drivers for 
the matter’s social acceptability. Accordingly, local communities are affected by losing and 
receiving little or no compensation for their land, and making them have to face the increasing 
vulnerability of their livelihoods. This results in a win-win-loss situation for investors, host 
governments and local communities, respectively. Economic (un)sustainability mainly 
depends on capital flow, infrastructure and employment. This aspect is evidenced as a win for 
investors and host governments and implies the aforementioned win-win-loss situation. The 
main aspects of environmental (un)sustainability are considered as biodiversity, ecosystem 
services, and climate change. According to the results, both host governments and local 
communities experience loss. This results in a win-loss-loss status of the TLDs. The major 
challenge remains in establishing good land governance, which can guarantee the benefits to 
local people and their access to land. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Since the 1990s, some capital-rich countries, such as China, South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait (STWR 2012) have started to buy or lease foreign lands to be able to produce 
food and biofuels. They have started ‘agricultural outsourcing’ (AO) mostly in Africa and 
Latin America (Kersting 2011). Hofman and Ho (2012: 3) define agricultural outsourcing 
(AO) as “the acquisition of user rights abroad for an area over 1,000 hectares in order to 
outsource domestic agricultural production”. Borras et al. (2012a 851) describes 
contemporary land grabbing as follows: “the capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of 
land and other natural resources through a variety of mechanisms and forms that involve 
large-scale capital that often shifts resource use orientation into extractive character, whether 
for international or domestic purposes, as capital’s response to the convergence of food, 
energy and financial crises, climate change mitigation imperatives, and demands for resources 
from newer hubs of global capital.” This definition shows how broad the contemporary term 
of ‘land grabbing’ can be interpreted.  
 
Not only foreign investors, but domestic investors may also be guilty of ‘grabbing’ land and 
other natural resources. The driving forces behind these investments are mainly considered as 
crises, climate change and increasing demands in food and energy (Hall 2011: 193; Borras et 
al., 2012b: 403). The phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’ is not a new process and can be traced 
back to historical precedents in the era of imperialism. Margulis et al. (2013: 1) argue that 
‘the character, scale, pace, orientation, and key drivers of the recent wave of land grabs is a 
distinct historical phenomenon closely tied to major shifts in power and production in the 
global political economy’.  
 
The present issue of ‘land grabbing’ has become the subject of numerous media reports since 
the global food crisis worsened in 2008 (FIAN 2012). This has led to the rise of many 
scientific studies concerning this subject. Azadi et al. (2013) for instance, have recently 
studied TLDs and divided them into four categories; i.e., loss-loss, loss-win, win-loss and 
win-win deals. According to them, the ‘win’ or ‘loss’ outcome relates to the two parties in 
TLDs: the investor(s) and investee(s). In addition to their classification, this chapter includes a 
third party and therefore studies three main stakeholders as follows: the investor(s), the host 
country’s government and the host country’s local community; mainly local (small-scale) 
farmers. Azadi et al. (2013) argue that the ‘win’ or ‘loss’ for the different stakeholders should 
 61 
 
be discussed in the framework of sustainability, which they break down into three 
dimensions: the political, socio-economic and environmental aspects of sustainability. In this 
chapter, these dimensions are translated into social, economic and environmental dimensions.  
 
The first dimension of sustainability can be referred to as ‘social acceptability’, which relates 
to social welfare, employment, poverty and disputes. For this aspect of sustainability, 
governance plays an important role in order to maintain these social criteria. The focus for 
social sustainability lies in local (small-scale) farmers and how their lives could possibly 
change after dealing the land. The social dimension implies “both (a) the processes that 
generate social health and well-being now and in the future, and (b) those social institutions 
that facilitate environmental and economic sustainability now and for the future” (Dillard et al 
2009: 4). For example, in Africa, up to 90 percent of rural lands are under customary tenure 
(Gerlach and Liu 2010). This often leads to social conflicts regarding land tenure between 
investors and local communities. Especially due to weak land governance (Azadi et al., 2013), 
local people often have little access to the law and are excluded from formal land rights (Rudi 
et al., 2012). For instance, although most of the cultivable land targeted for agricultural 
outsourcing is used or claimed by local farmers and pastoralists, they possess no formal land 
documentation (Toulmin 2008) or land title registration (Miceli et al., 2001; Sohl at al 2010; 
Verburg et al., 2010).  
 
The second dimension of sustainability mainly focuses on financial viability and employment. 
“An economically sustainable system must be able to produce goods and services on a 
continuous basis, to maintain manageable levels of government and external debt, and to 
avoid extreme sectoral imbalances that damage agricultural or industrial production” (Harris 
et al., 2001, xxix). Land and agricultural production have been highlighted as critical 
components for economic growth and the reduction of poverty (Clover and Eriksen 2009). It 
is assumed that the creation of employment opportunities created by agricultural outsourcing 
improves domestic production by focusing on the local job market and other inputs as well as 
processing outputs and possibly increasing food supplies for domestic and foreign markets 
(Hallam 2009) and hereby boosts economic growth. Some case studies however, observed 
that TLD projects are labour intensive during the initial phase but become increasingly 
mechanized later on, thus reducing future job and therefore income opportunities (Gerlach 
and Liu 2010). 
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The third aspect of sustainability lies in ‘environmental conservation’. Here, the 
environmental impacts of TLDs are considered. In order to measure the environmental 
sustainability, global concerns such as biodiversity, ecosystem services, and climate change 
are taken into account. As Cotula et al. (2009) pointed out, sustainable TLDs need 
assessments of environmental aspects of the proposed investments. According to them, soil, 
water and biodiversity should be monitored. For example, for soil and water, short-term 
mining through the cultivation of crops with high water or nutrient demands, can lead to soil 
erosion and water scarcity (Azadi et al., 2011). Also, the impacts on biodiversity need to be 
watched out for(e.g. mono-cultural production which may even lead to pest or disease 
problems (Bazuin et al., 2011)). Since long-term land leasing normally takes 40-50 years, this 
may lead to long-term problems which may affect the environment as well as local 
communities. 
 
As said and emphasized in the ‘Critical Agrarian Studies Colloquium No. 4’ on 11 June 2012 
in The Hague (the Netherlands), there is a need for the existing research findings to be 
globally understood(ISS 2012).  
3.2 Theoretical framework 
This study investigates the sustainability of the TLDs in the three main dimensions. The 
theoretical framework is conceptualized in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 illustrates how the three 
aspects of sustainability should be considered when assessing the TLDs. As shown in the 
figure, each dimension includes several concepts as follows (It should be noted that one can 
find other concepts within this framework. Nevertheless, in this study, we considered these 
dimensions and concepts as the core concepts to the investigation of the TLDs.). 
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Figure 3.1  The conceptual framework of the study 
3.2.1 Social sustainability 
3.2.1.1 Land tenure 
According to the FAO (2002: 7), land tenure can be described as “the relationship, whether 
legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land 
and associated natural resources (water, trees, minerals, wildlife, etc.). Rules of tenure define 
how property rights in land are to be allocated within societies. Land tenure systems 
determine who can use what resources for how long, and under what conditions.” 
3.2.1.2 Livelihood  
“A livelihood comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the 
activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together 
determine the living gained by the individual or household.” According to Ellis (2000: 10), 
livelihood is a wide social concept that relates to the means of living (mostly associated with 
local people), food security, poverty or welfare, eviction, and other broad concepts that relate 
to the social well-being of people. According to the FAO (Bellù et al ., 2006: 7) “social 
welfare can be described by means of a so called ‘Social Welfare Function”. Champernowne 
and Cowell (1998: 88) define the Social Welfare Function as “the generic term for coherent 
and consistent ordering of social states in terms of their desirability is a social-welfare 
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function”. We use the term ‘social’ because it normally refers to the whole community, but it 
does not imply that the ordering was somehow chosen by the whole community: there can be 
as many social-welfare functions as there are opinions held. 
3.2.1.3 Soft infrastructure  
Casey (2005: 8) describes that soft infrastructure “involves responses to both the needs of 
communities, while simultaneously building the capacity of local people and groups to 
respond to current and future needs. It is not simply about providing physical assets but about 
enhancing skills and knowledge and access to a range of appropriate services and responses.” 
For our systematic review, the main elements of ‘soft infrastructure’ included health care 
(centres), education and training (schools). These elements are important for providing social 
sustainability for the host country, and especially the local communities. By investing in soft 
infrastructure, the investor(s) can provide the host country a better future through knowledge 
and health care. 
3.2.1.4 Security  
In many cases of ‘land grabbing’, local people are evicted or forced to leave their land. This 
process is often accompanied by violence, conflicts and other security problems. For example: 
"Sadly, there is a messy tale in Tanzania, where local communities are sometimes forcibly 
evicted off the land to make room for national parks and other tourist attractions" (Mutch 
2011: 60). This aspect thus can negatively influence social sustainability: violence brings 
unsustainability for all three stakeholders.  
3.2.1.5 Social differentiation (or polarization)  
‘Land grabbing’ often causes or intensifies (existing) differentiation in social classes (of 
wealth, race, gender or even age). White and White (2012) for instance, studied the ‘gendered 
experiences of dispossession: oil palm expansion in a Dayak Hibun community in West 
Kalimantan’. This aspect needs more attention in research studies, since it can cause (more) 
social unsustainability for those classes who are already being discriminated against.  
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3.2.2 Economic sustainability 
3.2.2.1 GDP  
GDP is defined by the World Bank (Subbotina 2004: 12) as: “the value of the total final 
output of all goods and services produced in a single year within a country's boundaries. GNP 
is GDP plus incomes received by residents from abroad minus incomes claimed by 
nonresidents”. The host country can see this aspect as an important reason to stimulate the 
TLDs. By bringing foreign direct investments, the investor(s) contributes to the GDP of the 
host country, and can add have some economic values. 
3.2.2.2 Hard infrastructure  
In this study, ‘hard infrastructure’ is considered as a type of infrastructure defined by Casey 
(2005: 7) as that “which is focused on provision of basic utilities i.e. water, gas and 
electricity, waste, transport provision (roads, rail, air) that provide the framework in which a 
community transacts economic, social and environmental activity.” There are case studies in 
which the investor provides hard infrastructure, e.g. roads, electricity or irrigation systems, 
which may (not) benefit local communities and small-scale farmers. Establishing new hard 
infrastructure is often seen as an important criterion for allowing the TLDs by the host 
country. 
3.2.2.3 Employment  
“An agreement between an employer and an employee that the employee will provide certain 
services on the job, and in the employer's designated workplace, to facilitate the 
accomplishment of the employer organization’s goals and mission, in return for 
compensation. The agreement can be verbal, implied, or an official employment contract” 
(Heathfield 2012: 1). Many cases of AO are facilitated not only by the government, but by the 
availability of abundant (and cheap) labour forces in the host country as well. This aspect has 
a great deal of influence on local communities and their economic (un)sustainability. 
3.2.2.4 Equity/shares  
In some case studies, the investors also invest in the stock market, or, as in the case of Russia 
(Visser and Spoor 2011: 693), "Most investors from abroad have chosen to acquire equity 
within already established Russian or Ukrainian agro-holdings, obtaining several farm 
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enterprises with their (mostly leased) land in one go." This aspect is rather rarely found in the 
research studies, but the case of Russia shows how it can affect the economic sustainability of 
the host country. 
3.2.2.5 Land value  
Land value refers to the economic value of the land itself. Here, the increasing interest in land 
can affect the land prices for local as well as foreign investors. Therefore, this aspect can 
contribute to economic (un)sustainability. Mousseau and Sosnoff (2011) for example, have 
seen the results of TLDs that were only looking to increase the land value in their case study 
in Ethiopia. Here, land is only used by the investors to gain economic prosperity by increasing 
the land value. This can be achieved by simply clearing the land of forests and selling it 
afterwards as land for agricultural production. Even though the investors may gain in these 
cases, the consequences for the local communities may be severe. 
3.2.3 Environmental sustainability 
3.2.3.1 Biodiversity 
In this study, biodiversity concerns the maintenance of different species (flora and fauna) in 
their natural ecosystems (genetic diversity is not included in this study) over time. 
Biodiversity is defined by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (United Nations 
1992: 3) as: “the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they 
are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems”. 
3.2.3.2 Ecosystem services 
Water  
In the TLDs, the investor not only gets to cultivate land (soil), but often also gets the rights 
over other natural resources on the dealt land, e.g., water. The TLDs can thus affect water 
security and safety, e.g. by reducing and polluting existing water resources. Here, the effects 
can be immense, especially for the host country and its local communities. 
Soil (land) 
 The effects of the TLDs on soil (land) could also include many things, which among some, 
we assessed the following: 
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1. Land cover: generally defined as “the observed (bio)-physical cover on the Earth’s 
surface. It includes vegetation and man-made features as well as bare rock, bare soil and 
inland water surfaces.” Besides this definition, Herold et al. (2006: 158) also define ‘land 
cover’ on a fundamental level: “land cover is the most important element for description 
and study of the environment. In situ and satellite land observations as well as different 
disciplines (geography, ecology, geology, forestry, land policy and planning etc.) use and 
refer to land cover as the most obvious and detectable indicator of land surface 
characteristics.” In our study, land cover is one of the most influential aspects studied in 
the systematic review.  
2. Land use is “characterized by the arrangements, activities and inputs people undertake in 
a certain land cover type to produce, change or maintain it. Definition of land use in this 
way establishes a direct link between land cover and the actions of people in their 
environment.” (Di Gregorio and Jansen 2000) 
3. Soil erosion: “a complex process that depends on soil properties, ground slope, 
vegetation, and rainfall amount and intensity … Changes in land use are widely 
recognized as capable of greatly accelerating soil erosion … and it has long been 
recognized that erosion in excess of soil production would eventually result in decreased 
agricultural potential … Although soil fertility generally declines with accelerated 
erosion, soil fertility is itself a function of agricultural methods and site conditions such 
as soil type, nutrient, and organic matter content”. (Montgomery 2007: 13268) 
4. Land degradation is “a process involving multiple causal factors, among which climate 
variability, soil quality and land management play a significant role ... It specifically 
refers to a reduction of the productivity and capacity of providing ecosystem services by 
cropland, rangeland and woodlands”. In the study of Ceccarelli et al. (2014: 60), land 
degradation is further “considered as a process occurring not only in a semi-natural 
context, but also in agricultural and peri-urban lands areas ”. 
3.2.3.3 Climate change 
Even though most case studies do not specifically mention ‘climate change’ as an outcome of 
AO, there are cases where research shows the impact of the investment on the local climate. 
For example, in Bolivia, “there is evidence of environmental degradation in the eastern 
lowlands to such an extreme that this has seemingly caused a significantly warmer and drier 
climate in the region." (Urioste 2012: 444) 
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By exploring the social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainability, this 
chapter investigates the following research problem: “How ‘sustainable’ are transnational 
land deals for the investor, the host country and the local communities in terms of social, 
economic and environmental aspects?” and “What are the main sub-indicators that lead to 
gain or loss in the social, economic and environmental aspects?” 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1  Systematic review with a meta-analysis component 
Systematic reviews typically involve a comprehensive and detailed plan and search strategy 
derived a priori, with the objective of reducing bias through identifying, appraising, and 
synthesizing all the necessary studies on a particular issue (Uman, 2011). Often, systematic 
reviews include a meta-analysis component which applies statistical techniques to synthesize 
the data from diverse studies into a single quantitative estimate (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). 
This study used mainly a systematic review but with a meta-analysis component to investigate 
the sustainability of the TLDs and the concepts described in the theoretical framework. 
Trikalinos et al. (2008: 312) define meta-analysis as “the quantitative synthesis of information 
from several studies”. 
 
“While the statistical procedures used in a meta-analysis can be applied to any set of data, the 
synthesis will be meaningful only if the studies have been collected systematically. This could 
be done in the context of a systematic review, the process of systematically locating, 
appraising, and then synthesizing data from a large number of sources”. As Borenstein et al. 
(2009, xxii) explain, the collection of data is a first important step in this method. This has 
been performed in the sample collection, followed by the qualitative analysis (content 
analysis) itself. 
3.3.2 Sampling 
The main objective of a meta-analysis lies in cumulating research findings across different 
studies on the same issue which, in our case, is “transnational land deals”. Such studies have 
been gathered from different published journals; mainly ‘Journal of Peasant Studies’, ‘Water 
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Alternatives’, ‘Geopolitics’, ‘Development and Change’, ‘Globalizations’ and ‘Journal of 
Agrarian Change’. 
 
 In order to justify the choice of research studies, a number of criteria was considered: the 
studies were first chosen by searching following key words: “large-scale land deal”, “land 
grab” and “agricultural outsourcing”. This primary search resulted in 23,030 journal articles 
and published reports. Afterwards, the number of studies was narrowed down by taking a 
closer look at them to understand whether, at least, one of the key words could be found in 
their title or abstract. Accordingly, 161 journal articles and published reports remained. In the 
third step, the journal articles and published reports were further scrutinized to determine 
whether they report case studies on land grabbing or generally agricultural outsourcing. 
Furthermore, our systematic review with its the meta-analysis component focused on “land” 
grabbing, and thus excluded “water”, “carbon”, and “soil” grabbing. This sample approach 
resulted in the selection of 73 journal articles and published reports at the end that were 
published from 1992- 2013 (Figure 3.2). 
 
 
Figure 3.2  Sampling approach 
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The distribution of the case studies per country is depicted in the following figures. 
 
 
Figure 3.3  Distribution of case studies per continent 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4  Distribution of the number of case studies per host country (investee) 
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Figure 3.5  Distribution of the number of case studies per investing country (investors) 
 
Figure 3.3 shows that most research is conducted in Africa, followed by South-America and 
Asia. Only 5 case studies are located in Russia, Europe. Figure 3.4 and 3.5 display the 
distribution of the investing countries and host countries around the world. Most of the host 
countries are located in Africa (35), Latin-America (17) or Asia (15) as displayed in Figure 
3.4, while most of the investing countries are situated in China (16), the Middle East (27) and 
Europe (21) as is depicted in Figure 3.5. It should be noted that Figure 3.4 and 3.5 only depict 
the number of case studies analysing a specific country or region. The number of case studies 
studying (parts of) a continent have been left out: Africa (3), East Africa (1), Sub-Saharan 
Africa (1), West and Central Africa (1), South Asia (1), Southeast Asia (2), East-Asia (2), 
UAE (2), USSR (1), Europe (2), EU (1), Latin-America (3), South America (1) 
3.3.3 Data integration and analysis 
After selecting the journal articles, the case studies were first analysed qualitatively in the 
initial phase of the meta-analysis. To do so, a content analysis of these studies was conducted 
in order to find commonalities and/or differences. The content analysis consisted of the 
following three steps: a content inventory, a content audit and a content map (Fox 2008). 
The content inventory concentrated on the following data in the studies on land dealing: 
1. Study (title and name of the authors) 
2. Location (land and region) 
3. Subject/aspects (investor(s) and main drivers) 
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4. Indicators (social, economic and environmental)  
5. Conclusion (short abstract of the main conclusions of the research) 
6. TLD type (win-win, win-loss, loss-win or loss-loss)  
7. Stakeholders (investors and investees (host country government and local community)) 
 
The content audit listed all these elements in a table in order to make a comparison between 
the studies. For the analysis, the full text of the studies was read in order to maximize the 
number of references inside the text needed to verify the assumptions of win or loss. Finally, 
the content map depicts these results in Table 3.1. This table gives an example of a possible 
outcome of the content analysis. Based on the three main aspects of sustainability, sustainable 
TLDs are described in the following equation: 
SLD = f (SOS+ ENS+ ECS) + e     EQUATION (1) 
 
Thus, the sustainability of land deals (SLD) is a function of the three main aspects: social 
(SoS), environmental (EnS), economic (EcS) sustainability, and error term (e). This equation 
is further developed in the meta-analysis. Table 3.1 gives an example of this step for the first 
case study in the social dimension. In this example, scores are designated to each sub-
indicator of the social dimension. For instance, the sub-indicator ‘Tenure Arrangements’ is: 
a) sustainable (+) for the investor,  
b) not researched (x) for the host country’s government (it was not mentioned in the case 
study), and  
c) unsustainable (-) for the local community.  
 
Accordingly, the main drivers behind the social, economic and environmental 
sustainability were examined. In case the drivers were clearly present in the case study, 
they were evaluated based on their presence/absence for the investors as well as the 
investees. The first columns indicate the case study and general information regarding the 
investor(s) and driver(s). In the following columns, a given land deal is evaluated based 
on the three aspects of sustainability, resulting in the four following situations: win-win, 
loss-win, win-loss or loss-loss situation (where a win is marked as a ‘+’ and loss as a ‘-‘). 
The column named ‘notes’ contains the reference to the sentence(s) in the case study from 
which the win/loss status is elicited. 
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Table 3.1  Example of a qualitative evaluation of a case study for the social indicator and 
‘TA’ sub-indicator* 
SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Case 
Study 
Location Investor(s) Driver(s) Notes 
Tenure arrangements 
TA Status Inv 
(+ or -) 
TA Status 
Gov (+ or -) 
TA Status 
Loc (+ or -) 
1 
Klopp, 
2000 
Kenya 
(Africa) 
private 
developers 
political 
liberalization 
"Francis Karani, 
a former Nairobi 
city 
commissioner, 
walked into the 
market and 
boldly 
announced that 
people had to 
move because he 
had been given 
the land" 
+ x - 
*‘TA’: Tenure Arrangements, ‘Inv’: Investor(s), ‘Gov’: Host country Government, ‘Loc’: 
Host country Local communities 
 
These drivers/sub-indicators of sustainability have been selected by reading and analysing the 
case studies. In order to avoid having to ascribe a certain weighting factor to the sub-
indicators, all indicators/dimensions were given five sub-indicators.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Social sustainability 
As explained in the methodology, the main drivers responsible for the social 
(un)sustainability of the TLD, are the ‘tenure arrangements’ (TA) and the ‘livelihood’ (L). 
The frequency of the five sub-indicators of the social dimension is depicted in Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6  Social sustainability of the TLD per indicator 
(TA: Tenure Arrangements, L: Livelihood, SI : Soft Infrastructure, S : Security, SD : Social 
Differentiation). 
3.4.1.1 Tenure arrangements (TA) 
The sub indicator ‘tenure arrangements’ counts 98% wins for the investors, 100% wins for the 
government and only 5% win for the local communities. For the losses, 2% of the evidence 
shows unsustainability for the investors, 0% is found with the government while 95% is 
counted for the local communities. The investors themselves, who most often get to buy or 
rent the land at favourable rates clearly gain here (98%). On the other hand, the local 
community or small-scale farmers lose their (farm) land to the investor(s), hence the 95% loss 
rate. The compensation paid by the investor(s) is often received by the government (100% 
win), while the local people have to move to other areas (with poor quality lands) and receive 
little or no compensation at all. The following example in Laos confirms these results: 
"The result of these negotiations was that farmers were compensated at rates far below the 
market value of their land and the amount that they requested. HAGL forced villagers to 
accept low prices by threatening not to award compensation at all, a threat against which 
villagers felt they had no recourse."(Kenney-Lazar 2012, 1031) 
3.4.1.2 Livelihood (L) 
The second main driver behind social unsustainability for the local communities on the one 
hand, and social sustainable land deals for the investors and host government on the other, is 
‘livelihood’. The results of Figure 3.6 show that the investors win in 100% and the 
government in 71% of the evidence. Furthermore, 94% of the studies show unsustainability in 
the livelihoods of the local communities and small-scale farmers. Most often, the loss of 
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(farm) land is accompanied by eviction or replacement, in some cases including violent 
actions from the government or the investor (Levien 2012). Other consequences of the land 
deals that affect local livelihoods are the increase of poverty or decrease of food security. 
More importantly however, is the impact on the basic needs (food, water medication, and 
housing) of the local community. For instance, most of the local communities depend on the 
food and materials they gather from their surroundings. When investors come and clear the 
land, contaminate water sources, or start hunting the local animals, this causes major damage 
to the local livelihood of many communities (e.g. Mousseau and Sosnoff 2011). Pastoralists 
are especially affected by ‘land grabbing’ due to losing their grazing lands and the rise of 
fencing of territories that interferes with their lifestyle. This is illustrated by the following 
examples, respectively in Africa (in a general case study), Cambodia and Ethiopia: 
"Game parks, theme parks and private lodges for the seriously rich have sprung up all 
over the place, with adverse effects on pastoralist communities in particular, as huge areas 
of once common grazing land have been fenced off."(Palmer 2011: 20). 
"The concession also blocked the stream flow of local creeks that provided freshwater for 
household consumption, fishery activities and villagers’ rice fields. Most importantly the 
concession infringed on the forest areas that were essential for local people’s 
livelihoods."(Neef et al., 2013: 9). 
"Villagers often used the now­cleared forest in the Saudi lease area during times of food 
insecurity for gathering food, fuelwood, and medicines.(…) Now, with further 
encroachment of domestic investors on the North side of the river, in addition to Saudi 
Star's clearing of land on the South side, the impending damming of the Alwero, the impact 
of villagization projects, ongoing raids from neighboring tribes, and changes to their local 
environment, the future is indeed bleak for the villagers of Pokedi."(Mousseau and Sosnoff 
2011: 32). 
 
3.4.1.3 Soft infrastructure (SI) 
The sub indicator ‘soft Infrastructure’ counts half (50%) of the wins for the investors 
and100% for the government as well as the local communities. For the losses, half (50%) of 
the evidence shows unsustainability for the investors, while no evidence (0%) is found with 
the government and their local communities. This can be explained by the investment made 
by the investors in order to establish soft infrastructure, e.g. health care or educational 
facilities. The host country only wins in this situation because of the benefits they receive 
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through health care and education. Even though this shows a sustainable picture for the host 
country, only a few case studies have documented the implementation of soft infrastructure. 
The study of Guillozet and Bliss (2011: 7) also demonstrates this phenomenon in Ethiopia: 
"The Enterprise contributes to a range of community development projects, for example: 
building schools and clinics in Kebeles bordering plantation and natural forests; 
disbursing Eucalyptus seedlings to try to boost farm incomes; providing supplementary 
agricultural extension services; and exploring options to devolve some natural forest 
management authority to communities." 
3.4.1.4 Security (S) 
As already explained in section“4.1.2. Livelihood”, the replacement of local people or land 
evictions often results in social conflicts and violence (Levien 2012). This issue has been 
evidenced by around half (35) of these case studies. This shows the loss in social 
sustainability in security for the local communities as well as the investor(s) (for 100%). One 
case study in India tells the following story: 
"In March 2007, 14 people were killed and many more raped and injured by police and 
party­thugs in Nandigram, West Bengal, for refusing to give their land for a petrochemical 
SEZ promoted by an Indonesian company. (...) Nandigram was the tip of the iceberg, as 
farmers across the country were resisting the government's use of eminent domain to 
acquire and transfer their land to private companies for the development of these hyper­
liberalized enclaves."(Levien 2012: 933) 
3.4.1.5 Social differentiation (SD) 
In most developing countries, there is already an existing social (class) differentiation (White 
and White 2012). However, evidence shows that agricultural investments have worsened this 
situation. The local communities are often already poor before land deals take place, but the 
impact of the investments has further exacerbated the polarization between the rich and poor. 
The majority of the case studies show the collaboration between governments and the elite, 
diaspora or high class society: they win for 100% in this sub indicator. The local communities 
face the loss in social differentiation with 95%. In Colombia, for instance, the Tayrona 
National Park has been used as a ‘green pretext’ to allow the social elite to build villas in the 
park, while the local poor are evicted and prohibited to use the forest: 
"Ecotourism serves as a powerful mechanism of accumulation by dispossession that 
evidences not just the workings of global capital, but also the green pretexts that produce 
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class­, race­ and gender­marked subjects as expropriable, disposable beings."(Ojeda 
2011: 1) 
3.4.2 Economic sustainability 
In the second dimension of sustainability, Figure 3.7 shows a more sustainable picture of AO. 
In this dimension, there is clear evidence of gains for the investors and host governments 
while local communities experience economic unsustainability. 
 
 
Figure 3.7  Economic sustainability per indicator  
(FDI: foreign direct investment and capital; HI: hard infrastructure; E: employment; S: shares 
and equity; LV: land value). 
3.4.2.1 GDP/FDI/capital (FDI) 
The first driver behind this polarization is foreign direct investment (FDI). The investor(s) 
gain in 90% of the studies by investing in TLDs and thus introduce foreign capital into the 
host country, by which the government gains economic sustainability in 97%. The local 
community and small-scale farmers lose in almost three-fourth of the evidence (71%) in terms 
of getting less incentives from the government, e.g. having to pay more for land than foreign 
investors, getting less tax free incentives, etc. Also, in out-grower schemes in which local 
farmers are obliged to pay for the machinery, technology, chemicals and fertilizers provided 
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by the (foreign) investor, they tend to lose a great deal of their profit (White and White 2012). 
This is demonstrated in the example of oil palm plantations in Indonesia: 
“Aside from these deductions for the (re)purchase of their land, the contract farmers' 
harvest incomes are further reduced by deductions for infrastructure maintenance, 
transportation, fertilizers and other inputs, etc.”(White and White 2012: 999) 
In the example of Ethiopia, the TLDs are clearly stimulated by the government itself as 
illustrated by the numerous incentives given to foreign investors: 
"Many investors suggest that the low input costs (e.g. labor), relaxed regulations, the 
streamlined process, abundant/suitable land, strategic location, preferential trade 
agreements, and abundant water resources are among the reasons why doing business in 
Ethiopia is lucrative."(Mousseau and Sosnoff 2011: 20) 
3.4.2.2 Hard infrastructure (HI) 
In contrast to soft infrastructure, ‘hard infrastructure’ is a more common compensation used 
by investors to benefit local communities, who gain in almost two-third (62%) of these 
investments. However, the benefit is also valid for the investors (89%) themselves and other 
people (on a large scale: the government, by 95%). An example of investment in hard 
infrastructure (in this case, irrigation infrastructure), is found in the case of the Save Valley in 
Zimbabwe: 
"As part and parcel of its 'corporate responsibility', Ratings entered into agreement with 
the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) and repaired 6 pumps each with a 
capacity to pump and irrigate 1,000 hectares. The facility was intended to benefit 132 
farmers resettled in 2003, whose irrigation infrastructure had been vandalised during the 
FTLR. By March 2010, Ratings Investment Ltd. and partners had reportedly used US$40 
million in the rehabilitation process. The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee also reported 
that Rating Investments and Partners, as part of their social responsibility, rehabilitated 
irrigation infrastructure covering 1,200 hectares for 4,000 irrigation communal farmers in 
the Chibuwe area at a cost of US$120,000..."(Makombe 2013: 7) 
3.4.2.3 Employment (E) 
Although employment could potentially be a great benefit of AO for the host country, the 
results of the systematic review and meta-analysis show almost two-thirds (65%) of evidence 
of economic unsustainability for the local people. The majority (88%) of investors on the 
other hand, gain from the cheap labour that is abundant in host countries. For the local 
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community, the TLDs provide an increase in employment, but the jobs are often poorly paid, 
take place in harsh and sometimes unsafe environments, with little security (contracts) and 
hard working conditions (Benjaminsen et al., 2011; Grandia 2011). The following cases in, 
respectively, Guatemala and Tanzania illustrate these difficulties: 
"There is work in palm companies, this is true, but they do not pay fair wages. In the 
beginning they did, and then they stopped. One week we are paid, the next one we are 
not."(Grandia 2011: 30) 
"Few workers are for instance employed full­­‐time. At the same time, most workers are 
paid below the Tanzanian minimum wage, and their work clothes are not sufficient and not 
compensated for.”(Benjaminsen et al., 2011: 15-16) 
3.4.2.4 Shares/Equity (S) 
There is evidence of a trend towards the rising of stock markets, although this process is only 
just beginning. Here, the investors gain in 100% of the cases and the government in four-
fifths (80%) of the evidence. The local community however, tends to lose in more than two-
thirds (67%) of the cases. In Russia, the investors use equity as a means of acquiring land by 
investing in existing agro-holdings: 
"Most investors from abroad have chosen to acquire equity within already established 
Russian or Ukrainian agro­holdings, obtaining several farm enterprises with their (mostly 
leased) land in one go." (Visser and Spoor 2010: 693) 
3.4.2.5 Land Value (LV) 
The last sub-indicator for economic (un)sustainability is ‘land value’. In fourteen of the case 
studies (19%), evidence shows that land value can be a reason for foreign investments to 
invest in land, from which they gain in all fourteen of these case studies. The government also 
gains by 100%, while the local people lose in two case studies by 100%. In these cases, the 
TLDs are used as a means of adding value to the land itself. In Ethiopia, for instance: 
"There is a concern that many of these investors will clear the land for charcoal (a 
quick form of income), and then allow the land to sit idle, transferring the land to 
another investor when land prices have increased."(Mousseau and Sosnoff 2011: 24) 
This raises a great concern on the possible losses for the host country: their forests can be 
cleared only for the purpose of making profit while the actual foreign agricultural investments 
may never be accomplished. In India, this phenomenon also takes place. Here, investors profit 
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from the demand for land. The local people on the other hand, do not have the luxury to wait a 
long time before selling their land and thus do not receive the same profits: 
"Those with little land and few other sources of income had to sell the rights to their 
compensation plots quickly and at a consequently lower price. Thus, at the time of the 
survey, 70 percent of those with less than two hectares of land had already sold their plots, 
compared to only 23 percent of those possessing more than four acres. When the larger­
holders did sell their plots, they received a median sales price that was over $44,000 per 
hectare more than the small­holders."(Levien 2012: 954) 
3.4.3 Environmental sustainability 
The result on the third dimension of sustainability demonstrates that only few research studies 
assess the environmental impacts of the TLDs. The main drivers here are the sub-indicators 
biodiversity, ecosystem services, and climate change. 
 
Figure 3.8  Environmental sustainability per indicator  
(W: water; Fl: flora; Fa: fauna; Cc: climate change; S: soil). 
3.4.3.1 Flora (Fl) 
The most commonly affected environmental sub-indicator is forestry, or flora in general. 
Besides water, forests are also an important source to attract investors. They gain by 96% 
from this resource, while the host country faces loss in three-fourths (75%) of the cases and 
the local community in more than four-fifths (87%) of the evidence. This is also the case in 
Cambodia: 
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"Krom Hun Chin (Chinese company) is clearing the forests. Forests no longer exist, and 
our lives will face difficulties in the near future. Our children will not see and know all 
trees and wild animals in this area." (Neef et al., 2013: 9) 
3.4.3.2 Fauna (Fa) 
Because of the impact on the environment, most TLDs also include an encroachment of 
habitats, and their fauna. The loss of fauna could therefore be linked with the loss of flora, e.g. 
the clearing of forests. Here as well, the host country faces loss of fauna in two-thirds (67%) 
of the cases for the government and the majority (89%) for the local communities. The 
investors however, win in almost all (93%) of the cases. In Colombia (Ojeda 2011: 21) for 
instance, under the pretext of conservation, the local elite are invading in the Tayrona 
National Park, at the same place where turtles used to lay their eggs: 
"Formerly a nesting place for sea turtles, the endangered Carey among them, Cañaveral 
became a surreal place in the middle of the forest where you find luxurious cabins (at 
US$350 per night), Jacuzzis, floating beds, a spa and numbers of employees in uniforms 
running around to bring martinis to the tourists that relax at the beach." 
3.4.3.3 Water (W) 
The first sub-indicator for the environmental aspect is water, including all possible water 
sources. As Figure 3.8 shows, the case studies evidence gains for the investors by 100% on 
the one hand, and losses for the host country by around three-fourths (71%) for the 
government and 100% for the local community on the other. Many of the investors chose to 
locate their investment nearby water areas, in order to get (free) access to water resources 
(Adamczewski et al., 2013). This explains why they experience environmental sustainability 
in the TLDs. For the local community however, their livelihood is impeded by the pollution 
of water resources. This is exemplified by the following extract from a case study in 
Tanzania: 
"These activities caused contamination of the water sources which feed a water supply 
scheme managed by a downstream local community and serving a population of 
45,000."(Arduino et al., 2012: 344) 
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3.4.3.4 Soil (S) 
Soil erosion can be caused by short-term mining or the cultivation of crops with high nutrient 
demands, as well as the use of pesticides and fertilizers (e.g. sugarcane: Azadi et al., 2012). 
Monoculture for example, may have serious consequences on the state of the soil. This is 
evidenced in the following quote from a case study in Brazil: 
"An increasing adoption of mixed production systems can be observed, although 
monoculture still prevails, causing significant damage to the soils. Furthermore, 
monoculture is eliminating the rich biodiversity of the Cerrados, which is only now 
becoming an object of conservation policies."(Wilkinson et al. 2012: 432) 
 
In this sub indicator, the investors gain in all case studies (100%), while both the government 
and local community lose in almost all of the same case studies (by respectively 87% and 
100%). In total, the results of our research on the drivers behind the (un)sustainability of 
TLDs prove the difference in win and loss for the three stakeholders. In the social dimension, 
we see an unsustainable situation for the local communities and a sustainable outcome for the 
investor(s) and host government. In the economic dimension, TLDs look more sustainable for 
all parties, however the meta-analysis shows the presence of losses mainly for local people. 
From the environmental point of view, the unsustainable situation for the host country is 
evidenced while only the investor(s) benefit from the environment in which the TLDs take 
place. In the next section, we will take a closer look at the “win-loss” situation for the three 
stakeholders’ per dimension of sustainability. 
3.4.3.5 Climate change (Cc) 
Even though this theme is very present in recent discourses and scientific studies, in terms of 
TLDs, climate change is not a highly researched topic in the case studies. There are forms of 
so-called ‘green grabbing’, which try to ‘protect’ the environment (Fairhead et al., 2012). 
However, at the same time, they imply negative consequences for the local community in all 
(100%) of the cases as well as the government in more than four-fifths (83%) of the cases. 
This is clearly also the case in Tanzania: 
"The general pattern in all these cases is a new form of primitive accumulation created by 
global actors with certain interests (biodiversity conservation, safari tourism, climate 
change mitigation) obtaining cheaply acquired land through capital investments at the 
expense of the rural peasantry." (Benjaminsen et al., 2011: 23) 
One case study in Bolivia described the influence of the land deals on the climate: 
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"However, there is evidence of environmental degradation in the eastern lowlands to such 
an extreme that this has seemingly caused a significantly warmer and drier climate in the 
region." (Urioste 2012: 444) 
3.4.4 Sustainability for all three dimensions and stakeholders 
By combining all the five sub-indicators of social sustainability, the overall social 
sustainability for each stakeholder was estimated in Table 3.2. Based on Figure 3. 6, for all 
the social indicators, 169 numbers (55+ 60+ 0+ 35+19) of evidence has shown losses 
experienced for local communities, while the numbers of the evidence for investors and 
country's government were 8 (1+ 0+ 2+ 5+ 0) and 4 (0+ 4 + 0+ 0), respectively. Also, 
according to Table 3.2, the local community has lost in 169 case studies. Investors have 
experienced a loss in 8 case studies, and finally, the number of evidence for loss experience 
for the country’s government is 4. 
 
Table 3.2  Social, economic and environmental sustainability per stakeholder 
Dimension Win-Loss status Stakeholder 
Investor Host country Local community 
Social Loss 8 4 169 
Win 74 48 17 
Economic Loss 8 3 42 
Win 89 67 27 
Environmental Loss 2 54 72 
Win 62 17 6 
3.4.5 Social sustainability 
As Table 3.2 shows, the most affected stakeholder in the social dimension is the local 
community together with local small-scale farmers: they lose in almost all (91%) case studies. 
This table also explains why there is a tendency to name AO in a negative way; i.e., “land 
grabbing”. The great number of evidence (91%) for losses experienced by local communities 
shows an unsustainable social situation for this stakeholder. The investor(s) experience more 
gains in nearly all case studies (90%). This explains their motivation to invest in the TLD. 
The host country’s government also wins in almost all (92%) case studies. 
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The social dimension therefore shows a win-win-loss situation for the TLDs, and thus a 
unsustainable social outcome for the local community while being socially sustainable for the 
investor(s) and the government of the host country.  
3.4.5.1 Economic sustainability 
In contrast to the social dimension however, the economic dimension clearly is of more 
interest for the investors and the host country’s government. After all, the investors see AO as 
an economic opportunity and this is the main reason why they seek these opportunities abroad 
(Mousseau and Sosnoff 2011). Within the host country a great difference between the 
government and the local communities is observed once more.  
Similar to the former dimension of sustainability, economic sustainability also 
introduces a win-win-loss status for the TLDs. The investors win by 92%, the host country by 
96% while their local communities lose by 61%. 
3.4.5.2 Environmental sustainability 
The third dimension evidences how both host government and local community lose in terms 
of environmental sustainability. Here, they both experience the losses caused by the TLDs, 
while the investor(s) receive some (economic) benefits from biodiversity loss, ecosystem 
services damage, and changing (micro) climates. The damage to these resources however can 
be seen as a loss for all three stakeholders, but the investors will leave the environmental 
damages to the local people after their lease period ends. 
 
In this case, the TLDs would be categorized as win-loss-loss. The investors gain in 97% of the 
cases, while the losses are experienced by the host country (76% for the government and 92% 
for the local community). Even though this already shows a clear differentiation between the 
‘win’-situation for the investor and the ‘losses’ for the host country, most case studies 
demonstrate a lack of research and monitoring in terms of consequences for the environment.  
3.4.5.3 Investors 
As concluded in the previous tables and figures, in all three dimensions of sustainability, the 
investor(s) often experiences a ‘win’-situation.  
Almost all of the wins are situated in the economic dimension (92%), by accumulating 
capital. However, in the case of social sustainability (90% gains), the sub-indicator ‘tenure 
arrangements’ contributes to another considerable win-situation for the investor(s). In the 
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environmental dimension as well, the investors find benefits in the environment (97% gains) 
through the use of flora (forest clearing), and ecosystem services (mainly water and soil 
resources). The perspective of the investors clearly demonstrates their interest in AO since 
they experience sustainability in its social, economic and environmental dimensions.  
3.4.5.4 Host government 
As many of the case studies have indicated, the government plays a crucial role in the 
stimulation of AO. Table 3.2 underlines their motivation for allowing and attracting foreign 
investments in their country. 
 
The largest share of gains is found in the economic dimension (96%): the increase of foreign 
direct investment along with the gross domestic product is the main drivers for encouraging 
AO by governments (Mousseau and Sosnoff 2011). Also, the investment in hard 
infrastructure from the investors contributes to these gains. The social dimension mainly 
consists of gains (by 92%) because of the compensation governments receive in terms of 
renting or selling land. This is characterized by the sub-indicator ‘land tenure arrangements’. 
On the other hand, the importance of the environmental dimension is also noticed. Even more 
than the economic dimension, the environmental dimension shows evidence of a need for 
attention, seeing the loss in more than three-fourths of the evidence (76%). Most governments 
do not seem to be aware of the threats of AO, or ‘land grabbing’ as they face a loss of 
environmental assets, which can cause unknown irreversible damage to the country’s ecology 
(Zoomers 2011).  
3.4.5.5 Local community 
In contrast to the investors, the local communities in the host countries experience losses in all 
the three dimensions of sustainability. Although all the three dimensions are marked by the 
unsustainability showcased in the case studies, there is definitely a higher amount of evidence 
in the social dimension (91% loss). The sub-indicators behind this observation are the losses 
found in the local livelihood, tenure arrangements and security. While there is a certain 
presence of gains in the economic category, the amount of losses is still higher (61%). These 
losses therefore minimize the advantages that local communities might experience. Besides 
the government, the environmental consequences also affect the local people in the host 
countries (92% loss), where the communities are often highly dependent on local natural 
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resources. By examining the drivers behind social, economic and environmental 
(un)sustainability for the investors, host government and local community, we are able to 
make some finalizing conclusions on the global picture of sustainability of TLDs in the next 
section. 
3.4.6 Overall sustainability 
In order to answer the question of sustainability of TLDs, we conclusively examine the total 
amount of losses as well as gains for the three dimensions of sustainability. Figure 3.9 
demonstrates the dominance of losses in the social and environmental dimensions but gains in 
the economic dimension.  
 
Figure 3.9  Total amount of losses and gains per dimension of sustainability. 
 
As shown in the figure, the unsustainability of the social dimension is higher in TLDs. More 
than half (57%) of the case studies evidence social unsustainability. As we have seen in the 
previous sections, the unsustainability in the social dimension is mainly experienced by the 
local communities. Therefore, the term ‘land grabbing’ is fitting for this dimension, since it 
implicates the negative outcome of the TLDs by which land is being taken from local 
communities in order to encourage large scale investments. This means that the TLDs are 
considered to be socially unsustainable. In contrast to the social dimension of sustainability, 
the gains exceed the losses in the economic dimension by more than three-fourths in the case 
studies (77% win).  
 
Even though the local communities may experience more losses, the gains for the investor(s) 
and host country’s government dominate the economic level, and thus show evidence of the 
economic sustainability caused by the TLDs. This further demonstrates why governments 
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stimulate the TDLs by welcoming investing (capital-rich) countries while the negative effects 
have impacted the local communities. Similar to the social dimension, the environmental 
losses dominate this dimension of sustainability by almost two-thirds of the case studies (60% 
loss). These losses are mainly of importance to the host country’s government and 
communities, whose environmental resources are affected. The investor(s) gain from these 
resources while the other stakeholders face the negative effects of the TLDs in the 
environmental dimension. 
3.5 Discussion 
In the chapter, efforts were made to investigate the (un)sustainability of transnational land 
deals. Based on the assumption that that that there are three dimensions of sustainability, i.e., 
the “social acceptability,” “economic viability” and “environmental conservation,” the level 
of (un)sustainability associated with the TLDs is examined. The concept of sustainability does 
not have a well structured and universally applicable measurement criteria, and hence, it was 
necessary to develop an own conceptual framework for analyzing the sustainability of land 
deals. As a result, there are limitations in computing values for each dimension of 
sustainability and overall sustainability of land deals. Given that the unsustainability of TLDs 
is prevalent in the social as well as the environmental dimension, this chapter proved the 
existence of land ‘grabbing’ in these dimensions. The chapter has also shown the vulnerability 
of the host country’s local communities and small-scale farmers. According to the results, the 
investors clearly gain in all three dimensions. All evidence shows the need for more balanced 
TLDs, where all stakeholders can experience ‘gains’ in all the three dimensions. 
 
For the first dimension of sustainability, the social sub-indicator ‘tenure arrangements’ shows 
a need to compensate the loss or eviction experienced by local communities. Without good 
land governance and land titling, vulnerable groups, especially small-scale farmers are the 
main losers of TLDs. The economic dimension demonstrates the need for governing the 
benefits of the local communities. In this case, the sustainability could be increased by 
monitoring the contracts between the government and the investors, by looking at the 
implications of the contracts for local communities. The focus here should lie in protecting 
outgrower schemes as well as hiring local workers, guaranteeing better working conditions 
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and fair wages, and demanding agricultural production (in order to discourage rising land 
value operations). 
 
The results put the main responsibility on the shoulders of the host country’s government that 
needs to protect their communities. Instruments such as research on the land use rights and 
communication with local people on the emergence of agricultural investments have to be 
increased. The introduction of spatial planning and a bottom-up approach could improve the 
situation of vulnerable groups. As the results of this study have shown, currently, the host 
country’s government experiences a ‘win’ in the economic and social dimensions. The local 
communities on the other hand experience ‘loss’ in all three dimensions. Spatial planning can 
be a top-down tool for the governments to plan the future of their country’s land and user 
rights. By implementing a spatial plan they are required to research the existing land use 
rights of local communities and pastoralists. By mapping these properties, they are able to 
give rights to the local people for their land(s). A bottom-up approach will mean that the local 
land owners will then have to be informed and involved in the spatial planning process and 
thus be able to express their needs and hope for the future of their land. Only by combining a 
top-down and bottom-up process, can the sustainability for both government and local 
communities of these countries be approached in the future.  
 
planning, a monitoring system should be implemented in order to maintain a sustainable 
outcome for all the three stakeholders in all the three dimensions. In this way, a win-win-win 
situation could be better approached. For the social dimension, monitoring the spatial 
planning system is necessary as well as creating local organizations in order to achieve 
bottom-up initiatives from local communities. An example here could be an organization for 
local farmers in which they can follow the training of and learn from the experience of foreign 
investors.  
 
In fact, a global monitoring system should be set-up to inspect the performance of the 
investors in host countries to come up with a green deal. Such a system should help both the 
host and guest countries to make a continuous monitoring system on the consequences of the 
deals (Azadi et al., 2013). It should therefore not be difficult for both countries to let third 
parties make an investigation on the consequences of TLDs. Moreover, they should 
intentionally ask the third parties to make such investigations continuously. Accordingly, the 
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monitoring system should formally be mentioned in the contract as an imperative article of 
the regulations.  
 
It is also important to note which actor should be involved in the monitoring, and what would 
suggest that this is done objectively. Subsequently, it is important to ask “how could this actor 
enforce that so that in case of undesired practices, investors or government are held 
accountable, and actions enforced? This should be addressed in future studies. Monitoring is 
not only necessary for the working conditions, but also the environment. The resources found 
in the environment are crucial in sustaining the livelihood of local people. This is why the 
natural water and soil resources as well as the biodiversity (measured by the flora and fauna) 
and the impact on the climate change have to be monitored, as Cotula et al (2009) have 
already pointed out.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This study has provided a summary of the results of existing research on “land grabbing”. In 
accordance with the study by Azadi et al (2013), the sustainability of TLDs has been studied 
in three dimensions (social, economic and environmental) as well as in the perspective of 
three stakeholders (investor, host country and local community).  
 
Accordingly, it seems that there is no absolute sustainability for local communities. As stated 
by Peluso and Lund (2011:669): “There is no one grand land grab, but a series of changing 
contexts, emergent processes and forces, and contestations”. The global surge in large-scale 
land investments is increasingly linked to the significant risks of negative impacts on access 
to and control over natural resources, food security, human rights, and the environment. These 
investments have been plagued by secrecy, with associated deals often made without 
acknowledging the role of local communities, who are thus unable to hold governments or 
investors accountable.  
 
Lack of transparency in contract negotiations also develops corruption and deals that do not 
maximise the communities’ interest. Some recently reported land deals were associated with 
allegations that investors had paid cash or in-kind contributions to business or other activities 
run by high government officials or even the president in a personal capacity (Hervieu, 2009). 
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Furthermore, polarised debates about individual titling in Africa have witnessed sceptical 
positions from many civil society groups. The new land acquisition trend requires revisiting 
the longstanding debate about land titling. Local land rights systems can work well at the 
local level, but they are irrelevant to investors. As noted by Cotula (2009), the collective 
registration of community lands can be an effective tool for protecting local land rights vis-à-
vis incoming investors. The international community also needs to pay greater attention to its 
potential role in facilitating, or tackling corruption in land  
 
The responsibility of the host country’s government for improving the sustainability of TLDs 
is therefore high. They need to protect their local communities and their natural resources 
whilst attracting foreign investments in order to guarantee economic growth, with the support 
of international development partners and civil society organizations. Social mobilization by 
community leaders and civil society organizations is crucial to ban ‘land grabbing’. NGOs 
and other civil society communities do not only have a stake in governance, but also a driving 
force behind greater international cooperation through the active mobilization of public 
support for international agreements (Kulkarni et al. 2013). According to Gerstter et al. 
(2011), there are two approaches at the international level that aim at regulating transnational 
land deals. First is the responsible principles for agricultural investment that respects rights, 
livelihoods and resources by the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The other action is the development of 
guidelines or principles for good land governance and responsible investment in agriculture 
that can be taken by intergovernmental organizations (IFAD 2010). The FAO has been 
working on raising awareness of the importance of good governance of land and natural 
resource tenure in the past few years (Gerstter et al., 2011). The World Bank Group (WBG) 
can also promote large-scale land investment in developing countries as a “win-win” situation 
where investors profit and host nations benefit from economic development, improved 
agricultural infrastructure, and employment opportunities (Azadi et al., 2013). The WBG 
contribution to the land investment trend is direct financing of agribusiness firms. 
 
Apart from the host nations and intergovernmental bodies, investors should also take over 
their complete responsibility and commitments in all this. The question surfaces whether such 
deals are sensible when we take into account the opportunity costs and alternative scenario's. 
Furthermore, there remains some other crucial questions like: How does the employment 
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gained compare to the employment lost? How much does the host state gain economically, 
when, as often happens, land is leased out very cheaply, and investors receive a range of tax 
breaks and subsidies? How economically viable are these large-scale investment projects? As 
concluded by Azadi et al. (2013), this study also recommends that in order to understand the 
main impacts of such deals, we still need to create more evidence for each situation in the 
framework of a series of risk assessment studies on the bases of both “country-case” and 
“crop-case”. 
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Chapter 4 Features of land acquisition in 
Ethiopia  
Adapted from Dereje, T., Azadi, H., Nyssen, J., Lanckriet, S., Asfaha,T.G., Mitiku, H., Witlox, 
F. (2016). Dynamics in the North­South Capital Mobility and Rise of South­South Land 
Deals? Features of Land Acquisition in Ethiopia. Submitted 
 
Abstract Transnational land deals, or ‘global land grabbing’, is among the most contested but 
inadequately understood topics. We have dealt with the features of large-scale transnational 
land deals (LSTLDs) in the South, and with its consequences in the context of Ethiopia. In the 
present study, we applied a mixed method research design which employed both qualitative 
and quantitative techniques. While snowball sampling procedure is used to solicit qualitative 
information, databases are used to generate numeric data. Results indicated that the 
government commercialized nearly 2.47 million ha of land (approx. the area of Djibouti) to 
both domestic (excluding state projects) and transnational investors (who dealt 80% of the 
total land) in Ethiopia. Through these initiative actions, the Government of Ethiopia has 
shown its commitment to involving their private sector in the national economy. About 81 
percent of the total leased land is conducted on a large-scale basis (> 200 ha) to transnational 
investors at cheap land rental prices, € 1.40 – 37 ha-1 yr-1, for 25-50 years. We found that there 
is a significant variation among transnational investors regarding the size of the land that they 
hold (p < 0.0001). Foreign companies (mean = 17,018 ha, SE = 2,293), joint-ventures (mean 
= 5,143, SE = 1368), and diaspora, i.e., Ethiopians living abroad (mean = 1,062 ha, SE = 
129). We explored the dominance of LSTLDs deals by companies of the Global South, 
particularly entrepreneurs from India. Ethiopia is a good case in point that validates emerging 
arguments on the rise of South-South investment deals rather than the established explanation 
of North-South capital flows. However, three-fourths of the land deals show scant levels of 
performance. LSTLDs have contributed between 4.5 – 6 percent in raising domestic 
agricultural production but have resulted in non-performing loans for banks of the host 
country as well. In all probability, the land deals are leading to financial-grabbing, where 
Ethiopian banks are end up with non-performing loans and then must hustle with chasing 
‘investors’ to settle loans counted in millions that investors borrowed in order to run their 
projects. In the study, we unveiled plenty of issues related to LSTLDs and narrated an 
exemplary lessor-lessee dispute, i.e., the Karuturi Global case. The study also specified 
questions for further scrutiny and policy intervention. 
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4.1 Introduction 
‘Global land grabbing’ has become the favourite expression to describe transnational 
commercial land acquisitions. Globally, powerful actors are acquiring land outside of their 
national boundaries in order to invest in agribusiness areas. Many have regarded it as a natural 
supply side ‘response’ to the crop price hikes of 2007-2008 (Cotula et al., 2009; Azadi et al., 
2013; Dereje et al., 2015; Vandergeten et al., 2016). Mehta et al. (2013) considered the 
transnational land acquisition was the result of the surplus liquid capital that has accumulated 
in the financial markets of the developed North where owners face a shortage of profitable 
investment opportunities. According to Zoomers (2010), it is the combined result of 
globalization and liberalization in land markets. The leasing or buying of large parcels of 
land, i.e., large-scale land acquisition, from developing countries (hereafter ‘lessors’ or 
‘governments’) by transnational or domestic companies, governments or individuals, hereafter 
‘investors’, is a contentious subject. It is considered as part of the prevailing manifestations 
within the restructuring food regime and its global economic networks (McMichael, 2013). 
 
The rising demand for crops coupled with the tightening of factor markets in densely 
populated parts of Asia and the Middle East has also attributed to accelerated transnational 
farmland acquisition (de Hoyos & Medvedev, 2011). Some have scrutinized the phenomenon 
in terms of the agrarian political economy (Peluso & Lund, 2011), and political ecology 
(James et al., 2012). Others relate it to gender relations (Chu, 2011), the role of the state 
(Suhardiman et al., 2015), and security mercantilism (McMichael, 2013). For other scholars, 
it is attached to ‘water grabbing’ (Mehta et al., 2013; Rulli et al., 2013), food sovereignty 
(Rosset et al., 2014), and enterprise labour (Li, 2011). 
 
GRAIN (2012), documented 416 large-scale land acquisitions by foreign investors, claiming a 
total of 35 million ha of land in 66 countries. The Land Matrix database is a recently available 
database for transnational land transactions that has some limitations. Accordingly, in the 
period 2000-2015, about 1103 large-scale transnational land deals (LSTLDs) were concluded 
globally, transacting 40.6 million ha, more than thirteen times the size of Belgium or about 
equivalent to the size of Netherlands and Germany combined. Ten percent of the investors 
hold 68% of the overall land acquired in the stated period, implying that LSTLDs dominantly 
involve large land sizes, and 35% of the acquired land is in Africa (Land Matrix, 2015). Yet, 
this database is imprecise, a limitation that we will examine in the case of Ethiopia which is 
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one of the leading destinations of LSTLDs (Lavers, 2012; Dessalegn, 2011). First, we must 
ask, how and how much commercial farmland has been leased in Ethiopia so far? Some 
authors attempted to answer this question, but all of them stated limitations in their reports. 
For instance, World Bank et al. (2010) estimated a total of 1.2 million ha of Ethiopian land 
was transferred to transnational investors while the Global Land Project (GLP) stated the 
entirety of the commercialized land in Ethiopia was between 2.9 – 3.5 million ha (GLP, 
2010). Others reported 2.5 million ha (Vhugen, 2010), 1.19 million ha (Deininger et al., 
2011), or 3.5 million ha (Dessalegn, 2011). However, we have presented an up-to-date data 
made with different categories of investors. 
 
Second, how much does it cost to rent the leased land? How was that price determined? Who 
leases the land to investors? And how ? And how the country’s rural land administration and 
use proclamation affect the outcomes expected from the land deal? Third, the recurring 
transnational land acquisition is understood as the North-South investment deals (GRAIN, 
2008; Zoomers, 2010). Some presume that the decline of North-South collaborations and the 
ascent of South-South socio-economic cooperation is a precursor for the new configurations 
of global power (Margulis et al., 2013). Therefore, which one takes place in the context of 
Ethiopia?  
 
Fourth, what are the major crop focus areas for the companies in question? And lastly, after 
years of cooperation between contracting parties (i.e., investors and the government of 
Ethiopia), disputes have emerged. We identified and fully explained one exemplary form of 
ongoing conflict between the government of Ethiopia and a transnational company that 
received the largest share of land from among all of the other investors. The company initially 
agreed to develop 100,000 ha of land (with a promise to add further 200,000 ha of land) with 
an annual land lease rate of Birr 20 (≈ € 0.83) ha-1 for 50 years. 
 
The chapter has four major sections. After this introductory section, the second part is about 
the study area and methodology which briefly described the study area and the research 
methods used. The third section presents results and discussion where much data is presented 
coherently with triangulation of facts for the critical analysis made. Finally, in the conclusion 
section, we made an inference on how the global south becomes a key player for the dynamics 
in the large-scale transnational land deals, and we forwarded issues for further investigation. 
 102 
4.2 Study area and methodology 
4.2.1  Study area  
Ethiopia is a country located in the Horn of Africa (Figure 4.1) and is one of the fastest 
growing economies with a total area of 1.14 million km2, of which 45% is arable (EIA, 2013). 
With a projected population of 99.4 million in 2015, it has a population density of 87 persons 
km-2 and an annual population growth rate of 2.4% (United Nations, 2015). Over the period of 
2004 – 2014, the country has scored a real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 10.9% 
(MoFED, 2010; World Bank, 2015a). By considering the national average population growth 
of the country, the average real GDP growth per capita is 8% per annum. In the period of 
2000 – 2014, Ethiopia’s human development index (HDI) has improved from 0.284 to 0.442, 
implying an increase of 55.6% at 3.21% annually (UNDP, 2015). The Gross National Income 
(GNI) per capita it is also on the proper track record in order to reach its goal of a middle-
income country by the year 2025 (World Bank, 2015a). Next to the services sector, 
agriculture is the second largest contributor to the economic growth in the country followed 
by industry.  
 
Figure 4.1  Location and topographic map of Ethiopia and Benishangul Gumuz region 
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4.2.2 Methodology 
4.2.2.1 Types of agricultural investors 
The minimum threshold set for the term ‘large-scale’ in land deals varies considerably: 200 ha 
(Joshua et al., 2013) or 1001-10,000 ha (Baumgartner et al., 2015). Some associate the term 
‘mega’ as the denotation for land greater than 10,000 ha, and 500 ha (Deininger et al., 2011). 
We considered 200 ha as the minimum threshold (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Rulli et al., 2013) . 
For our analysis, we conceptually classified investors in the agricultural sector into two 
broader categories: viz. transnational and domestic (Figure 4.2). Multinational investors are 
reclassified into large scale (holding > 200 ha) and non-large scale (those holding < 200 ha), 
where the former include foreign companies, Ethiopian diaspora businesses and joint 
ventures.  
 
* The focus of the dissertation 
Figure 4.2  Types of agricultural investors 
[Those involved in large-scale transnational land deals (LSTLDs) and other groups of 
investors (where LSTLDs deals over > 200ha of land)]. 
4.2.2.2 Study design and data sources 
The study employed a mixed-method research approach which encompasses both quantitative 
and qualitative measurements (Creswell, 2003). Multiple data sources were used to explore 
and validate figures and concerns related to land deals in Ethiopia. We used databases in the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Ethiopian Agricultural Investment and Land Administration 
Agency (EAILAA), Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA), Central Statistical Agency (CSA), 
Land Matrix, and the concerned banks and investors. From the databases, data explored on a 
number of variables such as signed land lease contractual agreements, amount of land 
supplied to investors, land used per investment area and crop type, reported employment 
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generated and crop production. State institutions in Ethiopia have recently implemented 
progressive public service improvement reforms which have caused institutions to be 
restructured. Consequently, though quantitative desktop data is available in a relatively 
organized form, it is hardly possible to access consistent and up-to-date data about 
commercial land deals from a single source. Leased land data from 338 large-scale 
transnational investors, who acquired 81% of the total commercialized land in the country, 
were considered for the study. A snowball sampling procedure was followed in order to 
gather the necessary data (Figure 4.3). Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling 
procedure or technique used to identify potential respondents who are hard to locate without 
the assistance of referrals.  
 
Figure 4.3  Snowballing, a recruitment network in a respondent-driven sampling 
(Launched with with 4 “seeds”. Adapted from Heckathorn (1997) 
 
The method pictured above was initially developed to investigate the structure of social 
networks (Goodman, 1961). In our initial attempts, we realized that the most feasible method 
of pursuing transnational land lease data in the country was to obtain appropriate and 
informative members of the potential study ‘population’ using all available mechanisms (first 
wave, i.e. the seed). In our case, a respondent is not necessarily an individual, as we were 
dealing with an institutional issue (i.e., land deal), but our respondents could also be teams or 
process owners; the presence of which make our method a kind of modified snowball 
sampling (Heckathorn, 1997). In addition to its low cost, an advantage of the snowball 
sampling approach is its ability to locate respondents (from an unknown number of 
population) with reliable information (Frank & Snijders, 1994). On the other hand, respondent 
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bias and incorrect anchoring are some of the possible limitations of the approach (Cohen & 
Arieli, 2011). However, cross-validating the data with other sources such as archives, official 
reports, and databases was used in order to mitigate the effects of such limitations attached to 
snowballing.  
4.2.3 Data analysis 
Descriptive statistics, analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA), and qualitative analysis were 
used for analysis. Specifically, in the One-Way ANOVA tests the null hypothesis: μ0 = μ1 = 
μ2 = μ2 =... μn where µ = group mean land size acquired by investors and n = number of 
groups. For our case, n = 3, where ‘n’ refers to the number of lessee groups. 
n1 = 91 = Foreign companies  
n2 = 46 = Joint ventures (i.e, foreign investors and Ethiopian diaspora) , and 
n3 = 201 = Ethiopian diaspora investors  
Since ANOVA does not show which group is statistically different from the rest, we ran the 
Bonferroni post hoc multiple comparison test (Hilton & Armstrong, 2006). As an iterative and 
reflexive process, we began qualitative analysis while we were on a data collection mission 
and continued throughout the study period as described in Stake (2005). Through the process 
of progressive focusing (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012), we consistently adjusted our data 
collection approaches. 
4.3 Results and discussion 
4.3.1 The demand for land and its supply 
Since 1992, the former Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA), presently the Ethiopian 
Investment Commission (EIC), has been the institution responsible for handling most of the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows of the country. For an eleven year period (2005-2015) 
agriculture had a considerable share in the FDI inflow of Ethiopia. During those years, 
agriculture and operations related to it contributed, on average, 21% of the FDI inflow of the 
country (Figure 4.4).  
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Figure 4.4  The share of agricultural in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Ethiopia  
Source: Own computations from UNCTAD (2011; 2015), (World Bank, 2015b), and unpublished data from the 
Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA). 
 
The government announced the availability of 115,460 km2 of land suitable in ten ‘potential 
areas’ of investment (Figure 4.5). The two principal areas of investment were pulses and 
cotton, followed by oil crops, maize, and horticulture. Later, other crops, such as sugar, were 
considered necessary, which led to more land being allocated. However, the stated figure is 
somewhat exaggerated, i.e., that it is about 10% of the total area of the country. Officials in 
the Ethiopian Agricultural Investment and Land Administration Agency argue that there are 
further available farmlands in the ‘unutilized’ lowlands in Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Somali, 
and Gambela regions.  
 
Figure 4.5  Potential areas of farming in Ethiopia as adapted from EIA (2013) 
The numbers in the parentheses represent size of land (’000 km2) 
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Since there is a scarcity of farmland in the highlands, renting land to investors is more 
common in the lowlands, for example, in the Benishangul-Gumuz region (Dereje et al., 
2016). According to survey results, the mean household land holding in highland Ethiopia is 
fragmented, on average, into 2.3 plots of land, each having 0.35 hectares (Samuel, 2006). 
However, there are regions in the country which have legally restricted further fragmentation 
of land, making it so that no plot of land may be smaller than 0.25 hectares (Segers et al., 
2010). According to a recent survey carried out in 10 regions of the country (i.e., all regions 
except Addis Ababa city), the average size of land for a single household is 1.37 hectares, 
though there is some variation based on the gender of the household head and place of 
residence (CSA & World Bank, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 4.6  Land transferred to investors in Ethiopia each year (until September 2015). 
 (Source: Own computation from EAILAA (2015) and different unpublished datasets at Ethiopian Investment 
Agency (EIA), Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Central Statistical Agency (CSA), and Land Matrix) 
 
Though, according to the national investment commission (EIA, 2013), 45% of the country’s 
total area is arable, but there are conservation laws which prohibit farming in some places. For 
instance, according to the Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation (GoE, 2005b), 
the management of rural land with a slope < 30% should adhere to the strategy for soil 
conservation and water harvesting. Besides which, the development of annual crops on 
agricultural land with slopes 31-60% is only allowed when bench terraces have been 
constructed. Yet, the official declarations are ambitious whenit comes to potential available 
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investment land. How much commercial farmland is leased in Ethiopia so far? A great deal of 
it was leased between 2008/’09-2012/’13 (Figure 4.6). 
 
Table 4.1  Overview of transnational land leases in Ethiopia 
Rank Company/investor Origin Major crop 
Total area leased 
(ha) 
Share 
(%) 
1 Karuturi Global Inc India Oil palm, cereals 100000 4 
1 Boleyn industrial PLC China Rubber 100000 4 
1 LHB Israel PLC Israel Jatropha 100000 4 
4 Sun Biofuels Ethiopia (NBC)  UK Jatropha 80000 3.2 
5 Acazis Agro-Industry Germany Peanuts, castor 56000 2.3 
6 Adventure Ethiopia Agric PLC China Cereals 50000 2 
6 S and P Energy Solutions PLC India Pongamia 50000 2 
8 Horizon Plantation PLC Saudi Arabia Coffee, tea 49662 2 
9 Ethio Agri-CEFT PLC  Saudi Arabia Tea, flowers 48248 2 
10 Hovev Agriculture Ltd Israel Jatropha 40000 1.6 
11-20 Various companies/investors various Oil crops, cotton 334800 (33480)  1.4 
21-50 Various companies/investors various various crops 520986 (17366)  21 
51-100 Various investors/investors various various crops 294636 (5893) 12 
101-200 Various companies/investors various various crops 118889 (1189) 4.8 
201-338 Various companies/investors various various crops 45474 (330) 2 
Total (under transnational investors*, occupying ≥ 200 ha) 1,998,695 81 
Domestic (excluding state-owned enterprises) 472,205 19 
Total commercialized land 2,470,900 100 
Numbers in brackets indicate average size of leased land in the group  
*Transnational investors include Ethiopian diaspora, i.e., Ethiopians living abroad 
 
Of the total 3.815 million ha of land in different regions of the country that was solicited 
(EAILAA, 2015), 2,470,900 ha of that land has been leased to investors (Figure 4.6). Among 
the total land transferred to transnational investors, large-scale land deals (i.e., land 200 ha or 
greater) constituted 81% of the whole land that was leased either to a foreign or a foreign-
Ethiopian joint venture investment. (Table 4.1). The market rental price of land was € 1.40 – 
37 ha-1 yr-1 (overall, an average lease price is about € 7.65 ha-1 yr-1), a much lower rate even 
when compared to local land rental market prices. Local land lease prices vary considerably 
within and across regions, for instance, the lease rate in the Benishangul-Gumuz region is € 
83 – 140 ha-1 yr-1 with a regional average of € 107 ha-1 yr-1. 
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4.3.2 Who leases land to investors? 
The land is leased by two actors in the country (Figure 4.7): by the federal government 
(from the federal land bank), and by the regional governments (from the land they 
administer). As a Federal State, Ethiopia has two special administrative cities that are 
accountable to the federal government and nine regional states that are autonomous in 
regard to their regulatory affairs. The powers and functions of both the federal and 
regional governments are demarcated in the constitution of the country (GoE, 1995). 
Accordingly,  
The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural 
resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is 
a common property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and 
shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange (GoE, 1995, Art.40/3). 
 
The federal government is mandated to enact laws that utilize and conserve land and other 
natural resources, historical sites and objects (Art.51/5). In line with this, in 1997 it enacted a 
Land Administration and Use Proclamation, i.e., Proclamation no.87/1997, which was later 
replaced by the current Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation, Proclamation 
no.456/2005 (RLALUP) (GoE, 2005b). It also passed a law on the expropriation of 
landholding and the accompanied compensation, Proclamation no.455/2005 (GoE, 2005a). 
Furthermore, there are other rules and regulations that were formulated by parts of the federal 
government, such as the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
and Ministry of Agriculture. There also are federal laws that regulate further land 
administration issues, such as the Urban Land Lease Proclamation (GoE, 2011) and the 
Investment Proclamation (GoE, 2012).  
 
Regional states, on the other hand, have the jurisdiction to administer land within their 
respective dominions (GoE, 1995). According to the first Rural Land Administration and Use 
Proclamation, Proclamation no. 89/1997 (GoE, 1997), which allowed regions to pass laws in 
order to administer land within their territory. Later, the stated proclamation was revoked by a 
new Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation, Proclamation 456/2005 (GoE, 2005b). 
One of the primary reasons for revoking Proclamation no. 89/1997 was ‘to encourage private 
investors in pastoralist areas where there is tribe based communal land holding system’ (GoE, 
2005b:2). This later allowed investors to use the land they lease as collateral: investors could 
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borrow money from banks using their lease holding right. However, customarily-owned 
grazing land, forests, wetlands and land that are not under cultivation were misconstrued as, 
‘idle,' ‘unused,' a ‘waste,' ‘unoccupied,' and ‘underutilized' (Cotula et al., 2009; Dereje et al., 
2016). 
 
Before 2008, regions did not restrict the size of the land they leased to investors. However, in 
2008 the federal government decided to assign a central state branch responsible for large-
scale land lease. Consequently, the responsibility was given to the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development, i.e., the current Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). In February 2010, the 
Council of Ministers empowered the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) to lease land measuring 
5000 ha and above on behalf of regional states, while regions continued to be limited to 
mandating the leasing parcels up to 5000 ha. Consequently, a partial recentralization of 
investment land administration through the establishment of a ‘land bank’ system was 
installed, through which the MoA solicited land from regions and leased it to investors 
(Figure 4.7).  
 
 
Figure 4.7  The land commercialization framework in Ethiopia 
 
The Ministry prepared a number of information packages and was able to attract many 
investors in the sector. It was also in charge of signing contracts with investors, transfering 
land, and follow-up. While the MoA accomplished most of the land lease processes, income 
generated from the land deals, such as land rental payments and income tax, was intended to 
benefit the regions. However, in practice, the regions collect payments from those ‘regional 
investors’, i.e., from those investors who signed lease agreements with the regional 
governments. The issue is still a point of contention among regional government offices. 
 111 
 
Furthermore, the federal government has automated and institutionalized the relatively 
transparent process of obtaining an investment license and registration: a prerequisite for an 
investor to get land (Figure 4.8). Previously, the process was full of intricate bureaucratic 
procedures and discouraged investors. 
 
 
Figure 4.8  Investment licensing and registration procedure in Ethiopia 
(Based on key informant investors and officers at Ethiopian Investment Commission). 
 
Though the commercialization of land has produced a shared economic development 
objective and was made within available institutional frameworks, the local perceptions and 
reactions of both the pre-deal expectations and post deal achievements were taken into 
account. We explored the strongly felt concern that the federal government (through its 
institutions) is violating one of the basic tenets of regional self-administration, thus 
compromising the regions’ autonomy in administrating their land. Analogous with our 
finding, Lavers’ arguments (Lavers, 2012) emphasized that the land deals in Ethiopia are the 
manifestation of the political economy of agricultural investment. Particularly, two regions in 
the country, i.e., the Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambela regions, are examples where the MoA 
has leased about 470,000 ha of land to investors on behalf of the regional states. In practice, 
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however, the MoA has also been involved in leasing land below 5000 ha. For example, 
Verdanta Harvest PLC (3012 ha), Keystone Agro-industry PLC (431 ha), and AlMehadi 
Match Marketers PLC (1000 ha) are among the companies that signed a lease agreement with 
the Ministry of Agriculture although the land they leased is below 5000 ha. Furthermore, the 
role of the federal government and the role of the regional states in leasing land to investors is 
ambiguous and irregular, which contributes to the limited progress of the sector.  
4.3.3 Landholding variability among investors 
Results revealed a statistically significant variability among lessee groups (i.e., transnational 
investors) concerning the size of land they hold, F(2,325) = 56.22, P < 0.0001 (Table 4.2). A 
post-hoc Bonferroni test revealed there are statistically significant differences between foreign 
companies (mean = 17,018 ha, SE = 2,293), joint lessee groups (mean= 5,143, SE = 1,368), 
and diaspora investors (mean = 1,062, SE= 129) (Table 4.3).  
 
Table 4.2  ANOVA Summary table for the land size leased for three groups of investors 
Source SS DF MS F Prob >F 
Between groups  1.5980e+10 2 7.9902e+09 56.22 0.0000 
Within groups 4.7612e+10 335 142124660 
Total 6.3592e+10 337 188701063 
Bartlett’s test for equal variances: Chi2(2) = 660.4585 Prob >chi2 = 0.000 
 
 
Table 4.3  Comparison of land size among lessee groups(one-way ANOVA) and generated 
employment 
Lessee group Obs Mean 
Std.Error 
(SE) Std.Deviation 
 Employment 
Permanent Seasonal
1 
Foreign companies 91 17018.44 2293 21877  9,436 251140 
Joint (Foreign and diaspora2) 46 5142.8 1368 9276  942 40883 
Ethiopian diasporas 201 1061.93 127 1823  1281 26540 
Total 338 5905 1023 18757  11659 318563 
1Employees who were not employed permanently but were in paid works for at least one month 
2Few foreign or diaspora investors jointly established ventures with local Ethiopian investors and we 
categorized them on the basis of investment share each has allocated. Source: Own computation from 
EAILAA (2015) and different unpublished datasets at Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA), Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA), Central Statistical Agency (CSA), and the Global Land Matrix). 
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While there is a relatively small variation of holdings among Ethiopian diaspora investors 
(SE= 127), high variation is observed among the remaining groups. Even though the 
expectation of employment opportunities was many times greater, investors only employed 
11,659 and 31, 8563 persons on permanent and seasonal bases, respectively. For a better 
understanding of the distribution of land sizes refer Figure 4.9.  
 
 
Figure 4.9 Distribution of land size leased for all large-scale transnational investors 
 
According to the databases we consulted at the Ministry of Agriculture (MoE), the average 
expected job creation was 0.012 jobs ha-1 (MoA, 2010). However, according to Deininger et 
al. (2011), the average job creation in Ethiopia was 0.005 jobs ha-1, while it was 0.01- 0.351 
jobs ha-1 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Deininger et al., 2011), and 0.014 jobs ha-1 in 
Brazil (FAO, 2012). Yet, we actually have found 0.008 permanent jobs ha-1 and 0.19 seasonal 
jobs ha-1. It is expected that there would be a higher contribution of jobs if investors operated 
in a full capacity over all of the land they leased. However, smallholder farming is more 
efficient than that of large farms and is able to create a greater amount of productive 
employment (Thapa & Gaiha, 2011). The deals generated 11,659 permanent jobs and on 
average 318,563 seasonal jobs (Table 4.3). Compared to what was expected six years ago, the 
overall employment generated is significantly smaller and the reasons for that are due to the 
meager implementation status of projects and the seasonal nature of agricultural jobs.  
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4.3.4 Origin of investors for the LSTLDs 
Companies from India took the lead in acquiring 358,000 ha (14.5% of the total leased land) 
of land, followed by companies from Saudi Arabia (9.1%), Israel (7.3%), China (7.1%), the 
USA (6.5%) and Germany (5%) (Figure 4.10). We explored that companies from ten 
countries hold about 1.50 million ha of farmland, i.e., 61% of the land leased to transnational 
investors and 64% of the total farmland commercialized in Ethiopia (Figure 4.10). GRAIN 
(2012a) reported that Indian companies took the lead in acquiring about 71.7% of the total 
leased land, followed by Saudi Arabia (13.4% ), Germany ( 5.4%), Italy (2.9% ) and USA 
(1.7%). Despite the fact that there are limitations in the land lease system, the government of 
the country was successful in attracting investors from more than 42 countries.  
 
Figure 4.10  Leading country of origins for foreign companies which acquired land in 
Ethiopia 
 (By number of projects and size of leased land) 
 
Much of the emerging literature considers the recent wave of transnational land deals, or the 
‘global land grab’, as the North-South business investment arrangement in which European 
and North American dealers are the principal actors. Contrary to this, our findings strengthen 
arguments that purport the rise of South-South deals (Margulis et al., 2013), as land deals in 
Ethiopia, for example, are dominated by Indian entrepreneurs (Figure 4.10). Is the rise of such 
of South-South investment deals fresh opportunities or do they bring new threats to host 
countries of the south? Further case-by-case investigations can add meaningful contributions 
in this regard. Even in other investment sectors (such as in manufacturing), companies from 
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the South played predominant roles in Ethiopia. For example, Xinxiang Kuroda of China 
invested $67 million in the textile industry and created about 1,100 jobs (UNCTAD, 2011). 
4.3.5 Land lease fee 
Land is an invaluable natural resource, serving both as an input in production and as the store 
of wealth and thus, it should be valued properly. Furthermore, an astute understanding of land 
as a scarce resource with competing benefits and values among land governance bodies 
precedes the allocation of the land itself and of other investment inputs on it (Burger, 1998; 
Price, 2000). However, there is fundamental issue that makes land valuation difficult. The 
objective of land valuation, the process of assessing and evaluating the characteristics of a 
given parcel of land, is to determine the value i.e. market value or benefit value, of the land 
(Demetriou, 2016). This process not only requires an understanding of the market and non-
market valuation methods, but also the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings related to 
land (Ricardo, 1817; Marx, 1965; Dachary & Rambonilaza, 2012).  
 
For many of the lease agreements, land deals passed through price negotiations made between 
investors and the government of Ethiopia. Due to a weak land management information 
system, limited infrastructure, a rushed and ill-organized land lease processes, the government 
has little bargaining power when it comes to determining land lease prices. Until December 
2008, the maximum annual per hectare land lease rate was in the Oromia region, Birr 135 (€ 
9.25 ), followed by other regions such as SNNP, Birr 117 (€ 8.01), and Amhara, Birr 79.37 (€ 
5.44).  
 
The minimum land lease price was in Amhara, Birr 14.21 (€ 0.97), followed by Benishangul-
Gumuz, Birr 15 (€ 1.03) and Gambela, Birr 20 (€ 1.37). However, by December 2008, the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) drafted a more generalized land lease price guideline (Table 
4.4) and applied it to some of the land lease contracts. Accordingly, the land lease rate was 
then determined in consideration of five fundamental factors viz., labour, capital, business 
profitability, indirect costs, and cost of transportation from ports. However, the prices do not 
reflect the real market value of the land (at least the local land rental rates). As a result, in 
consideration of the stated conditions (i.e., the location of parcels within 600 – 700 km 
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distance from the capital city and non-irrigable land, Table 4.4), the proposed lease rate, Birr 
111, ( € 4.81 – 6.45 ha-1yr-1) was effected. 
 
 
Table 4.4  Land lease price for the production of crops: categories A & B 
Category A: Land lease price for the production of all crops (except for cotton and sesame) 
Distance (km) from a reference city 
(Addis Ababa) 
Irrigable land (ha-1yr-1) Non-Irrigable land(ha-1yr-1) 
Birr EUR (€)1 Eth Birr EUR (€) 
With in Addis Ababa region 3077 188.31 2946 180.29 
Within 100 km distance 2660 162.79 2541 155.51 
100-200 2243 137.27 2136 130.72 
200-300 1826 111.75 1731 105.94 
300-400 1409 86.23 1326 81.15 
400-500 992 60.71 921 56.36 
500-600 557 34.09 516 31.58 
600-700 158 9.67 111 6.79 
Category B: Land lease price for the production of cotton and sesame 
Distance (km) from a reference location 
(Ethio-Sudan border) 
Lease price 
Eth Birr(ha-1yr-1) EUR (€ ha-1yr-1) 
Starting point  880.42 53.88 
Within 100 km distance 805.42 49.29 
100-150 767.92 47 
150-200 730.42 44.70 
200-250 692.92 42.41 
250-300 655.42 40.11 
300-350 617.92 37.82 
350-400 580.42 35.52 
400-450 542.92 33.23 
450- 500 505.42 30.93 
1 1EUR ≈ 16.34 Birr (exchange rate in June 2010). Source: Adapted from MoA (2012) 
 
Investors such as BHO Bio-products PLC, Verdanta Harvests PLC, Gashaw Bizu, Green 
Valley Agro PLC, Ruchi Agri PLC (Table 4.5), and many others that are not stated here, took 
land within a 600-700 km distance from the capital city. However, contracts made for 
irrigable parcels but within the same 600-700 km distance from the capital city, a slightly 
higher lease rate of Birr 158 (€ 4.82 – 7.22 ha-1yr-1) was effected. As was the case in the land 
lease agreements made with companies such as Sannati Agrofarm PLC, Hunan Dafengyuan 
Agriculture Co., LTD, etc. (Table 4.5).  
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Table 4.5  Details of some of the large scale transnational land lease agreements made with the Ministry of Agriculture, Ethiopia 
Name of company, 
Project or investor 
Investor’s 
Origin 
Major 
Crop(s) 
Area 
(ha) 
 
 
Rank 
(Table 4.1) 
 
Lease 
period 
(years) 
Registered capital 
(millions)1 
 Lease price 
(€ ha-1yr-1 ) 
Birr EUR2 
 
Birr EUR2 
BHO Bio-products PLC India Cereals, crops 27000 22 25 918 53.34  111 6.45 
Sannati Agrofarm PLC India Rice, cereals 10000 47 25 160 7.21  158 7.12 
Verdanta Harvests PLC India Tea 3012 97 50 631 35.27  111 6.20 
S & P Energy Solutions PLC India Biofuel 50000 6 50 984 54.88  134.40 7.50 
Keystone Agroindustry PLC Diaspora Cereals, fruits 431 238 25 66 2.9  712 31.32 
CLC Industries PLC India Cotton 25000 23 50 1177 65.39  665.85 37.00 
Karuturi Agroproducts PLC India Palm, cereals 100000 1 50 2110 147.55  20 1.40 
Saudistar Agri Devt PLC Saudi Arabia Rice 20500 31 50 37640 2071.55  30 1.65 
Hunan Dafengyuan Agriculture Co., LTD China Sugarcane 25000 23 40 25000 1143.12  158 7.22 
Kehedam Trading PLC Diaspora Oil crops 3000 98 25 13 0.56  337.8 14.42 
Saber Farms PLC India Cotton, soybean 25000 23 25 436 18.06  158 6.84 
Toren Agroindustries PLC Turkey Cotton, soybean 6000 68 25 1000 43.29  158 6.84 
Agropeace Bio Ethiopia PLC Israel Castor oil, cotton 2000 114 25 253 11.35  665.85 29.87 
AlMehadi Match M PLC Pakistan Match stick 1000 139 30 79 3.64  649.65 29.94 
Gashaw Bizu Diaspora Cotton, soybean 3000 98 25 44 1.90  111 4.81 
Green Valley Agro PLC India Cotton  5000 71 25 171 7.42  111 4.81 
JVL Overseas PTE LTD India Cotton  5000 71 25 74 3.35  158 4.82 
Omo Valley Farm Cooperation PLC Turkey Cotton 10000 47 25 750 33.94  158 7.15 
Daniel Agri Devt  Diaspora Cotton  5000 71 25 65 4.74  158 7.15 
Ruchi Agri PLC India Soybean 25000 23 25 1451 80.97  111 6.19 
Source: Own computations from MoA (2013)  
 1 For clarity, we stated monetary values in two currencies: Birr = Ethiopian currency, and EUR or Euros (€)= European currency 
 2 Local currency (Birr) was converted to EUR based on currency conversion rate announced on the date of each land lease agreement 
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There also are enterprises that concluded lease agreements with a rent price rates as little as 
Birr 20 (€ 1.40 ha-1yr-1), effected over 100,000 ha (≈ 1000 km2) of land for 50 years. The 
contracts were made for 25 - 50 years with a possibility of renewal for additional years if 
agreed upon between the pertinent parties, i.e., the Ministry of Agriculture and investors. 
More than anything else, the 25-50 year rental agreements did not properly consider the 
time value of money and the appreciative value of land. As time value of money and the 
appreciative value of real estate, such as land, are the key fundamental variables in 
investment decisions (Gilg, 2009; Haberl et al., 2004; Lavee, 2015; Mike, 2005). 
 
The annual lease rate for a hectare of land varies among agreements, and it was generally € 
1.40 - 37 ha-1yr-1 (Table 4.5). The deals in question involve large swatches of land with dirt 
cheap lease rates, a three year grace period, and five year income tax holidays. A grace 
period is an amount of time after the agreed land lease payment becomes due. Lease 
payments that were supposed to be made during the three years grace period were prorated 
over the remaining years annually, commencing from the contractual agreement’s date of 
execution. Investors were also fully exempted from paying customs duties and other taxes 
levied on imported capital goods, such as machinery essential to operate their business. In 
addition, there are further investment and export incentives for investors depending on 
their business license and the location of investment (EIA, 2013). Both the lessee and 
lessor have stated rights and obligations that are narrated in Dereje et al. (2016). For most 
of the land lease agreements, the lessor, i.e., the Ministry of Agriculture, reserves the right 
to revise the lease payment. From an intensive review of contract archives, the modalities 
of revising lease rates can be classified into three major groups: 
 
Category 1: The lessor reserves the right to revise the lease payment rate as the need may 
arise in consultation with the lessee. As in the case of the agreements signed with 
companies such as Shaporji-Palonji (S & P) Energy Solutions PLC for 50,000 ha of land in 
the Benishangul-Gumuz region and Whitefield Cotton Farm PLC for 10,000 ha of land in 
region of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples.  
 
Category 2: The lessor reserves the right to revise the lease payment after ten years of 
such last fixation as the need may arise in consultation with the lessee. However, if there 
might be an increment in the rate of the lease, it shall not exceed 20% of the existing rate. 
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Examples for such agreements include those contracts signed with Ruchi Agri PLC for 
25,000 ha of land in the Gambela region and BHO Bio-products PLC for 27,000 ha of land 
in the same region. 
 
Category 3: The lessor reserves the right to revise the lease payment after ten years of 
such last fixation as the need may arise in consultation with the lessee. However, if there 
might be an increment in the rate of the lease, it shall not exceed 10% of the existing rate. 
As in the case of the agreement signed with CLC Industries PLC for 25,000 ha of land in 
the Amhara and the Benishangul-Gumuz regions.  
 
There are no guidelines for the three categories of lease rate revisions and it is a matter of 
negotiation between the lessor and the lessee. Parties agreed to administer the contracts in 
accordance with the laws of Ethiopia and the conditions for force majeure would be 
governed by the Ethiopian Civil Code. For example, before starting a business operation, it 
is mandatory for investors to get investment and trade licenses in accordance with 
Ethiopian investment and trade laws. However, in some cases we uncovered, transnational 
investors insist that the termination of contracts to be made in line with the multinational 
bilateral investment treaties signed between the governments of the host country (Ethiopia) 
and their country of origin. 
 
Regional states also have their investment land lease rates fixed by their respective 
regional governments, as it is in the case of Benishangul-Gumuz (Dereje et al., 2016; 
GBGR, 2009). So, depending on market circumstances, regional governments could revise 
their rates. To sum up, the general commercial land supply and the large-scale 
transnational land deal, in particular, was made with neither fair land valuation nor with a 
proper cost-benefit analysis for lease projects. 
4.3.6 Crop focus 
Sesame, sorghum, maize, and wheat are the dominant crops that occupy 53% of the 
commercially cultivated land. However, in terms of production volume, maize sesame, and 
wheat are the dominant crops produced by commercial farms over the stated period. As 
they are perennial crops, palm oil and jatropha have not been harvested so far. However, 
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there has been a disappointing performance among companies that invested in biofuel 
plantations. For example, the UK-based Sun Biofuels company signed an agreement for 
80,000 ha of land for a Jatropha plantation in Metekel Zone of the Benishangul-Gumuz 
region, yet it terminated the contract for agronomic reasons, mainly due to moisture stress. 
According to Mengistu (2016), the reasons for the ineffective operational progress among 
biofuel companies are moisture stress, high opportunity cost of land and labor, and conflict 
with local communities over alternative land use.  
 
When comparing the cultivated land versus crop cover, in 2011 about 0.6 million ha of 
land was cultivated and covered by 12 crops, about 42% of which was sesame (Figure 
4.11). Sesame, cotton, and coffee are the leading crops among cultivated land. While the 
government supported sesame and coffee exports, the production of cotton was also 
encouraged for the expanding domestic textile industries. In the period of 2012-2015, the 
total cultivated land has risen incrementally along with corresponding rises in crop cover. 
However, in 2015, there was a decline in both cultivated land and the volume of crop 
production. The primary reasons were: Some investors engaged in disputes with 
government (Eg. Karuturi) and thus did not pursue a better performance as they did in the 
previous years, and the El Niño effect (WFP, 2015), which resulted in erratic rainfall in 
some parts of the country. The 2015 El Niño effect caused farms covered with sesame to 
decline and the production of sorghum and maize to rise, as some sesame producers shifted 
their cultivation to sorghum and maize because they considered them to be relatively better 
at resisting moisture stress, as compared to sesame. 
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Figure 4.11  Cultivated commercial land (A) and developed crop cover (B) 
Source: Own computation from databases at Central Statistical Agency (CSA) and (EAILAA, 2015) 
 
In a five-year period (2011-2015)the volume of production from commercial farms, 
excluding jatropha and palm oil, investors contributed to the production of 11.10 million 
tons of crops, with a yearly of average production of 2.22 million tons. Among the ten 
major crops produced commercially, maize, sesame, and wheat were dominantly produced, 
with a share of 28%, 22%, and 19%, respectively. For the year of 2014, while smallholding 
farmers produced 25.2 million tons (CSA, 2015), investors’ production reached 1.6 million 
tons, which was 6% of the total crop production in the country. In regard to crop 
productivity, on average, smallholding peasants produced 34.1quintals ha-1 (CSA, 2015) of 
maize, while the productivity of large-scale commercial farms was 37.02 quintals ha-1. For 
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wheat, smallholding farmers produced 25.43 quintals ha-1(CSA, 2015) while the yield 
among commercial farms was 29 quintals ha-1 (Figure 4.11). 
 
Productivity among commercial farms is higher by 9% (for maize) and 14% (for wheat) 
compared to small-scale farms. While there is a significant inter-annual variability in the 
production of cotton and sorghum, there was less variability in the case of soybean, 
sesame, and haricot bean (Figure 4.12). Sorghum in agro-ecological settings is comparable 
to Australia, where yields are 36 quintal ha-1 (Deininger et al., 2011). Yields are only 22.40 
quintal ha-1 in the case of Ethiopian large-scale commercial farms and 23.69 quintal ha-1 in 
the case of Ethiopian traditional farming (CSA, 2015). However, Ethiopia is much better in 
the case of sorghum productivity compared to other sub-Saharan Africa countries like 
Sudan, where productivity is 4.10 quintal ha-1 (Deininger et al., 2011). 
 
 
Figure 4.12  Crop productivity of commercial farmlands for the five-year period 
Source: Own computation from EAILAA (2015) and Central Statistical Agency (CSA) 
 
Among commercial farms, the most commonly declared justification for this by key 
informants, was the development of new land (as most of them stated it ‘virgin lands’), 
while the peasant sector holds that the cause is nutrient depleted and degraded farmlands. 
Furthermore, in the first 2-3 years, commercial farmers did not apply chemical fertilizer in 
order to get the aforementioned yield, while the peasant farmers did. Further studies about 
farm level productivity among the two groups of farming could have interesting findings 
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according to different scales, crop types, farm inputs and the application of farm level 
technologies. 
4.3.7 Commercial farmlands as collateral 
Article 8(4) of the Ethiopian Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation, 
Proclamation 456/2005 (GoE, 2005b) states:  
An investor who has leased rural land may present his use right as collateral 
 
Ethiopian smallholder farmers, however, do not have the same right to use landholdings as 
collateral, as is provided for large-scale commercial farmers or domestic, diaspora or 
foreign investors. As a result, many investors (including the large transnational companies 
that had been expected to come with hard currencies and invest in Ethiopia) took outloans 
from Ethiopian banks. Prominently, the major lenders that finance investors in order to 
implement agricultural investment projects in the country are the two state owned banks, 
i.e., the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 
(CBE), as compared to other non-state banks. However, the banks are facing an increasing 
risk of non-performing loans than expected, as companies are not implementing their plans 
according to the promises they expressed. The Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) has a 
significant share in providing loans to commercial farmers. Its scheme is to provide loans 
that cover up to 70% of the total agricultural project budget as long as investors are able to 
cover the remaining 30% of the total cost stated in the farming project proposal (DBE, 
2014). 
 
According to the existing laws, investors have the right to use the land they have leased as 
collateral to banks in order to get loans, as stated in art. 8(4) of the Rural Land 
Administration and Use Proclamation (GoE, 2005). However, a system which can 
concurrently monitor whether or not the borrowers have allocated the loan for the intended 
purpose of boosting the production level of commercial farms has not been established. 
According to key informant interviews and relevant data bases, agriculturel is the second 
leading beneficiary of bank loans, next to industrial loans. For example, within the span of 
two years (2013/14- 2014/15), all the banks in the country disbursed a total of Birr 135.45 
billion (equivalent to € 5.64 billion) in loans to investments made in various economic 
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sectors, from which 55.5 % of the loans were provided by public banks (National Bank of 
Ethiopia, 2016).  
 
Agricultural loans account for 23.94 billion Birr (≈ € 1 billion) or 17.7% of the total loans 
provided in the country. By the end of 2014/15, the total outstanding loans equaled 231.8 
billion Birr (≈ € 10 billion), 12.5% of which consisted of investors’ loans in the agriculture 
sector. Agricultural investment projects are characterized by the accumulation of unpaid 
loans, where 8.5% of the total outstanding loans accumulated in Ethiopia (34.4 billion Birr 
(≈ € 1.43 billion)) is made up of the outstanding credit in the sector (National Bank of 
Ethiopia, 2016). 70% of the outstanding loan (about € 1.43 billion) is the share of 
transnational investors, which includes Ethiopian diaspora community members. In 
countries where land is not a publicly owned property, it is not a surprise if an investor 
uses his/her land as collateral in order to get bank loans (Fenske, 2011; Fostel & 
Geanakoplos, 2016). However, in the context of Ethiopia, the case is unique. Any 
commercial agricultural investor in Ethiopia can get a loan from the state’s bank using 
leased land as collateral, while land, per se, is legally a joint property of the people, which 
shall not be subject to sale or any other means of exchange. Unlike commercial farmers 
(i.e., investors), the Rural Land Use Proclamation does not state that small scale farmers 
have the right to use their land holdings as collateral, even though smallholder farming is 
the major contributor to the growth of the agricultural sector (World Bank, 2015a).  
 
In March 2016, the DBE suspended agricultural loans after it was tricked by two 
companies and ended up giving them two loans for the same agriculture project; the Bank 
continued this investigation. According to key informants, there are many cases in which 
investors illicitly shift ‘their’ capital (including the loans they took from banks) from 
agriculture to more lucrative urban-based businesses, most commonly real estate in the 
name of a family member or relative. They also stressed the prevalence of well-established 
chains of corruption in the investment, land lease and loan supply systems. Ultimately, the 
country, local people, and the government of Ethiopia are the ones that lose the most from 
the large scale transnational land deals; which have been made in the country even though 
there are few encouraging cases that needed to increase in size. Recently, in March 2016, 
the government woke up and suspended the supply of commercial lands for an undisclosed 
period, and started to evaluate the whole programme of supplying large-scale commercial 
farmland. 
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There were critics of the World Bank that argued that the Bank backed countries that 
supplied large scale land to transnational investors, an action that threatened local 
inhabitants, especially small-scale farmers (World Bank et al., 2010). On the other hand, 
the Bank urges host country governments to demand that investors increase the 
productivity of their farms and to improve peoples’ livelihoods. Later the World Bank, 
together with other institutions, provided guidelines, i.e., the seven ‘principles for 
responsible agricultural investment’, which the Bank argued would help to correct the 
deficiencies in global land transactions. However, the World Bank did not address the 
fundamental questions, such as, who had what power and the most interest in the deals? 
(Dereje et al., 2015). Futhermore, it failed to address the economic, social, political, and 
environmental contexts, drivers and consequences of the land deals (Borras et al., 2011). 
 
4.3.7.1 Lessor - Lessee dispute: Notes on Karuturi Global Ltd  
Attracted by low land rental prices and investment incentives offered by the Government 
of Ethiopia, transnational companies acquired land for commercial farming. However, they 
did so without adequate multinational investment risk analysis and without adequate 
experience in the large scale commercial agricultural sector. A typical example is the 
Global Ltd. incorporated in 1994, was when in 2008 the company became the world’s 
biggest producer of cut roses in the international market; with floriculture operations in 
India, Kenya, and Ethiopia. In addition to the attractive land lease prices, tax laws, and 
other business incentives the company invested in Ethiopia. In terms of incentives, for 
example, when rose growers in Africa export to Europe, they have a better cost advantage 
(compared to those in India) and benefit from a favorable taxation structure, which 
ultimately lowers the market cost on average by 25%. Furthermore, the company’s 
management was passionate about diversifying its business and investing beyond the 
floriculture sector. It had a particular interest in the production of its own brand food crops 
and palm oil, which are new additions to the company’s business history.  
 
In 2008, the company entered a lease agreement to annually produce a million tons of 
maize, rice and palm oil from 300,000 ha of land. The company obtained the land (located 
in Gambela regional state, Nuer Zone, Jikao and Itang special districts) and the lease 
certificate with a serial number EIA-IP 14584/07. The large swatches of land which the 
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company acquired were significantly covered with vegetation, ranging from dense forest to 
grassland. The company promised that its project would create 20,000 jobs and planned to 
contribute to the development of local infrastructure in the form of schools, hospitals, 
water, and day care centers. Albeit, all of these things were not stated formally in the 
contract, and thus up to the magnanimity of the company. According to the original land 
lease agreement which was agreed upon with the Gambela regional government, the 
company was not required to pay a rental fee for the first six years of the contract but after 
that it, they agreed to pay 15 Birr (≈ € 0.625) ha-1yr-1. However, two years later, the federal 
government interfered, as the amount was deemed excessive and beyond Karuturi’s 
capacity to develop, thus 200,000 ha was returned to the regional state (and later became 
part of the federal land bank). By repealing the former agreement that was made between 
Karuturi and the Gambela regional government, in October 2010, the Ethiopian Ministry of 
Agriculture (a federal institution) was able to sign a new agreement with the company 
upon 100,000 ha with annual leasing fee of 20.00 Ethiopian Birr (≈ € 0.83) ha-1 for 50 
years, with possibility of renewal. The location of the 100,000 ha of land was broken up 
into two districts: 42,088 ha in Itang district, and 57,912 ha in Jikao district. Many argued 
that the Ministry’s agreement with Karuturi was concluded without adequate preparation 
from both parties, and without an adequate feasibility study, environmental impact 
assessment, and without public transparency. 
 
There are many reasons for Karaturi’s low performance. First, the company had to deal 
with a lack of experience in industrial farming, let alone in large-scale agriculture; the 
company also had no prior experience with the production of food crops, despite the fact 
that it was successful with floriculture investments. Initially, it procured a large number of 
low-cost farm machinery from suppliers in India. Later, after spending millions, the 
company realized that Indian farm machinery was not suitable for operating large-scale 
farms, but were made to suite small family farms. Next, it approached well-known heavy 
duty machine and large tractor suppliers such as John Deere in the USA, resulting 
unintended costs for the company. Although renting machinery is a legally restricted duty 
for domestic investors in Ethiopia, the government of Ethiopia allowed the company to 
rent out its extra farm machinery in order to cover some of its unintended costs. Second, 
another challenge wasfinding skilled labor from the available local workforce, which 
required the company to waste their time and budget on training employees.  
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Furthermore, many of its employees who were assigned as farm managers lacked large 
scale or industrial farming experience, which, again, lead to increased costs, lost revenues, 
and incorrect decisions. Consequently, the company attempted to hire experienced 
consultants in industrial agriculture. Third, the remote location of the farmland was a 
challenge to the enterprise. The farm is located closer to the Ethio-South Sudanese border, 
which, comparably, requires better security service, including military protection. Not to 
mention that the area also has limited infrastructure. Fourth, since the location of the farm 
land is along the perennial Ethiopian Baro river banks, the company was forced to 
construct 100 km dyke in order to mitigate flood risk. Although the company’s 
management was fascinated by the promise of potential irrigation, its construction 
consumed a significant amount of the time and budget of the enterprise. Some of the 
interviewees tried to justify the low cost of the land as compensation for the risks that are 
inherent to the investment. 
 
 Fifth, for years the company’s management has already been marred in controversy with 
rental machine renting enterprises that pursue Karuturi in order to settle its payments. 
Thus, the company’s management did not duly attend to its large-scale farming operations. 
While running the investment, the company borrowed a total of 170 million Birr (≈ € 7.08 
million ) from different banks in Ethiopia, of which 60 million Birr ((≈ € 7.08 million) is 
from the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE). It borrowed the stated amount by 
providing the property collaterals of the 100,000 ha of farmland as the country’s policy 
allows: Art 8(4) of Proclamation 456/2005 (GoE, 2005). The company was in extended 
dispute with the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), following CBE’s request to 
foreclose the business and to settle the 55.8 million Birr (≈ € 2.33 million) loan that 
Karuturi received yet was unable to pay pack on time. Money lenders (banks in Ethiopia) 
very nearly compete with each other over the company’s properties in order to have the 
loan they provided to Karuturi paid off. However, through the company’s appeals to the 
court and the prime minister of the country, and later through a court order, foreclosure 
remained suspended.  
 
According to company-based sources, the management of the company did not recognize 
the cancellation of the contract. Due to this, even though the investment is terminated, it 
should be made according to the transnational bilateral investment treaty, which was 
signed between Ethiopia and India in 2007. In this agreement, investment termination and 
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expropriation should be accompanied by market-value compensation. Although the 
Ministry of Agriculture complained that the company developed only 1200 ha, the 
company argued that it has already cleared 65,000 ha of forested land and built a 100 km 
dyke. The company blames the government of Ethiopia for not providing the ultimate 
concession strategy, as it blocked financing through a cereal-export ban. Furthermore, 
according to company sources, in 2014 the government prevented diesel from reaching the 
farm in Gambela for national security reasons, as the area is located closer to the war-torn 
South Sudan. Further sources added that the reputation of the company was diminished in 
2011 when its management attempted to (re)outsource 20,000-40,000 ha of the farmland it 
leased from Ethiopia to Indian farmers on a stock market share basis and in a revenue-
sharing scheme; in short, to illegally re-outsource the outsourced land. In addition, the 
company’s poor decision to clear massive amounts of forest land using fire and to engage 
in the illicit, but sporadic act, of selling wood (timber), diminished the country’s goodwill 
toward the company. Both parties, which signed an agreement over the 100,000 ha, lose in 
this situation, which is also an ideal example of the loss-loss agricultural outsourcing (red 
deals) which was initially explained in Azadi et al. (2013) and Vandergeten et al. (2016).  
 
Karuturi is not the only company which stacked while implementing land lease contracts in 
Ethiopia. Other businesses that occupied about 65% of the total leased land, almost find 
themselves in a similar status and most of those situations resemble Karuturi’s. For 
example, (i) Saudi Star Agricultural Development Plc, developed only 350 ha of 10,000. 
(iii) Shapoorji Pallonji (S&P) Co.Ltd, a Mumbai-based company, agreed to establish 
50,000 ha of land for biofuel in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, yet it only developed 2500 
ha and most of that is not covered by crops that are included in its contract. (iii) Ruchi Agri 
Plc, another Indian based company, obtained 25,000 ha in Gambela, but it only developed 
1,000 ha (only 4%). (iv) BHO Bioproducts PLC leased 27,000 ha of land in Gambela 
region near Baro river and borrowed 89 million Birr (≈ € 3.71) from Ethiopian banks but 
has not made any significant progress.  
 
The Pakistani Al Habesh Overseas Engineering and Trading company was provided 
70,000 ha of land in the Arjo-Dedesa area in the East Wollega Zone of the Oromia Region 
in order to produce sugar. The investment started with 28,000ha and a loan of 800 million 
Birr (≈ € 54.12 million) from the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. Later, due to unmet 
contractual obligations by the company and failure in investment management, the 
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Ethiopian State-owned Sugar Development Corporation (SDC) has taken over Al Habesh’s 
sugar refinery, which was the largest private sugar factory in Ethiopia owned by a 
Pakistani. According to an official government report (EAILAA, 2015), commercial 
farmland investment has progressed by 30% overall. On the other hand, the comparison 
between domestic growers and transnational investors has not been given much attention.  
 
In a case about investors’ performance in 2010, the National Council of Ministers 
established the Textile Industry Development Institute (TIDI) of Ethiopia in order to 
facilitate the development and competitiveness of textile industries in the country (Council 
of Ministers, 2010), emphasizing the production of cotton farming . According to state 
media, FBC (2016), in the three year period of 2013-2015, more than 100,000 ha of land 
was leased to commercial farmers (mainly in Benishangul and Gambela regions). For the 
stated time, a financial loan of 4.2 billion Birr (≈ € 175 million) was arranged for investors 
who would invest in the sector, and 3 billion Birr (≈ € 125 million) was lent to investors. 
However, most of the loan was not used for the intended cotton production, and TIDI has 
established a team in order to investigate the case. 
4.3.7.2 Some encouraging cases 
There are few well-appreciated companies which have better performance levels. The 
africaJUICE Tibila Share Company is one of them. With a rising global demand for 
tropical fruit juices, in 2009 the Netherlands-based company took 1200 ha of land and 
operational control of the Tibila Farm in the Upper Awash Valley of Ethiopia and started 
producing tropical fruits. In addition to farming operations, it has built a new fruit-plant 
with modern fruit processing, packaging, and sterilization equipment. The company 
exports processed juice to markets in Europe and the Middle East. As of February 2015, 
the company has permanently employed 2400 people and it is mentioned as one of the 
success stories among stakeholders in Ethiopia. Similar interesting accomplishments are 
reported from companies such as Horizon Plantations PLC and Ethio Agri-CEFT PLC, 
both of which are owned by a Saudi Arabian investor with Ethiopian origin. Horizon 
Plantations PLC, for instance, is performing well over its 49,692 ha of coffee and tea farms 
which are located in Bebeka, Gojeb, Limu and upper Awash areas. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This study has dealt with the features of large-scale transnational land transactions 
(LSTLDs) in the South, and its consequence in the context of Ethiopia. Our findings 
challenge the conventional presumption that LSTLDs are predominantly driven by global 
forces (push factors) and by actors such as multinational corporations and governments 
from the developed world, since states from the developing South are less receptive to 
liberal investment policies (Rulli et al., 2013). In order to meet national development 
objectives (pull factors), the government of Ethiopia promoted the availability of more 
than 11.5 million ha of land and was able to attract many transnational investors.  
 
In the period of 2005 - 2015, it commercialized nearly 2.47 million ha. We found a 
significant variation among transnational investors regarding the land size they hold, at 
F(2,335) = 56.22, p < 0.0001): foreign companies (mean = 17,018 ha, SE = 2,293), joint-
ventures (mean= 5,143, SE = 1, 368), and diaspora (mean = 1,062, SE= 129). The 
government leased large swatches of land without conducting land valuation, feasibility 
studies, cost-benefit analysis, environmental impact assessment, and without adequately 
scrutinizing investors. Consequently, there is low investment performance progress and 
many of the investors engage in speculation in the sector by using available policy 
loopholes. The current land rental prices are between € 1.40 and 37.00 ha-1yr-1 for a lease 
period of 25-50 years. The lease agreements did not consider both the time value of money 
and appreciative value of land, which are important variables in investment decisions. 
 
The findings substantiate the dynamics in the usual North-South investment capital flow 
and the rise of South-South investment deals (Margulis et al. , 2013). However, with the 
context of moving capital, speculation drove non-performing loans and resulted in 
companies engaging in financial grabbing. Applying Ethiopia’s policy of using agricultural 
land lease holding as collateral for investors (but not for small-scale farmers), banks in the 
country lend billions, which has resulted in an outstanding loan of 18.6 billion Eth Birr (≈ 
€ 791 million). Most likely, land deal-‘land-grabbing’ is a result of financial-grabbing, 
where Ethiopia banks end up with a huge sum of non-performing loans and then must 
hustle and chase ‘investors’ in the South in order to settle loans. So far, less than one-third 
of the LSTDs are operational, and the whole commercial sector has only contributed in 
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raising the agricultural production of the country by 6%. Employment generation so far, 
has been minimal, both due to the meager implementation of projects and the seasonal 
nature of agricultural jobs. Had it been managed well, it could have significantly 
contributed to the national economy.  
 
The large-scale farming was not new to the country and dates back to the 1930’s and 40’s 
(Joyce, 1943), and to the 1970’s-1980’s (Alemayehu, 1992; Hurni, 1983), there were a 
substantial number of commercial farmlands run by enterprises and by the state in 
Ethiopia. It is now time for the government of Ethiopia to go back to the drawing board 
when it comes to administering land by the existing interests of the public and the 
alternative uses of land, and to reconsider its land lease policies and legislative framework. 
The policy of allowing investors to use their leased landholdings as collateral for obtaining 
loans from the capital scarce growing nation has no legitimacy, and is contrary to the 
essence of investment and expectations of an investor. Furthermore, small-scale farmers, 
who feed the state, should be provided equivalent support. After supporting investors and 
with all due patience, the Government of Ethiopia is trying to repeal the land lease 
contracts. According to signed contracts, the land lease agreements were administered by 
the laws of Ethiopia and the conditions of force majeure is governed by the Ethiopian Civil 
Code. However, transnational investors insist that terminating the contracts is carried out in 
line with the multinational bilateral investment treaties signed between the governments of 
the host country (Ethiopia) and their country of origin.  
 
The case we noted on our discussion, for instance, can be worth mentioned here. While the 
government of Ethiopia announced the termination of a 100,000 ha farmland lease 
agreement with an India-based company (alleging insignificant progress in developing the 
land), the company announced to seek international arbitration on the issue. However, 
according to the global database for investment treaties, the investment agreements made 
so far between Ethiopia and India is not ‘in force’ (United Nations, 2016). On the other 
side, the pressure from transnational agricultural investments upon national economies, 
contracting parties, local communities, land and natural resources becomes visible. Hence, 
it is time for governments and advocators to work towards the formulation of effective 
legal frameworks to ensure the positive contribution of transnational agricultural and 
related investments to sustainable development. To this end, the work by Cotula (2016) is a 
valuable input on how to use law so that foreign investment can have a viable contribution 
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to sustainable development. Furthermore, political-economic institutions are trying to 
envisage transnational land deals from different dimensions. For instance, analyzing on the 
involvement of EU-based corporate and financial entities in transnational land transactions, 
Think tanks at European Parliament offered a series of recommendations on how to deal 
with emerging issues of land acquisitions outside the European Union (Borras et al., 2016). 
 
Further studies that focus on projects and local levels could produce interesting findings. 
Such as, How to deal with non-performing land deals? How to reconcile global land deals 
with the transnational bilateral investment treaties of states in order to enhance socially 
desirable outcomes? Lease prices should reflect the prominent land market value, which is 
a function of the capitalization rate, rental, land taxes (Gwartney, 2014) and other pertinent 
factors. So, what should the prices of (Ethiopian) farmlands be? The geographic 
information system (GIS) and business intelligence tools, such as the On-Line Analytical 
Processing (OLAP) tool, role is paramount in order to more accurately valuate developable 
land (Weber, 2001). Diversification of investment with alternative uses of land, should also 
be given its due level of attention. Finally, we have investigated a part of the big picture 
(Figure 4.2); i.e., large-scale transnational land deals (LSTLDs), which implies that both 
the domestic land deals or deals of any type but with less than 200 ha is still an interesting 
area of future study. 
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Chapter 5 Transnational land aquisition in 
Ethiopia: Lessons from the Benishangul-
Gumuz region 
Adapted from Dereje, T., Azadi,H., Nyssen,J., Mitiku, H., Witlox, F. (2016). How 
sustainable is transnational farmland acquisition in Ethiopia? Lessons learned from the 
Benishangul Gumuz Region. Sustainability 2016, 8,213 . Copyright © by the authors; 
licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. 
Abstract Due to the nature of available land as one of the main attractions for investment, 
land lease marketing in Sub-Saharan Africa is appearing on policy agenda. This chapter 
describes critical land-related institutional and governmental frameworks that have 
shaped the contemporary land governance and land lease contracts in Ethiopia. It also 
examines the effectiveness of the land lease process regarding economic, social, and 
environmental expectations from agricultural outsourcing. Both qualitative and 
quantitative data analyses were used and results showed that the size of the land 
cultivated by investors is significantly lower than the agreed-upon size in the contract. 
Besides, the supply of land to large-scale commercial investors in Ethiopia is made 
without adequate land use planning, land valuation, and risk analysis. Furthermore, 
limitations in monitoring systems have contributed to meager socio-economic gains but a 
risk of deforestation and woodland degradation. Accordingly, the study concludes that 
supplying vast tracts of farmland to large-scale agricultural investors requires integrated 
land use planning, land valuation and governance, monitoring systems, and a capacity to 
implement the various social and environmental laws in coordination with other sectors. 
Improving rural infrastructure, particularly road, is also indispensable to enhance the level 
of performance of commercial farms. Last but most importantly, the customary land 
holding rights of residents should be respected and institutionally recognized. 
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5.1 Introduction  
Literature about transnational land acquisition, predominantly called ‘land grabbing’ and 
land deal, is full of debates, discontents, justifications, and emotions among academia, 
practitioners, policy makers, and institutions. Most of the recent literature underlined the 
term ‘land grabbing’ as a contemporary phenomenon which was elicited due to the 
combined effects of global stock market crash and food and energy crisis of 2008/2009 
(Cotula et al., 2009, White et al., 2012; Mehta et al., 2012; Franco et al., 2013; Margulis 
and Porter, 2013; Wolford et al., 2013 ). However, the term ‘land grabbing’ was also 
mentioned in the earlier works by Karl Marx who mentioned ‘land grabbing’ for the first 
time in the context of the enclosures of England: ‘The laborers are first driven from the 
land, and then come the sheep. Land grabbing on a great scale, such as was perpetrated in 
England, is the first step in creating a field for the establishment of agriculture on a great 
scale’ (Marx 1867:363). Following the global financial crisis, the rise in the demand for 
food and biofuel and the effects of climate change, however, have stemmed a new wave of 
land transactions in many developing countries (Zoomers 2010; De Schutter 2011).  
 
Foreign companies and governments moved into those ‘land-abundant’ agrarian countries 
in Africa and Latin America so as to produce and export food and biofuel that is also 
facilitated by government officials and resulted in dispossession, expulsion, and adverse 
incorporation of local communities (Borras et al. 2012). For example, the South Korean 
Daewoo Logistics planned to invest on 1.3 million hectares of land to produce maize, but 
later its license was cancelled by the transitional government of Madagascar after a high 
debate in the country (Gerlach and Liu 2010). Furthermore, Hamelinck (2013) has shown 
that many other land deals which had aspired for the production of biofuel were under 
serious public pressure resulted in the cancellation of long-term land use agreements. 
 
The governments of developing countries which host such investments on the other hand, 
would consider transnational land acquisition as part of their development strategy; an 
opportunity to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in their agriculture sector and supply 
land to transnational investor companies and mainly rich government (Stebek 2011; Hall 
2011; Lavers 2012; EIA 2013; Demeke et al. 2014). In addition to the upkeep of 
transnational land deal by governments, international development institutions facilitate the 
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acquisition of land by big corporations (both foreign and domestic) typically in the form of 
leases or concessions rather than outright land purchase-for development (White et al., 
2012).  
5.2 Ethiopia:Attractive for FDI 
Ethiopia is one of the leading countries in attracting agricultural foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The country is endowed with abundant agricultural resource bases. The country’s 
tropical location coupled with its diverse topography and varied altitude of 148 meters 
below sea level to 4,620 meters above sea level. These two factors enable Ethiopia to have 
18 major and 49 sub agro-ecological zones, many of them with their own potential for 
agriculture and biological diversity (EIA, 2012).  
 
Like that of other developing countries’ governments, the anticipation of the government 
of Ethiopia is that investors bring capital, know-how, technology, and market-access. 
Investors could therefore be a catalyst for economic transformation in rural areas where the 
Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) of the country is central. This, in turn, is expected 
to generate employment, increase public revenue, improve local people’s access to 
infrastructure and overall improvement in the standard of living of the local communities. 
The country’s Ministry of Agriculture and investment agency announced that more than 
11.50 hectare of land is on offer for agricultural investment (EIA, 2012, 2013). From the 
stated amount of land, so far close to 2.5 million hectare of land has been given for 
investors who came from more than about 32 different countries and investing in the 
different regions of the nation between 2007-2013. However, comprehensive evidence is 
lacking regarding the national, regional, and grass root level issues and effects of 
transnational land acquisition in Ethiopia as for the focus of this chapter 
 
Since 1991, Ethiopia has formed a federal government structure which allows substantial 
autonomy to the nine regional states and two city administrations. The regional states are 
vested with decentralized decision-making power in economic, political and social 
domains. The country’s economy and the livelihood of its more than 91 million citizens 
(World Bank, 2013a) significantly relies on its natural resources, predominantly on land 
and water for small scale peasant agriculture. Agriculture contributed to 44% of the 
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country’s GDP (MoFED 2013), 85% of employment and 90% of foreign earnings in 2011-
12 (EIA 2013). Governance of land and other natural resources in the country is shared 
between the federal and regional governments. In terms of development policy, the 
government formulated successive poverty reduction strategies, called Plan for Accelerated 
and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). The accelerated economic growth 
strategy was guided with two policy directions: the commercialization of agriculture, and 
accelerating the development of private sector (MoFED 2006; also quoted in Desalegn 
2011). The government’s pro-poor policy premise of Agricultural Development Leads to 
Industrialization (ADLI) intended to create a labor intensive agricultural sector was 
considered as an engine for rural transformation and overall economic growth (MoFED 
2003; 2006). 
 
Between 2002-2010, the government of Ethiopia issued two Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSP). The first one was ‘Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction 
Program’ (SDPRP) which gave due emphasis on small-holder farmers for alleviating 
poverty and it covered the first PRSP period of 2002-2005. The second one was the ‘Plan 
for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty’ (PASDEP) which focused 
on commercialization of the agricultural sector with a significant participation and 
contribution from the private investment sector (MoFED 2006). However, the outcomes of 
the two successive plans in transforming the agricultural sector and rural economy was 
below the national expectation (MoFED 2013). As designated in MoFED (2010), based on 
the lessons drawn from PASDEP, the government of Ethiopia again launched a 
comprehensive Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). Ethiopia’s GTP is a three five-
year successive plan (2010-2015, 2016-2020, and 2021-2025) which aspires the nation to 
be a climate-resilient middle income economy by 2025. During the first five years, the 
GTP has been supposed to improve Ethiopia’s economy through achieving the minimum 
projected annual GTP growth rate of 11% (MoFED 2010) where agriculture is underlined 
as the major source of economic growth.  
 
In order to promote and reinforce the agricultural transformation process of the country, 
the Federal Government of Ethiopia (GOE) established the Agricultural Transformation 
Agency (ATA) through a regulation approved by the Council Ministers (GOE 2010a). The 
agency is mandated to address periodic constraints of the agricultural sector and support 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), other public institutions, private and other 
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implementing partners. Passing through all the aforementioned state-lead development 
plan implementation, overall the country has succeeded to become one of the world’s 
fastest growing economies. As indicated in recent national development reports of MoFED 
(2013) and the World Bank (2014), Ethiopia is successful in achieving double digits 
growth for the first decade of the 21st century. While it is important in a poor country to 
have such a fast rising economy, ensuring a fair distribution benefit of such economic 
growth to people, particularly to the poorest ones of the society is very crucial.  
 
As part of the national economic growth strategies, the government of Ethiopia has offered 
about 11.5 million ha of land for private investment (EIA 2013). According to ‘databases’ 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, 2.11 million ha of land is already delivered to investors out 
of which 600,254 ha is the share of the Western Ethiopian lowland region called 
Benishangul Gumuz (MoA 2013). Focusing on this region, the following key research 
questions are considered in this study: (i) What are the key institutional frameworks which 
shaped the contemporary land governance in Ethiopia? (ii) To what extent and with what 
lease price land is supplied to investors in the Benishangul Gumuz region? (iii) What are 
the rights and obligations of the signatories in long-term land lease contracts? and (iv) How 
effective is the land lease process from the perspective of integrated land management 
considering economic, social and environmental aspects? 
 
Accordingly, the chapter is structured as follows. The introduction part describes key 
issues about the contemporary transnational land acquisition and the efforts of the 
Ethiopian government in attracting agricultural foreign direct investment as a strategy to 
speedup economic growth. The second part of the chapter elucidates the integrated land 
management framework which is the conceptual framework of the study. The third section 
constitutes brief explanation about the study area and the methods used to come up with 
the results. The fourth section deals with results and discussion followed by the conclusion 
at the end 
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5.3 Conceptual framework: Integrated land use 
management 
Land marketing in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is on the policy agenda. Many of SSA 
countries have passed through consecutive land use institutional reforms which were 
mostly made by the support of the World Bank and developed countries (Holden et al. 
2008).While national land use policies and strategies vary across countries, common land 
related problems, conservation strategies and expertise solutions are becoming apparent 
and provide timely lessons for Ethiopia. Land management systems are increasingly 
checked against information-based land use models that contribute to efficient and 
effective land use management. Globalization and technology development further 
enhance the establishment of multifunctional information systems through incorporating 
diverse land features, uses, rights, regulations, and other pertinent data (Enemark et al. 
2005). To this end, contemporary land management systems should consider the diverse 
interests and competitive purposes of land before it is marketed to commercial investment 
on long-term basis (Enemark et al. 2014). A holistic approach to land management 
includes information as part of the key requirement for land management, recognition of 
the human, social and governance elements, as well as adaptation of improved land use 
practices elsewhere and plays a central role for enhancing informed land marketing chains. 
 
There are a number of tools which are helpful to conduct sustainable impact assessment of 
development projects (Payraudeau and van der Werf 2005; Ness et al. 2007; Gasparatos 
and Scolobig 2012). We adapt the Integrated Land Use Management and Responsible 
Agricultural Investment framework because according to Enemark et al. (2005) and FAO 
et al. (2010), institutional arrangements, land information system, and land use 
management are more appropriate to see the informative level of land markets. 
Furthermore, it is important to consider multiple land use sectors, multiple dimensions of 
sustainability, and at multiple scales and hence integrated federal and regional issues 
(Reidsma et al. 2011). The interplay between institutional arrangements and land 
information system determines the quality of land use management which again 
determines the effectiveness and efficiency of land markets (Enemark et al. 2005, and 
FAO et al. 2010) (Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1  Integrated Land Use Management (ILUM). Adapted from Enemark et al. 
(2014) 
 
In an integrated land use management system, different land use interests are balanced 
against the broader developmental objectives of a country or region. It serves as a base for 
planning and control of land use through institutional mechanisms and incentives. As 
described by Reidsma et al. (2011) and Enemark et al. (2014), effective land use planning 
and control requires up-to-date land use data that help understanding the spatial, temporal, 
and anthropogenic consequences of land use policies and decisions. To this end, in 
addition to integrating the sectoral and spatial components, the process of land use 
planning and implementation should be participatory. Furthermore, administration of land 
for agricultural investment should be inclusive (Dereje et al. 2015) and designed to meet 
not only the interests of investors but also the needs of various stakeholders, particularly, 
local communities and their livelihood attachment to land and environmental sustainability 
as other key issues. A responsible agricultural investment is a situation where the process 
of investment respects resources use rights of local communities, ensures local food 
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security, transparency, consultation and participation, investment viability, and 
environmental sustainability (FAO et al. 2010).  
5.4 Study area and methodology 
As one of the regional states of Ethiopia, the Benishangul Gumuz region was officially 
established in 1995 (GOE 1995). It is located in 09.17° to 12.06° N latitudes, and 34.10° to 
37.04°E longitudes along the Western Ethio-Sudan border (Figure 5.2). The total area of 
the region is about 50,699 km². According to the Regional Bureau of Agriculture, the 
overall area of arable land in the region is about 911,877 ha from which less than half has 
been cultivated. It was briefed that 189, 534 hectares of land in the region is potentially 
irrigable (GBGR 2012). The region is located in an area where the Grand Renaissance 
Dam of Ethiopia is under construction over the Abay river. The area includes Beles, 
Dabus, Anger, Dhidhsa, and Dindir rivers which are tributaries of the river.  
 
Topographically, the region ranges between 580 and 2,731 meters above the sea level. 
Agro-ecologically, the region can be classified into three major climatic zones: (a) 
Lowland or kolla (75% of the region) with an altitude below 1500 m. (b) Midland (woyna 
dega) zone which constitutes about 24% of the region and has an altitude of 1,500- 2,500 
m. (c) Dega agro­ecologic zone which accounts for only 1 % of the area of the region and 
lies with an altitude of 2,500 m (GBGR 2007). 
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Figure 5.2  Map of the study area (Benishangul Gumuz region) 
 
The land use management and agricultural investment legal-institutional system in 
Ethiopia is fragmented across different levels of governance, federal ministries, regional 
bureaus and district organs, throughout the country. To analyze the commercial farmland 
acquisition process and its effects, multilevel exploration of qualitative and quantitative 
data is required. Accordingly, the study collected data at federal, regional, district, and 
village or farm levels (Table 5.1). Rigorous archival review, review of land lease contracts 
and accompanied documents, extraction of relevant data from accessed databases, and 
interviews were conducted. Participatory field observation and key informant interviews 
were also held at federal, regional, and local levels. The qualitity of the different data 
sources was verified through available official documents and experts at the respective 
offices and bureaus.  
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Table 5.1  Data sources and methods of data collection 
Level Data source1 Focus Method used 
Federal GOE, MOA,EIA 
(Addis Ababa) 
Land laws, regulations, 
land/investment data 
Document review, contract 
review, extraction of 
relevant data from accessed 
databases, and interviews 
Regional GBGR, investment 
bureau, BoARD 
(Asosa) 
Regional land laws, 
regulations, and land lease 
system 
Document review, key 
informant interviews, 
surveys 
District BoARD, and Natural 
Resource Protection 
Case Team 
(Dangure and Guba) 
Practices of delivering land 
to investors, resettling 
communities  
Key informant interviews, 
data extraction from 
regional databases 
 
Village/ 
farm 
Community leaders, 
investors, and 
employees 
Effects on local 
communities, environment, 
concerns from community, 
investors, and employees 
Key informant interviews, 
data extraction from 
regional databases, 
participatory observation 
1 GOE = Federal Government of Ethiopia; EIA = Ethiopian Investment Agency; GBGR=Government of 
Benishangul Gumuz Region; MOA= Ministry of Agriculture; BoARD = Bureau of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
 
A total of 26 interviews were made (4 in federal level institutions, 6 in regional bureaus, 7 
at district, and 9 at village levels) in the period from October 2013 to January 2014. 
Besides, 22 owners and/or managers of commercial farms in the study site were 
interviewed. A survey of 89 commercial farms were made in the period May 2013 – 
January 2014 so as to assess the performance of commercial farmers on the ground.  
 
Analysis of the legal, regulatory and institutional contexts which are important land 
governance foundations in Ethiopia in general and the Benishangul Gumuz region in 
particular are explained chronologically. The rights and obligations of land lease 
contractual parties in the contract (the lessee and the lessor) were analyzed considering 
integrated land use management (ILUM) (Smith et al. 2000; Enemark et al. 2005; FAO et 
al. 2010). Descriptive statistics and relevant statistical tests such as paired sample t-test are 
made as a complement for the qualitative data analysis and explain the economic, social, 
and environmental implications of the ongoing commercial land acquisition in the study 
area. STATA (version 11) software was used to conduct statistical computations. A paired 
sample t-test (with a significant level of α =0.05) was run to compare the amount of land 
taken in the form of lease and the amount of land developed. Furthermore, with a 
significance level of α =0.05, paired t-test was made for the amount of land size leased by 
an investor versus the size of land cultivated, and regression analysis on the amount of land 
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developed and employment generated so as to see whether significant amount of land was 
developed and the expected level of employment opportunity was achieved. 
 
5.5 Results and Discussion  
5.5.1  Institutional framework of land governance in Ethiopia 
According to the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (GOE 
1997). The right for land ownership and other natural resources of the country are 
exclusively granted to the State and the peoples of Ethiopia. This implies that, all 
subsidiary laws and regulations of the country which could be issued either by the Federal 
or Regional State bodies recognize usufruct rights to land which can be in the form of 
state, communal or group, and private holdings. Private ownership of land is prohibited 
although the right to use and inherit land is possible. Private ownership of land is 
prohibited to ensure equity of land use among citizens and between generations, especially 
in the rural areas where livelihood exclusively depends on land; if not, the country would 
be threatened by the social predicaments of land accumulation within few hands (GOE 
2005b). If land is allocated and accumulated within few hands, it will result in majority 
landless citizens. 
 
 It is up to the federal government to instruct the amount and type of land a citizen may 
hold in the country. The major justification given for this is that if land is privatized, small-
holder farmers may sell it when they face financial difficulties (desperation sales) and 
ultimately the country’s land would be under the hands of a few rich farmers. The 
concentration of land in a few hands and inequality in land ownership adversely affects 
human capital promoting institutions, for instance public schooling (Galor et al. 2009). 
Such concentrations have already happened in some Latin American countries such as 
Colombia (Cárdenas 2012). Inequitable allocation of land contributed to land related 
conflicts and unrest in a country, for instance the case of Brazil (Pestana et al. 2013).  
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Prohibition of private ownership of land, on the other hand, may not be an adequate 
warranty for equitable distribution of land among citizens. The policy which prohibits 
private ownership of land has been criticized because it stifles farmland investments and 
could lead to unproductive and excessively small parcel of land size (Samuel 2006; 
Crewett et al 2008). According to Nyssen (1998), land tenure system in Ethiopia has 
positive contribution to the unprecedented involvement of farmers in soil and water 
conservation because land is ‘equally’ shared among farmers unlike previous land holding 
systems. Some studies (Borras et al., 2012; McMichael, 2013; Wolford et al. 2013) 
showed that governments play important role in the contemporary ramifications of the 
political economy of a global capitalist system where land acquisition is considered as part 
of the ‘security mercantilism’ in international relations. Consolidating all the land in 
Ethiopia under the custody of the state on the other hand, is considered as suppressing 
citizens’ rights to have private land ownership which is one of the continuing debates in 
Ethiopia. The federal government, through the constitution and other laws that followed 
later, assigned mandates and jurisdiction to the different federal and regional government 
organs as summarized chronologically in Appendix 1. 
 
The current land use and land governance institutional framework of Ethiopia is the result 
of a number of consecutive institutional and regulatory evolutions. According to the 1955 
constitution of Ethiopia, all natural resources of the country (water, forest, land, etc) 
became state domain since 1955 (IGE 1955). Later in 1974, ownership for land became 
one of the major causes for the socialist driven revolution in the country which overthrew 
the imperial/feudal system in the country. ‘Land to the tiller’ was one of the mottos of the 
revolution. As a result of the 1974 socialist revolution in Ethiopia, all forms of private 
ownership of land were abolished without any compensation, and all lands used for 
agriculture or grazing purposes throughout the country declared to be the collective 
property of Ethiopians (GOE 1975a,b). Due to the functioning supreme law of Ethiopia 
(i.e., the 1995 constitution of the country), land and all other natural resources are 
commonly owned by the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and it is not 
subject to sale or to other means of exchange. Regional states are given the power and 
mandate to administer land and other natural resources in accordance with federal laws. 
Peasants and pastoralists have usufruct right over land without any charge and without 
time limit including the safeguard against expulsion from ‘their’ land unless it is intended 
for public purposes which is subject to compensation (GOE 1995; 1997).  
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In addition to the chronologically stated proclamations and regulations, under the tenets of 
the 2005’s Federal Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation (Federal 
proclamation no.456/2005), non-pastoralist regions of Ethiopia have enacted their regional 
rural land administration laws, regulations and guidelines. The first two regions in this case 
are Tigray (regional proclamation no.97/2006, and land use regulation no.37/2007), and 
Amhara (regional proclamation no.133/2006, and land use regulation no.51/2007). 
Likewise, the Southern Region’s Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation 
(regional proclamation no.97/2006), the Oromia Rural Land Administration and Use 
Proclamation (regional proclamation no. 130/2007). As explained by Tigistu (2011), the 
Gambela and Benishangul Gumuz regions enacted their land proclamation in 2010. The 
Benishangul Gumuz Regional State has a regional Rural investment Land Use Regulation, 
regulation no.29/2009. The remaining regions (Afar, Harari and Somali) lack legislation 
for administering their rural and clan based land use, hence it is currently difficult to 
enforce laws and formally recognize peasants’ and pastoralists’ rights in these regions.  
5.5.2 Investment land supply and the land lease contracts 
According to official investment guideline developed by the Ethiopian Investment Agency, 
as of 2012, a total of 11,545,902 ha of potential investment land was made available for 
investors in Ethiopia (Figure 5.3). We argue that the figure seems exaggerated though 
further assessment is required. Moreover, there is variation in stating figures among 
different authors, and such discrepancies of figures are common not only for Ethiopia but 
also for other host countries though the reasons for such discrepancy are poor land use 
planning and less informative investment land supply (Edelman et al. 2013; Scoones et al. 
2013).  
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Figure 5.3  Potential areas of agricultural investment in Ethiopia (EIA 2013) 
 
For instance, according to Deininger et al. (2011), since mid 2010, the total amount of land 
allocated to local and foreign investors is 1.2 million ha with a regional distribution of 
535,000 ha (Gambela), 380,000 ha (Oromia), 191,500 ha (Benishangul-Gumuz), 60,500 ha 
(SNNP), 20,000 ha (Afar), and 18,000 ha (Amhara). However, according to recent 
information from Ministry of Agriculture (MoA 2013) (i.e., since October 2013), totally, 
there are about 238 foreign agricultural investment projects from about 32 
origins/countries (including the Ethiopian diasporas) which took a total of 736,228 ha of 
land in the different regions of Ethiopia. Concerning the total amount of land delivered to 
investors (both foreign and domestic), the Benishangul Gumuz Region has taken the lead 
with 600,254 hectares of land delivered to investors followed by Oromiya and Gambella 
regional states with 458,292 and 399, 491 ha respectively (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4  Land delivered to investors in different regions of Ethiopia (MoA 2013) 
 
According to the revised land use directive which was developed in 2009 and became 
effective in 2011/2012, there was no maximum limit set on the amount of land that an 
investor could take. The maximum threshold of land that can be given to an investor is set 
based on the type of land development (Table 5.2), the capacity of the project (its capital 
and skilled man power), level of employment creation, and fertility level of the land. 
 
‘Foreigners can buy as much British Columbia farmland as they want­and they 
are’(Farmland grab 2014:1) and similar arguments by many contributers in the field such 
as Oviedo (2011), GRAIN (2011), Lavers (2012), and Margulis and Porter (2013). 
However, the context in Ethiopia is different. There is a limit both in terms of land size and 
land lease period while land is leased for investors depending on the area of investment 
and other factors due to which foreigners cannot buy as much land as they want (Tables 
5.2 and 5.3). ‘…The Ministry of Agriculture has given the responsibility of providing 
technical support for private investors investing in agriculture. The support ranges from 
providing land above 5000 ha…’ (EIA 2012:37). Lands of size 5000 ha and above and 
which are found in a single place will be administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, and 
lands below 5000 ha found in different places (or pockets lands) will be administered by an 
appropriate regional office (MoA 2009). 
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Table 5.2  Maximum threshold of land size for an investment project (MoA 2009) 
Area of investment Threshold 
(land in ha) 
Area of 
Investment 
Threshold 
(land in ha) 
Biofuel 50,000 Food crop  20,000 
Palm oil  50,000 Oil crop 20,000 
Rubber tree  10,000 Vegetable production 150 
Cotton 20,000 Fruit and enset production 5,000 
Forestry  20,000 Livestock farming 30 
Sugar cane 20,000 Animal fattening 5 
Coffee plantation 5,000 Seed reproduction 5,000 
Tea plantation 5,000 Wild animal production 50 
Forage production  5,000 Tobacco production 5,000 
 
The Benishangul Gumuz regional government has also set a maximum threshold of land 
for different areas of investment (Table 5.3). Although the regional government’s 
proposition of delivering 200-500 ha of land to a single investor is ambitious, vague and 
imprudent, it did not indicate a land lease period limit for an investment land of 200 ha and 
less. Besides, some of the regulatory points could be contrary to what is stated by the 
Federal Government. Because the base for setting the threshold by the federal government 
is land size (i.e., no limit in terms of years of investment operation) while the threshold by 
the regional government is made in terms of land size and years. However, with specific 
reference to the horticulture sector, the land lease period further varies according to the 
type of land (i.e., either cultivated or non-cultivated). Moreover, the regional government 
limited the land lease holding period of 25 to 35 years (Table 5.3).  
 
Table 5.3  Type of investment land and land lease duration 
Type of investment land Lease period/duration (years) 
201-500 ha Above 500 ha 
Cultivated land Rain fed 20-25 30-35 
Irrigation 20-30 30-35 
Non-cultivated land Rain fed 25-30 35-40 
Irrigation 20-25 30-35 
Dairy production 20 25 
Fast-growing perennial production 20 35 
Horticulture 30 35 
Livestock rearing and/or fattening  20 25 
Source: Regional land use regulation ( GBGR 2009) 
 
Although the Benishangul Gumuz regional government set 20-35 years as the maximum 
limit of lease periods for investment lands in the region, there are companies in the same 
region with contracts of 50 years. These companies hold land on large-scale basis and the 
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contractual agreement was made not between the regional government and the company 
but with the Federal government and the company. The reasons for this is that regions have 
‘delegated their authority upwards’ to the Federal Government (i.e, Ministry of 
Agriculture), for leasing adjoining farm land areas of above 5000 ha so as to expedite the 
development of large farm lands for export and industrial crops.  
5.5.3 What is in the land lease contract?  
Commercial land lease agreements in Ethiopia are generally bilateral. Meaning, land lease 
agreements are made between the investor termed in contracts as ‘lessee’ and the 
responsible government body, mainly the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) called ‘lessor’. 
Followings describe the rights and obligations of each party. 
5.5.3.1 Lessee  
The lessee has vested with rights to develop land for the cultivation of crops and 
plantations as agreed with the lessor. The lessee can build relevant infrastructure and 
facilities which are helpful to enable its investment operations upon consultation and 
permit from concerned bodies. Moreover, the lessee can administer or develop the leased 
land by itself or through a legally delegated agency or person. There is full right to use 
mechanization or other methods that the lessee consider as proper. The right to get 
additional land is maintained for the lessee based on performance on the ground. Upon 
presentation of convincing reasons or for better options, by providing at least six months 
time to the lessor, the lessee can cancel the contract (Stebek 2011).  
 
The lessee is obliged to make good care and conservation of the leased land and its natural 
resources with specific obligations to: (i) conserve trees which have not been cleared for 
land preparation, (ii) apply appropriate farming methods to avoid soil erosion, (iii) adhere 
to all laws and proclamations related to the conservation of natural resources, and (iv) 
conduct environmental impact assessment (EIA) followed by submission of the EIA report 
within three months (the EIA obligation was added to the contractual agreements recently 
and used for those land lease agreements made since 2010/2011 following the 
environmental damages by most of the land lease agreements made between 2007/2008 – 
2009/2010), (v) submit an action plan in advance about the use of leased land together with 
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the contract agreement document to the Ministry of Agriculture at the time of agreement 
(although what is practically found is the contract agreement and no submitted action 
plan!), (vi) pay the agreed down payments, and (vii) start operation on the land within six 
months from the date of the execution of the land lease agreement. The lessee is expected 
to develop at least one-third of the land within one-year period, and develop all the land 
within three years from the date of the execution of the land lease agreement. For some 
companies this obligation is adjusted to ‘develop at least 10% of the leased plot of land 
within the first year period from the date of the execution of the land lease agreement, and 
should develop the whole leased land within five years period.’ Yet, no justifiable is found 
for having two different statements in this part.  
 
Upon terminating the land lease contract or revocation of investment licenses, the lessee 
should clean the land from all his assets and hand it over to the lessor within one year and 
providing investment activity reports and correct data upon request from Ministry of 
Agriculture. Besides, the lessee should pay land lease rent every year at the rate stated in 
the agreements. The lessee should not make any unauthorized use of leased land without a 
written consent from the lessor. Until three-fourth of the land is developed, the lessee 
cannot transfer the land or properties developed on the land to any other individual or 
company. In addition, an organization or company which leased the land in its name 
cannot reallocate the land to its individual members or shareholders, and failure to do so 
results in an automatic revocation of a contract. Upon developing three-fourth of the land, 
the lessee can transfer the land or properties developed on the land to any other individual 
or company only with permit from the lessor.  
5.5.3.2 Lessor 
The lessor holds exclusive right to monitor the activities of the lessee in accordance with 
the mutually agreed contract without causing any hindrance to the activities and operations 
of the lessee. The lessor has also the right to amend the land rent rate (decrease or increase) 
in consultation with the lessee. Finally, after 2010/2011, a new statement is added under 
the lessor’s right: ‘With a convincing reason and for using the land for a better function 
(…) the lessor can revoke the land use contract’ [Article 5:5 of the contractual template, 
(MoA 2010)]. This implies that, according to key informant officers in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the lessor can revoke the leased land any time and has created a sense of 
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insecurity among potential investors and preclusion among investors which already leased 
land. 
 
Followings are the obligations of lessor: (i) to supply investment land which is free of any 
constraint on the ground to the lessee within ten days from the time of contractual 
agreement. However, this does not happen in practice. Many of the investors received the 
land between 6 and 15 months after signing of of the contract that faced many local 
impediments (for instance land assumed as free by the government was already in use by 
local people), overlapping problems with other investors, and unsuitable land for 
agricultural practices, (ii) to provide investment privileges and incentives in accordance 
with available directives promulgated by the government, (iii) to ensure the lessee that 
there are no impediments (legal or other) in relation to land preparation, (iv) to secure 
access to the lessee for soil testing facilities or map databases of regional or federal 
government research centers, (v) to guarantee peace and security (in collaboration with 
other governmental bodies) around the investment areas free of cost from the side of the 
investee, (vi) if the investee fails to start developing land within the agreed time or fails to 
develop land in accordance with agreements entered or causes any damage to local natural 
resources or fails to pay lease fees, the lessor may be obliged to extend the time for such 
compliance or obliged to terminate the contract.  
 
Generally, the land lease contractual agreement is focused on maintaining the interests of 
the two parties: the lessee (the commercial companies which acquire land) and the lessor 
(the governmental body: either the Ministry of Agriculture or the corresponding delegated 
body in the regions, i.e., the regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development). 
There is no single statement in any of the contractual documents or templates which 
requests for the participation of any other stakeholders (e.g., local communities) when 
signing the land lease contracts.  
 
In addition to the rights and obligations of the parties in the contract, the economic, social, 
and environmental significance of land lease agreements should be explored. How feasible 
are the contracts economically? For instance, how much is the land lease price across the 
districts of the Benishangul Gumuz region? How much is the status of large-scale 
agricultural investment projects in the region and what are the factors which determine 
progression at farm level in terms of the amount of cultivated land? Besides, the social and 
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environmental aspects of the contracts should be explored so as to have better 
understanding of the contracts and their practical implementation on the ground. The 
following section deals with the economic, social, and environmental perspectives of large-
scale agricultural investment in the study site. 
5.5.4 The gains and losses 
5.5.4.1 The socio-economic achievement so far 
Since land is a part of the supplies considered to be marketed to attract foreign direct 
investment, the expectation is clear: attraction of foreign capital, economic use of ‘free’ 
land and improving the internal state revenue through business (or income) tax yet, there is 
no objective land valuation in Ethiopia both at the federal and regional levels although 
there is a number of methods and techniques that could be used to measure the benefits of 
farmland such as hedonic pricing and contingent valuation (Ciriacy-wantrup 1947; 
Diamond and Hausman 1994; Ready et al. 1997; Venkatachalam 2004). Given that, the 
price quoted for different types of land is not based on its true values and amenities.  
 
The federal government proposes the price of land simply on the basis of distance from the 
capital city to the location of the leased land. To put it in a nutshell, the stated price of land 
does not reflect the real value of land, very low prices compared to local land rental prices. 
The country is not benefitting from the actual benefits of land because the value of land is 
properly determined which results in extreme low land lease prices for large-scale 
commercial farmlands compared to the local informal land market values. Besides, there is 
no formal economic benefit sharing mechanism with local people. The benefit of land 
acquisition to local people is expected in the form of some social gains such as 
employment opportunities, construction of infrastructures, and technology transfer; all of 
which are not formal requirements expected from investors.  
 
According to the interviews made with the lessees, the lower land lease price is considered 
as a compensation for the state’s low infrastructure, bureaucratic land acquisition process, 
and challenging business operating environment. Although the government of Ethiopia has 
a number of consecutive reforms to create a smooth investment and business operating 
environment, according to a recent the World Bank’s report: ‘Globally, Ethiopia stands at 
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166 in the ranking of 189 economies on the ease of starting a business’ (World Bank 
2013a:16). Nevertheless, this ranking is a point of debate as there is a growing investment 
flow to the country. This is because the number of business enterprises formed in the 
country within few years has increased by six folds in the period 2002-2012. Besides, there 
is a number of investment incentive packages, improved infrastructure and attractive 
investment environment (GOE 2012b; EIA 2013). However, pursuing the improvement of 
business operating environment in Ethiopia together with proper land use valuation and 
land integrated use planning can play a significant role in boosting the economic benefits 
of Ethiopian farmlands. Coming to the land lease pricing system, the Benishangul Gumuz 
regional government had its own land lease rent price for each district developed in 2008 
and made it effective since then (Table 5.4).  
 
While the nature of land (cultivated and non-cultivated) is considered as a determinant for 
setting land lease periods, it is not considered for determining land lease prices. Figure 5.5 
displays the status of large-scale agricultural investment projects in the Benishangul 
Gumuz region. Due to various reasons, the average amount of land cultivated or developed 
by investors is significantly lower than the average amount of land leased to investors.  
 
 
Table 5.4  Farm land lease price across districts of the region 
Land lease price ha/year Districts 
Birr 50 (Euro 3.14*)  Sirba Abay 
 Kumruk 
 
Birr 60 (Euro 3.77) 
 Agalo 
 Komashi 
 Menge 
 Odabildglo 
 Sherkole 
 Wenbera 
 Yaso 
 
 
Birr 70 (Euro 4.40) 
 Asosa 
 Homosha 
 Bambasi 
 Belewjiganfoy 
 Bulen 
 Dibate 
 Dangure 
 Guba 
 Maokomo 
 Mandura 
 Pawe 
* 1 Euro = 15.90 Birr (Ethiopian/local currency), 2009; the current exchange 
rate is about 1 Euro equal to 15.90 Birr. 
Source: Regional land use regulation (GBGR 2009) 
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The major reasons for this difference are lack of adequate information about the nature and 
suitability of land upon which investors agreed to develop, and farmland overlapping 
challenges and farm border disputes. Furthermore, challenging processes related to the 
import of agricultural inputs, discrepancy in the capacity of many investors in terms of the 
capital they promised to invest in and they actually invested, fear of contract cancellation 
by the government. 
 
While the nature of land (cultivated and non-cultivated) is considered as a determinant for 
setting land lease periods, it is not considered for determining land lease prices. Figure 5.5 
displays the status of large-scale agricultural investment projects in the Benishangul 
Gumuz region. Due to various reasons, the average amount of land cultivated or developed 
by investors is significantly lower than the average amount of land leased to investors. The 
major reasons for this difference are lack of adequate information about the nature and 
suitability of land upon which investors agreed to develop, and farmland overlapping 
challenges and farm border disputes. Furthermore, challenging processes related to the 
import of agricultural inputs, discrepancy in the capacity of many investors in terms of the 
capital they promised to invest in and they actually invested, fear of contract cancellation 
by the government.  
 
 
Figure 5.5  The status of large-scale Transnational (LSTN) agricultural investment projects 
in Benishangul Gumuz 
Source: Investment Bureau (Asosa) and own survey 
A paired sample t-test was applied to compare the amount of land taken in the form of 
lease and the amount of land developed (i.e., either started operation as operation is 
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measured in terms of ‘developed’ land size or fully entered into production of crops). 
According to the regional investment bureau, a ‘developed land’ is a leased land which is 
under commercial farmers or ‘investors’ and at least land preparation has started. 
Accordingly, the average land size developed (or cultivated) by investors (158.32 ha) is 
significantly (α < 0.05) lower than that of the average land size on which investors agreed 
to develop (461.45 ha). There is a higher variation among the amount of land delivered to 
investors (with standard deviation of 774.73) as compared to the variation among the 
amount of land developed so far (with standard deviation of 232.60 and α < 0.05) (Table 
5.5). This implies that, investors have either lack the capacity to cultivate the land they 
took or discouraged to cultivate as they agreed on paper due to limited infrastructure where 
the farmlands are located. 
 
Table 5.5  Paired t-test, size of land leased versus size of land cultivated 
Variable Obs Mean Std.error Std.deviation 
Size of land leased 86 461.4535  83.5418  774.7348  
Size of cultivated land 86 158.318 25.08216  232.6024  
Difference 86 303.1355  63.54804  589.3203 
Mean(diff) = mean(Size of land leased - Size of cultivated land), t = 4.770 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0 degrees of freedom = 85 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0, Ha: mean(diff) != 0, Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000, Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000, Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
There is also a policy issue on which debate is undergoing between export promotion and 
the stabilization of local food markets. As stated in the Ethiopian Investment Guide of 
2012, those companies which export half or three-quarter of their production, are entitled 
to get comparably more incentive such as exemption from income tax (EIA 2012:38) 
compared to those investors which supply their production to the domestic market. 
Domestic food market inflation takes place, on the other hand, and still this export policy 
exists. Encouraging the export through explicitly stated incentives is good for Ethiopia as a 
developing country but ensuring the appropriate balance export promotion and stabilizing 
the domestic food supply market is imperative. 
 
Respecting existing land use rights of local people, ensuring food security, transparency, 
good governance, community consultation and participation are among the desirable social 
standards for land deals so that investment can have a positive contribution to local 
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development. Article 92(3) of the constitution of Ethiopia promulgates that local people 
have the right to be consulted fully and express their view in planning and execution of 
environmental policies, projects and programs that affect them directly (GOE 1995). With 
respect to the participation of indigenous communities in Gumuz, before land is supplied 
for commercial investors, community level consultative discussions were made. There is a 
number of minutes and signed documents in district offices showing the consents of local 
communities through their representatives. However, nothing is formally stated on the land 
lease contractual agreements regarding the rights and options for local communities. 
District authorities mainly have difficult assignments of handling claims, conflicts and 
grievances voiced by local communities in relation to commercial farming companies. The 
two leading neighboring districts where 80% of the transnational companies got land in the 
form of long-term land lease contracts in the Benishangul Gumuz region are Guba and 
Dangure districts. There are dislocations or resettlement of local communities from the 
land they lived for years. 
 
Key informants and local administrative officials have different justifications for this 
displacement. According to the key informants, the eviction is considered as part of the 
preparation to supply ‘their land’ to investors. The local administrators call the 
displacement as ‘villagization’ programme which was made to supply improved social 
infrastructure such as road, school, clinics, water supply, electric energy supply, etc, 
though the practice on the ground has not seen so far. According to the data extracted from 
the study areas, a total of 2,396 households were dislocated in three years period (Tables 
5.6 and 5.7). The resettlement is creating a pressure upon the recipient villagers and the 
environment.  
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Table 5.6  Dislocated and recipient households in the Guba district 
Kebele* Resettled 
households 
Households in 
recipient 
village(s) 
Total (% increase 
of number of 
households) 
Abela Horus 83 78 161 (106.4%) 
Almehal 87 306 393 (28.4%) 
Bengo 211 54 265 (390.7%) 
Iyssid 104 98 202 (106.12%) 
Wedelbahit 46 13 59 (3.54%) 
Cumulative average 531 549 1080 (96.72%) 
Source: Own computation at Guba District office, Mankush 
*A ‘kebele’ is the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopian governance structure which 
consists a minimum of five hundred households or a population of 3,500­4,000 persons. 
 
 
Table 5.7  Resettled and recipient households in the Dangure district 
Kebele* Resettled 
households 
Households in 
recipient village(s) 
Total (% increase of 
number of 
households) 
Azaltiktli 97 73 170 (133%) 
Aypapo 158 38 196 (415.8%) 
Burji 173 190 363 (91.05%) 
Gitsi 115 110 225(104.54%) 
Dabuhkokel 99 104 203(95.19%) 
Jimtiya 144 149 293(96.64%) 
Gublak 69 330 399(20.9%) 
Chidanguya 74 23 97(321.74%) 
Dibatie 48 106 154(45.28%) 
Bawla 60 58 118 (103.45$) 
Juraysis 54 60 114(90%) 
DekMariam 299 95 394(314.73%) 
Bengez 11 57 68(19.3%) 
Kotay 44 122 166(36.07%) 
Anjakuaya 133 66 199(201.52%) 
Abaydar 287 78 365(368%) 
Total (average% 
increase) 1865 1659 3524 (112.42%) 
Source: Own computation at Dangure District office, Mambuk 
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If we see the ‘performance’ of the villagization program, 13% of the households in Guba 
and 16% of those in Dangure have been part of the villagization programme performed by 
district administration offices and the regional state. If the recipient communities in the 
villagization program are taken into account, 27% of households in Guba and 30% of the 
households in Dangure are affected by the villagization programs. Furthermore, 
employment opportunity and ensuring national food security are part of the presumptions 
behind the commercial supply of farmlands. Since October 2013, throughout the region, 
employment opportunity was created for 4,094 people from which 848 are permanent and 
3,246 are temporary. There is a high possibility of further employment opportunities that 
will be available in parallel to the farmland operational progress and growth of companies 
in the region. 
 
Although there may be many factors which determine the amount of land developed by an 
investor, we checked the level of effect from the five factors (as indicated in Table 5.8) 
which were prominently mentioned by key informants. So as to know the factors (and for 
which we have data) which may determine the size of land developed, regression analysis 
was made. According to the results of the regression output, R-squared = 0.75, adjusted R-
squared = 0.73, implying that the independent variables (i.e size of land taken or leased, 
level of permanent employment generated, level of temporary employment generated, 
distance of farm lands from all weather road, and investor’s level of education) explain 
about 73% of the variability in the dependent variable (i.e size of land developed or 
cultivated). 
 
The regression model is statistically significant, F(5, 80) = 47.38, p=0.0001, indicating that 
overall, the model applied can significantly predict the dependent variable, i.e the size of 
land developed or cultivated (Table 5.8). Among other variables, total size of land leased 
(i.e, land developed) has a significant effect upon the size of land developed and cultivated 
by an investor. Similarly, distance of farm from an all weather road has a significant effect 
upon the size of land developed or cultivated by an investor. This implies that improving 
rural infrastructure (particularly road) is indispensable to enhance farm level performance 
of commercial farms. Other factors, such as amount of labor employed and investor’s level 
of education has insignificant effect upon the size of land developed or cultivated by an 
investor. 
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The output correlates with the observation we have in the field that much of the temporary 
labour force is used to clear the land (land preparation) which is commonly made with 
supervising permanent employees. The more permanent employees, the more temporary 
employment. Both the amount of land taken and the amount of land developed do not have 
a statistically significant effect on the level of temporary employment so far. The most 
probable reason for this is that significant amount of land is not developed so far, as 
temporary employees are required either for weeding or cultivation works once investors 
enter into full production. However, the amount of land developed is expected to have a 
meaningful effect on the level of (temporary) employment after companies enter into 
fullscale production in the near future. 
 
Table 5.8  Regression analysis on the main factors influencing size of cultivated land  
 
 
Concerning the food security effect of farmland acquisition, there are key concerns among 
local communities and stakeholders in the country. Local Gumuz communities are losing 
access to non-timber forest products and their traditional sources of food, the natural forest 
areas, where they have been accustomed for generations. There is a dramatic shift in terms 
of land use and consequently the livelihood of local people: a shift from forest dependent 
means of living to customary farming practices without adequate support and training of 
farming practices. Furthermore, the socialization of the resettled groups of households (in 
some cases with different ethnicity) with the recipient ones is not easy. Understanding the 
wider context and the overall predicaments of local people in relation to local resource 
access for local communities is required.  
COEFFICIENTS 
Independent variables B Std.error Beta t Sig. 
Size of land leased 0.25 0.02 0.841 14.81 0.000 
Permanent employees 0.11 3.15 0.002 0.03 0.973 
Temporary employees 0.18 0.69 0.016 0.25 0.801 
Distance from road -2.13 0.88 -0.138 -2.41 0.018 
Level of education 2.01 3.01 0.038 0.67 0.508 
R-squared 0.75    
Adjusted R-squared 0.73    
Standard error  120    
F-value 47.38    
Level of significance < 0.001    
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5.5.4.2 Ecological degradation  
As stipulated in Article 92 (2) of the national constitution of Ethiopia, the implementation 
of development programs and projects shall not have damaging effects on natural 
environment. Furthermore, according to the country’s environmental impact assessment 
law (proclamation no. 299/2002), proper accomplishment of environmental impacts of a 
development project before its implementation is mandatory (GOE 2002b). However, in 
practice no environmental impact assessment reports are prepared which are cross-checked 
in various data bases and through relevant key informants and confirmed by investors. 
Parallel to land clearance for commercial farming, forest wildfire is also one of the most 
prevalent challenges observed during the field visits made in the region. The main causes 
for forest fire in the region include commercial farmers who burn their wood biomass so as 
to clear land for tillage, local people who practice wild honey production, and natural wild 
fires ocuring due to the dry-hot seasons. There is deforestation on the ground by the 
investees in the Benishangul Gumuz region but no action has been taken for years. 
 
Land conversion from forests to ’farm lands’ has contributed to deforestation of the natural 
forest resource bases of the region as well. However, the forest resources of Benishangul 
could have been conserved as national buffer zones for expanding the Sahara desert. It is 
very common to observe huge woody masses in every commercial farm, and an ongoing 
land clearing and preparation (deforestation) (Figure 5.6).  
 
 
Figure 5.6  Deforestation is commonly seen and it is part of ‘land clearance’ by companies 
(June 2012, Guba district) 
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Following deforestation, many of the commercial farms have started growing commercial 
crops, such as biofuel tree (Figure 5.7) and edible crops; resulted in huge tracts of land 
converted from forest to commercial crop farms. As a result, there is a huge loss in 
biodiversity (both flora and fauna). Moreover, the environmental cost of the villagization 
program in the study region is clearly visible which contributed to additional deforestation 
and degradation of forest resources (Figure 5. 8).  
 
Figure 5.7  Pongamia ( a biofuel tree seedling) by Shapoorji-Pallonji (S & P) Company  
(June 2012, Dangure district) 
 
 
Figure 5.8  The villagization program has contributed to deforestation 
(June 2012, Dangure district) 
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The other pressing issue in the Guba district is locally called ‘Dam-in-Between’, i.e., the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the building of which started in 2011. Its 
reservoir will have a capacity of 63 109 m³, covering a total area of 1800 km² (Salini 
Impregilo 2011). The dam will be the largest dam in Africa and the 8th largest 
hydroelectric power dam in the world (ERTA 2011). However, it was in this region where 
the dam is located, that the government of Ethiopia supplied huge parcels of commercial 
farmlands on long-term land lease basis. The reservoir will be threatened by sediment 
deposition if there is no conducive natural buffer zone. Similar challenge was already 
observed by previous studies in Northern part of the country, for instance, sediment 
deposition in reservoirs is a serious off-site consequence of soil erosion (Haregeweyn et al. 
2006). To have such a natural buffer zone, land and forest areas in the closer upper 
watershed should have been conserved properly, but the practice in the ground by the land 
deals has made it the opposite. Restoration of forest ecosystem services will be important 
both in terms of sustainable agricultural production and protection of aquatic ecosystem 
(Tilman et al. 2002; Chazdon 2008). 
5.6 Conclusion 
While it is imperative to encourage and attract agricultural investment for the economy of 
developing countries of Africa, it is equally important to meet the desirable social, 
economic, and environmental standards of the sector. Lessons learned from the 
Benishangul Gumuz region highlight that supplying huge tracts of farm lands to large-scale 
agricultural investment requires integrated land use planning, appropriate land valuation, 
functional land governance and monitoring frameworks, capacity to implement the various 
social, and environmental laws. Land should be seen not only from the economic benefits 
of large scale agricultural investment, but also from the angle of other marketable 
environmental services such as payments for environmental services.  
 
Sustainable land use alternatives other than commercial farming, such as reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and foster conservation and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) should be considered especially in those 
ecologically fragile areas where the threat of desertification is surging (Resosudarmo et al., 
2014). Countries should not ambitiously supply large-scale farmlands without adequate 
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preparation, land use planning, proper land valuation, and capable monitoring framework. 
Adequate consultations should have primarily been made with local communities aiming 
their active participation when formulating the contract and all agreements. Accordingly, 
commercial land acquisitions should pass through ‘inclusive’ deals that integrate 
biophysical environment, stakeholders, governance and institutions (Dereje et al. 2015). 
Following the acquisition of land by transnational companies, there is a dramatic shift in 
terms of land use and the livelihood of local people: a shift from forest dependent means of 
living to customary farming practices without adequate support and training of farming 
practices.  
 
Integration and harmonization of large scale commercial farming with other local 
development projects is crucially important for countries which supply tracts of large scale 
farm lands to investors. For instance, there is a big concern in the context the Benishangul 
Gumuz region of Ethiopia where the fate of large-scale commercial farmlands around the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) where long-term land use contract is made 
between the government of Ethiopia and commercial companies (Goitom, 2014). What 
will be the long-term effect of those large-scale mechanized commercial farms which are 
operating the upper watersheds of the region upon the functionality and sustainability of 
the reservoir of the dam? Introducing cadastral systems and fit-for-purpose land 
management approach can contribute to resolving the prevailing challenges and 
predicaments of large-scale private commercial farming in the region (Enemark 2005; 
Enemark et al. 2014).  
 
Large-scale agricultural investment in the Benishangul Gumuz region in general and Guba 
district in particular is at the crossing point of protecting reservoir of the hydroelectric dam 
or continuing in the supply of large scale farm lands which has resulted in significant 
deforestation and land conversion. Besides, the forest resources of the Benishangul Gumuz 
region could have been conserved as national buffer zones for expanding the Sahara desert. 
Moreover, the critical functions of forestlands in deterring the expansion of the Sahara 
desert to western SSA is indispensable. Determinants of employment among commercial 
farmlands in commercial land supplying developing countries in general, and in the study 
area in particular, household level welfare effects, land use land cover changes, and the 
nexus between large-scale commercial farming and mega hydro dam and its reservoir can 
be further issues for future studies to create more lessons learned from commercial 
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farmland acquisition in Ethiopia. Lastly, improving rural infrastructure, particularly road, 
is indispensable to enhance farm level performance of commercial farms.  
References 
Azadi, H., Houshyar, E., Zarafshani, K., Hosseininia, G., Witlox, F. (2013). Agricultural 
outsourcing: A two-headed coin? Global and Planetary Change, 100, 20–27.  
Borras, S., Franco, J., Gomez, S., Kay, C., Spoor, M. (2012). Land grabbing in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), 845–872.  
Borras, S., Kay, C., Gomez, S., Wilkinson, J. (2012). Land grabbing and global capitalist 
accumulation: key features in Latin America. Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies/Revue Canadienne D’études Du Développement, 33(4), 402–416.  
Ca´rdenas, R. (2012). Green multiculturalism: articulations of ethnic and environmental 
politics in a Colombian “ black community.” Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(2), 309–
333. 
Chazdon, RL. (2008). Beyond deforestation: restoring forests and ecosystem services on 
degraded lands. Science, 320(5882), 1458–60.  
Ciriacy-wantrup, SV. (1947). Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Capital 
Returns from Soil-Conservation Practices. Journal of Farm Economics, 29(4), 1181–
1196. 
Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R., Keeley, J. (2009). Land grab or development 
opportunity ? international land deals in Africa Land grab or development 
opportunity ? (1st ed., p. 120). London/Rome: FAO, IIED and IFAD. 
Crewett, W., Ayalneh, B., Korf, B. (2008). Land Tenure in Ethiopia Continuity and 
Change , Shifting Rulers , and the Quest for State Control (No. 91) (p. 35). 
Washington DC. 
CSA. (2007). Census 2007 Tables: Benishangul Gumuz Region, Central Statistical Agency 
of Ethiopia. 
De Schutter, O. (2011). How not to think of land-grabbing: three critiques of large-scale 
investments in farmland. Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(2), 249–279. 
Deininger, K., Byerlee, D., Lindsay, J., Norton, A., Selod, H., Sticker, M. (2011). Rising 
Global Interest in Farmland: Cant it yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits? (p. 
206). The World Bank.  
Deininger, K., Daniel, A., Tekie, A. (2014). Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure 
Security , Investment , and Land Market Participation : Evidence from Ethiopia 
Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security , Investment , and Land Market 
Participation : Evidence from Ethiopia. Land Economics, 87(2), 312–334. 
Demeke, A., Dereje, T., Dong-geun, H. (2014). Development of Foreign Direct Investment 
in a Rising Africa: A Case Study of Ethiopia. Journal of Economics: Photon, 114, 
235–247.  
Dereje, T., Abebe, E. (2011). Land tenure and Farmers’ investment on agriculture: 
 171 
 
Evidences from three counties in Hawzen District, Tigray, Northern Ethiopia. 
International Journal of Research in Commerce, Economics, and Management, 1(6), 
5–12.  
Dereje, T., Azadi, H., Nyssen, J., Mitiku, H., Witlox, F. (2015). Transnational land deals: 
Towards an inclusive land governance framework. Land Use Policy, 42, 781-789. 
Desalegn, R. (2011). Land to investors: large-scale land transfers in Ethiopia (pp. 0–36). 
Addis Ababa.  
Diamond, PA., Hausman, JA. (1994). Contingent Valuation : Is Some Number Better than 
No Number ? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(4), 45–64. 
Edelman, M., Oya, C., Borras, SM. (2013). Global Land Grabs : historical processes , 
theoretical and methodological implications and current trajectories. Third World 
Quarterly, 34(9), 1517–1531.  
EIA. (2012). Ethiopia Investment Guide 2012. Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA), Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia.  
EIA. (2013). Invest in Ethiopia: An Investment Guide to Ethiopia, Opportunities and 
Conditions . Ethiopian Investment Agency, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
Enemark, S. (2005). The Land Management Perspective - Building the Capacity. In ITC 
Lustrum Conference Spatial Information for Civil Society Capacity Building for the 
International Geo­Information Society. Emschede, The Netherlands, 14­16 December 
2005 (pp. 14–16). 
Enemark, S., Clifford, K., Lemmen, C., McLaren, R. (2014). Fit­for­Purpose Land 
Administration, Joint FIG/World Bank Publication (1st ed., p. 44). Copenhagen, 
Denmark: International Federation of Surveyors (FIG).  
Enemark, S., Williamson, I., Wallace, J. (2005). Building Modern Land Administration 
Systems in Developed Economics. Journal of Spatial Science, 50(2), 51–68.  
ERTA. (2011). Ethiopia Launched Grand Millennium Dam Project, the Biggest in Africa. 
Retrieved 22 February 2013, from http://www.ethiopian-news.com/ethiopia-launched-
grand-millennium-dam-project-the-biggest-in-africa/ 
FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD, World Bank. (2010). Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
Investment that Respects Rights , Livelihoods and Resources (p. 22).  
Farmland grab. (2014). Foreigners can buy as much B.C. farmland as they want — and 
they are. Retrieved 20 December 2014, from http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/23452. 
FIAN. (2010). Land grabbing in Kenya and Mozambique:A report on two research 
missions – and a human rights analysis of land grabbing (p. 44). 69115 Heidelberg, 
Germany.  
Galor, O., Moav, O., Dietrich, V. (2009). Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of 
Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence. Review of 
Economic Studies, 76(1), 143–179. 
Gasparatos, A., Scolobig, A. (2012). Choosing the most appropriate sustainability 
assessment tool. Ecological Economics, 80, 1–7.  
GBGR. (2007). Regional Atlas of Benishangul Gumuz Region, Asosa. Asosa: Bureau of 
Finance and Economic Development. 
GBGR. Benishangul Gumuz Region Rural Investment Land Use Regulation, Regulation 
no.29/2009 (Amharic version)  
 172 
GBGR. (2012). Regional Statistics: Benishangul­Gumuz, Benishangul­Gumuz Regional 
State Bureau of Finance and Economic Development. Asosa. Asosa. 
Gerlach, AC., Liu, P. (2010). Resource­seeking Foreign Direct Investment in African 
Agriculture A review of country case studies (No. 31) (pp. 1–19). Rome. 
GOE. (1975). Public Ownership of Rural Lands Proclamation (by the Provisional Military 
Administration Council) (1975). Negarit Gazeta, 34th year, no.26, 29 April, 1975, 
p.93-101. 
GOE. (1995). Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation 
no.1/1995 (1995). Ethiopia: Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, Year 1, No.1, Addis Ababa, August 21, 1995. 
GOE. (1997). Federal Rural Land Administration Proclamation, Proclamation no.89/1997 
(1997). Ethiopia: Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, Year 3, No.54, Addis Ababa, July 7, 1997. 
GOE. (2002). Ethiopia EIA Proclamation (2002). Ethiopia: Federal Negarit Gazeta, Year 
9, no.11, December , 1975, p.1951-1958. 
GOE. (2005). Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rural Land Administration and 
Land Use Proclamation, Proclamation no.456/2005 (2005). Ethiopia: Federal Negarit 
Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Year 11, No.44, Addis 
Ababa, July 5, 2005. 
GOE. (2010). Agricultural Transformation Council and Agency Establishment Council of 
Ministers Regulation, Regulation no. 198/2010 (2010). Ethiopia: Federal Negarit 
Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Year 17, No.20, Addis 
Ababa, March 1, 2011.  
GOE. (2012). Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic 
Investors Council of Ministers regulation, Regulation no.270/2012, Pub. L. No. 
270/2012 (2012). Ethiopia: Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, Year 19, No.4, Addis Ababa, November 29, 2012. 
Goitom, G. (2014). Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam  Ending Africa's Oldest 
Geopolitical Rivalry ? The Washington Quarterly, 37(2), 25–37.  
GRAIN. (2008). The 2008 land grab for food and financial security. Retrieved 16 
December 2012, from http://www.grain.org/ 
GRAIN. (2011). Land grabbing and the global food crisis Land grabbing ? (p. 30). 
Barcelona. Retrieved 20 February 2013, from http://www.grain.org/ 
Hall, R. (2011). Land grabbing in Southern Africa: the many faces of the investor rush. 
Review of African Political Economy, 38(128), 193–214.  
Hamelinck, C. (2013). Land grabs for biofuels driven by EU biofuels policies (p. 106). 
Utrecht, The Netherlnads. Retrieved 26 October 2013, from http://www.ecofys.com. 
Haregeweyn, N., Poesen, J., Nyssen, J., De wit, J., Mitiku, H., Deckers, S. (2006). 
Reserviours in Tigray (Northern Ethiopia): Characteristics and Sediment Deposition 
Problems. Land Degradation and Development, 230(August 2005), 211–230. 
Holden, S., Otsuka, K., Place, FM. (2008). Understanding land markets: questions and 
hypotheses. In The emergence of land markets in Africa: assessing the impacts on 
poverty, equity, and efficiency (pp. 18–54). Washington DC, USA: Resources for the 
Future. 
 173 
 
IGE. (1955). Revised Constitution of Ethiopia, The Imperial Government of Ethiopia, Pub. 
L. No. Negarit Gazeta 15th Year No.2, Addis Ababa, November 4, 1955 (1955). 
Ethiopia: Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia, London 1969.  
Lavers, T. (2012). “Land grab” as development strategy? The political economy of 
agricultural investment in Ethiopia. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(1), 105–132.  
Margulis, ME., Porter, T. (2013). Governing the Global Land Grab: Multipolarity, Ideas, 
and Complexity in Transnational Governance. Globalizations, 10(1), 65–86. 
Marx, K. (1867). Capital: Volume One, The Process of Production of Capital (first Engl., 
Vol. 1887, p. 505). Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR. Retrieved 20 February 2013, 
from http://www.marxists.org/index.htm. 
McMichael, P. (2013). Land Grabbing as Security Mercantilism in International Relations. 
Globalizations, 10(1), 47–64.  
Mehta, L., Veldwisch, GJ., Franco, J. (2012). Introduction to the Special Issue: Water 
Grabbing? Focus on the (Re) appropriation of Finite Water Resources. Water 
Alternatives, 5(2), 193–207. 
MoA. (2010). Agricultural Investment Land Lease Guideline (Amharic version), 
December 2009 (2009). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
MoA. ( 2010). Land Rent Contractual Agreement Template Between Ministry of 
Agriculture and Investors (Amharic version) (2010). Ministry of Agriculture, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia. 
MoA. (2013). Agricultural investment land handed to investors, excel file(data set). Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia. 
MoFED. (2003). Rural Development Policy and Strategy (p. 74). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Economic Policy and Planning 
Department. 
MoFED. (2006). Ethiopia : Building on Progress A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained 
Development to End Poverty ( PASDEP ): (2005/’06­2009/'10), Volume I (Vol. I, p. 
278). Ministry of Finance and Economic Development(MoFED).  
MoFED. (2010). The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Growth and 
Transformation Plan(GTP) 2010/’11­2014/'15 (p. 85). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Economic Policy and Planning 
Department(MoFED). 
MoFED. (2013). Ethiopia: General Economic Implementation (2002­2013) (Amharic 
version) Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) , Addis Abab 
Ness, B., Urbel-Piirsalu, E., Anderberg, S., Olsson, L. (2007). Categorising tools for 
sustainability assessment. Ecological Economics, 60(3), 498–508.  
Nyssen, J. (1998). Soil and water conservation under changing socio-economic conditions 
in the Tembien Highlands (Tigray, Ethiopia). Bulletin de La Société Géographique de 
Liège, 35, 5–17. 
Oviedo, S. (2011). Avoiding the land grab: Responsible farmland investing in developing 
nations (p. 15). Sustainalytics, Amsterdam  
Pestana, C., Francisco, A., Ricardo, J. (2013). Brazilian Land Tenure and Conflicts : The 
Landless Peasants Movement. Cato Journal, 33(1), 47–75.  
Ready, RC., Berger, MC., Blomquist, GC. (1997). Measuring Amenity Benefits from 
 174 
Farmland : Hedonic Pricing vs . Contingent Valuation. Growth and Change, 28(June), 
438–458. 
Reidsma, P., König, H., Feng, S., Bezlepkina, I., Nesheim, I., Bonin, M., Sghaier, M., 
Purushothaman, S., Sieber, S., Ittersum, MK., Brouwer, F. (2011). Methods and tools 
for integrated assessment of land use policies on sustainable development in 
developing countries. Land Use Policy, 28(3), 604–617.  
Resosudarmo, IAP., Atmadja, S., Ekaputri, AD., Intarini, DY., Indriatmoko, Y., Astri, P. 
(2014). Does Tenure Security Lead to REDD+ Project Effectiveness? Reflections 
from Five Emerging Sites in Indonesia. World Development, 55, 68–83. 
Salini Impregilo. (2011). Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project. Retrieved 20 
February 2013, from http://www.salini-impregilo.com/en/projects/ 
Samuel, G. (2006). Land, Land Policy and Smallholder Agriculture in Ethiopia: Options 
and Scenarios. In Future Agricultures Consortium meeting at the Institute of 
Development Studies 20­22 March 2006 (p. 14 ).  
Smith, C. , McDonald, G., Thwaites, R. (2000). TIM: Assessing the sustainability of 
agricultural land management. Journal of Environmental Management, 60(4), 267–
288.  
Stebek, EN. (2011). Between “Land Grabs” and Agricultural Investment: Land Rent 
Contracts with Foreign Investors and Ethiopia’s Normattive Setting in Focus. Mizan 
Law Review, 5(2), 175–214. 
Tigistu, GA. (2011). Experience and Future Direction in Ethiopian Rural Land 
Administration. In Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Property, April 2011, 
Washington D.C (p. 16).  
Tilman, D., Cassman, KG., Matson, PA, Naylor, R., Polasky, S. (2002). Agricultural 
sustainability and intensive production practices. Nature, 418(6898), 671–7. 
Venkatachalam, L. (2004). The contingent valuation method: a review. Environmental 
Impact Assessment Review, 24(1), 89–124.  
White, B., Borras, SM., Hall, R., Scoones, I., Wolford, W. (2012). The new enclosures: 
critical perspectives on corporate land deals. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), 
619–647.  
World Bank. (2013). Doing Business 2014, Economy Profile : Ethiopia. Comparing 
Business Regulations for Domestic Firms in 189 Economies (11th ed., p. 108). 
Washington DC.  
World Bank. (2014). Prosperity for All/Ending Extreme Poverty: A Note for the world 
Bank Group Spring Meetings 2014 (p. 30). Washington DC.  
Zoomers, A. (2010). Globalisation and the foreignisation of space: seven processes driving 
the current global land grab. Journal of Peasant Studies, 37(2), 429–447.  
 175 
 
 
Chapter 6 Environmental response on land 
deals: A case of peak discharge and sediment 
transport 
Adapted from Dereje, T., Lanckriet, S., Azadi, H., Asfaha, T.G, Mitiku , H., Witlox, F., 
Nyssen, J. (2016). Effects of land deals on peak discharge and sediment transport in the 
catchments around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.(Under review). 
 
Absrtract Land degradation poses siltation threats to reservoirs, and hence, sustainable 
hydropower development necessitates conservation of upstream catchments. Ethiopia is 
constructing Africa's largest hydropower dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
(GERD), on the Blue Nile. Given the commercialization of large tracts of land in the closer 
catchments, there is a need to explore the effects on peak discharge and suspended 
sediment concentration (SSC). A field survey was conducted on 20 ephemeral streams to 
compare annual maximum peak discharges between catchments (0.4 – 15.5 km²), eight of 
which drain commercial farms and twelve others land under traditional management. We 
measured channel characteristics, observed flood marks and applied the empirical Manning 
equation to calculate peak discharges. SSC samples were taken during each runoff event 
from a stream in each of the two dominant land management categories. Results indicated 
that there is a 51% increase in the magnitude of peak runoff from commercial farms 
compared to traditionally managed lands. Catchments dominated by commercial farms 
also have a significantly higher SSC (mean = 6.44 ± 2.23 g l-1) compared to catchments 
without commercial farms (mean = 2.77 ± 2.31 g l-1). Forests and woodlands have strong 
buffering effect, croplands are generating higher peak discharges and sediment transport. 
Leasing forests and woodland to agricultural companies has resulted in deforestation. 
Consequently, the increased runoff response may lead to downstream bank erosion, affects 
downstream communities, and the increased sediment transport poses a significant threat to 
the 4.8 billion dollars hydropower reservoir of the GERD. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Sustainable hydroelectric power development requires conservation of upstream 
catchments because sediment deposition can be a threat to reservoirs (Adams, 1989; Devi 
et al., 2008). The Government of Ethiopia is constructing Africa's largest hydroelectric 
power station on the Blue Nile called the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). On 
the other hand, the Nile basin is characterised by severe land degradation and variability of 
river discharges (Bewket & Teferi, 2009; Frankl et al., 2011; Nyssen et al., 2004). Soil 
erosion from large-scale farms has been a challenge in Ethiopia in earlier times. According 
to Joyce (1943), soil erosion and gullying were conspicuous on the large Italian tractor-
ploughing schemes in Ethiopia. Later on, during the socialist regime in Ethiopia, high rates 
of soil loss were measured on large mechanised state farms (Alemayehu, 1992). The high 
erosion rates were attributed to monoculture cropping, improper cultivation, mechanisation 
and large farm sizes with extremely long slopes up to 200-500 m. Hurni (1983) observed 
soil erosion, particularly slight gullying and abundant rill erosion, on half of the large-scale 
farm lands in the country. 
Conversion of natural land cover to farmlands can have a significant effect on the 
hydrological functions of catchments in other countries (Andréassian, 2004; Buytaert et al., 
2005; Guillemette et al., 2005). Brown (2012) pointed to topsoil loss from mechanised 
farms in countries such as Chad, Mongolia, North Korea and Haiti. Although 
commercialization of farmlands is assumed to cause land degradation, the effects of the 
contemporary large-scale land acquisitions or ‘land grabbing’ upon stream response and 
soil loss is a less explored area of study around where the GERD is located (Dereje et al., 
2016).  
 
The GERD is a roller-compacted concrete dam with a height of 145 m, complemented by a 
saddle dam up to 50 m high and 5 km long (IPoE, 2013). After impoundment, its reservoir 
will extend 246 km into the Blue Nile valley, as well as into the valleys of its tributaries 
such as Beles River (Figure 6.1). The dam is located 20 km east of the border between 
Ethiopia and Sudan. The reservoir covers 1874 km2 at the full supply level will be at 640 m 
a.s.l. With a water storage volume of 74.01billion m³ (due completion in 2017), the dam is 
expected to generate 15,692 GWh of energy annually. However, leasing large tracts of land 
to both international and domestic investors in the upper catchments, close to its reservoir 
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has become one of the emerging issues which have not given the desired level of 
investigation and policy attention (Dereje et al., 2016). Our study focuses on exploring the 
impacts of commercial farms on peak discharge and suspended sediment concentration 
(SSC) in the catchments nearer to the reservoir of the GERD.  
6.2 Materials and methods 
6.2.1 Study area 
The location of the study area (Figure 6.1) is in Benishangul-Gumuz Region, a low-lying 
peripheral region, located between the Western Escarpment of the Ethiopian highlands and 
the Sudanese border between 11° - 11°30' N and 35°30' - 36° E. The average annual 
rainfall of the areas is 1280 mm. The summer rainfall (July to September) accounts for 
85% of the annual precipitation. The indigenous people in the study area, the Gumuz 
communities, are used to customary and communal ‘ownership’ of land. They are shifting 
cultivators who involve in a slash-and-burn farming. Besides, they support their livelihood 
through hunting, fishing, gathering, and honey production.  
There is ongoing land conversion in the area, especially after the government of Ethiopia 
offered millions of hectares of land for companies (EIA, 2005). Consequently, investors 
occupy forest and woodland for commercialised agriculture. Commercial catchments are 
characterised with tractor ploughing on larger plots of farms (average size of 18 ha) where 
some of the plots have up to 2.2 km length. Under the obligations of the lessee, 
commercial farmers were agreed to conduct an environmental impact assessment, 
conservation, and apply appropriate farming methods to prevent soil erosion. However, 
there is a lack of scientific evidence about the actual effect of commercialization of Gumuz 
lowlands upon stream flow and soil erosion and the interplay with the emerging (the 
biggest in Africa) hydropower reservoir. For the study, twenty comparable and 
representative catchments (0.4 – 15.48 km²) are considered, eight of which are 
predominantly under commercial farming while twelve are mainly non-commercial lands 
with mixed use (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). The study area is predominantly low-relief with an 
average altitude of 870 m a.s.l, mean slope gradient of less than 2%, and mean slope aspect 
of 197° (i.e., South-West). 
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Figure 6.1 Location of GERD and the study area 
6.2.2 Land cover variables 
 By adapting available techniques of land cover classification, eight land cover classes 
were identified (Torello-Raventos et al., 2013). High-resolution Google Maps 
(2012/2013), Digital Globe, NASA Aqua MODIS imageries (2014/’15) were co-registered 
on an image-to-image basis. Co-registration was made to the topographic maps (1: 50,000) 
as the reference positional accuracy of x and y coordinates were determined by root-mean-
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square error (RMSEx,y) and it was between 0.001 and 0.48 m. For ground truthing, ground 
control points (GCPs), n=410, were collected in the field using the handheld Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). The GCPs were unambiguously identifiable ground 
points such as camps, farm level monitoring sites, village points, bridges, road features, 
remarkable trees, local administration posts, rivers and other topographic features 
 
Furthermore, the GCPs were indispensable to verify remotely sensed data as remote 
sensing imageries are under the influence of geometric distortions (Eltohamy & Hamza, 
2009). Repeated land cover observation in collaboration with local key informants and 
photographs of 2012-2015 were also valuable inputs to make the land cover classes. 
Finally, detailed field verification was made (February-August 2015) with the land use 
maps of each catchment at hand. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Partial views of the study area: Abraham catchment, typical commercial 
farming area (A), Kuda Guna area, typical for non-commercial farming (B). 
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In addition to the percentage of forest and woodland cover, the forest distribution index 
(Kcv) across the catchments can determine the runoff variability (Quynh & Bao, 2006): 
msdKcv           (1) 
Where Kcv is forest cover distribution, sd is standard deviation, m is the mean value of ten 
randomized trials (Kis’) which fall within the polygons of forest cover class. Kcv is usually 
categorized into four groups: (i) 0 < Kcv < 10% : even distribution, (ii) 10% < Kcv < 20% 
: relatively even distribution; (iii) 20% < Kcv < 30%: uneven distribution, and (iv) Kcv > 
30% : very uneven distribution 
Based on Kcv values and percentage of forest cover, integrated index of forest cover and 
its distribution (RCD) is computed.  
RCD KcvFC          (2)  
Where, FC is forest cover (%) and where Kcv is forest cover distribution. 
6.2.3 Morphometric variables 
Catchment-based morphometric characteristics and streams affect runoff in various ways. 
For example, they influence the time distribution of runoff response from stream channels 
and the whole catchment (Bruijnzeel et al., 2011). Using a digital elevation model (DEM), 
i.e., ASTER-DEM and topographic maps (scale, 1:50,000), values for relevant 
geomorphometric variables (Table 6.1) were computed. Finally, using the national 
geological map of Ethiopia (GSE, 1996), the lithological profile was defined for each 
catchment. 
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Table 6.1 Morphometric factors of the study 
Geomorphometric variable Method or model used 
Equation 
no. 
Catchment geometry 
Catchment area (A, km2) GIS analysis (Schumm, 1956) 
Catchment perimeter (Pc, km) GIS analysis (Schumm, 1956) 
 Catchment length (Lc, km) GIS analysis (Schumm, 1956) 
 Compactness coefficient (Cc) 
 A
Pc
APcCc 2841.02    (Gravelius, 1914) (3) 
 
Drainage characteristics 
 Length of main channel (Lmc, 
km) GIS analysis (Schumm, 1956) 
Stream length (Ls, km)  
n
i
LsiLs
1
 (Strahler, 1957) (4) 
Drainage texture (Dt)  PcNsDt  (Horton, 1945) (5) 
Drainage density 
 (Dd, km km-2)  ALsDd  (Horton, 1945) (6) 
Infiltration number 
 (If, dimensionless) If = Dd * Df (Faniran, 1968 ) (7) 
Length of overland flow (Lo)  Lo = 0.5Dd (Horton, 1945) (8) 
Relief characteristics 
  
Hypsometric integral (Hi) min)max(min)( HHHHmeanHi  (Schumm, 1956) (9) 
Ruggedness number (Rn) Rn = Hd * Dd (Patton & Baker, 1976) (10) 
Average catchment slope  
 (Sc, mm-1)  LdHdSc  (Schumm, 1956) (11) 
Time factor 
Time of concentration (Tc) 
 Tc = SmcLmcK
385.077.0
* (Kirpich, 1940) (12) 
 Lmc: length of main channel(km); Dt: Drainage texture; Dd: Drainage density; Lf: infiltration number; Lsi: 
Length of streams 1, 2, 3, ....n (km); n: number of streams; Cc: compactness coefficient; H: Elevation, Hean: 
average elevation; Hmin: minimum elevation; Hmax: maximum elevation; Hd: catchment elevation 
difference between the highest and the lowest topography; Ld : difference in length; Lmc: length of main 
channel; Smc: slope of main channel; K: a unit conversion coefficient where K= 0.0195. 
6.2.4 Sediment sampling and calibration  
Twin catchments (Figure 6.3) were compared for suspended sediment concentration. The 
catchments are not only near each other but also very similar regarding relevant variables 
such as rainfall, lithology, altitude, and average catchment slope, yet significantly different 
in land use/land cover, as the one is mainly under commercial farming and the other 
traditionally managed. Suspended sediment concentration (SSC) samples (n=30, 15 from 
each of the sediment monitoring stations of the two catchments) were taken once per rainy 
 182 
day during the rainy season. Samples were taken during runoff discharge using a plastic 
bottle on a stick. We aimed to sample during the peak of each event, as the sediment load 
at that moment; best translates the erosivity of the catchment. 
 
Figure 6.3 Land cover and location of sediment sampling stations: Abreham and Aybon 
catchments 
 183 
 
6.2.5 Computation of peak discharge  
There are different methods of measuring discharge from catchments. The instantaneous 
measurement of peak discharge is challenging because of the requirements of permanent 
instrumentation, and the destructive character and flashness of the major discharge events 
in dryland rivers (Lumbroso & Gaume, 2012). For our case, as it was not difficult to obtain 
peak mark points at the outlet of catchments (Figure 6.4), annual peak discharges were 
obtained using indirect methods (El-Hames, 2012; USGS, 1982).  
 
 
Figure 6.4 Stream peak flow marks 
 
The Manning’s equation was applied to determine peak runoff as it is recommended for 
computing open channel flows (Williams, 1970): 
QP = AcV         (13) 
Where QP is annual peak discharge (m
3 s-1), Ac is the cross-sectional area of the channel 
section (m2) for the level of annual peak flood (as indicated by flood marks), V is average 
flow velocity (m s-1). Ac was computed as the product of the average stream channel width 
and its depth. V was calculated using the Manning’s empirical formula: 
V = (R2/3 S1/2)/n        (14) 
Where R is hydraulic radius (m) which is cross-sectional area divided by the wetted 
perimeter; S is average slope gradient of the channel (m m-1), and n is the Manning’s 
roughness coefficient. As there is a strong relationship between the peak discharge 
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estimation and estimation of Manning’s n values which is usually done using qualitative 
field observation. Besides, multiple photographs taken from different directions were used 
to evaluate n values. The values of n were determined through expert evaluation whereby 
eight experts assessed the n value using, at least, four photographs of every channel taken 
from different directions. The lists of the factors that affect the value determined for 
roughness coefficients were adapted from Cowan's (1956) method (Appendix II) which 
considers specific factors to calculate the Manning’s roughness coefficient (N): 
N = (no + n1 + n2 + n3 + n4)/m      (15) 
Where no is materials involved, n1 is the degree of irregularity, n2 is variation in channel 
cross section, n3 is the effect of obstruction, n4 is an effect of vegetation and m is the 
degree of meandering. Since total peak discharges events across the catchments were also 
dependent on catchment area, to compare catchments on their runoff response, peak 
discharge values were normalized per catchment area (Blume et al., 2007): 
Cp = Qp/Ac         (16) 
Where Cp is peak discharge coefficient for a particular catchment (m
3s-1km-2), Qp is annual 
peak discharge (m3s-1), Ac is catchment area (km2). Rainfall is positively influenced by 
altitude (Davie, 2008). However, the catchments are almost similar in altitude. According 
to Beven & Hornberger (1982), in a relatively homogeneous topography, the effect of 
rainfall variability was in the timing of the runoff hydrograph only, with an inconsiderate 
effect on peak storm volume. Furthermore, recent rainfall data (2012-2015) obtained from 
companies located in catchments show that the annual rainfall is nearly the same as the 
rainfall data obtained from Manbuk (11°17'36''N, 36°14'39''E), the nearby meteorological 
station. 
 
Finally, we made normality checks on the data using Shapiro-Wilk test, which is helpful to 
know whether a sample is drawn from a normally distributed population or not (Shapiro & 
Wilk, 1965). To make a comparison of variables between commercialized and non-
commercialized catchments, a two-sample T-test was conducted for normally distributed 
samples, while the Mann-Whitney T-test was applied for variables lacking normality in 
their distribution (Mann & Whitney, 1947).  
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6.3 Results and discussion 
6.3.1 Land cover variability and effect on peak flow  
On average, the commercialized catchments comprise of cropland (58%), forest 9%, 
woodland (21%), savannah (6%), bamboo (3%), and other land covers (3%). The non-
commercialized catchments constitute woodland (38%), forest (27%), cropland (17%), 
savannah (10%), fallow or bukuna land (in local Gumuz language) (4%), bamboo (4%), 
and others (1%) (Table 6.2). Results show a significantly lower (P < 0.01) forest cover in 
commercialized catchments (mean = 9.10%, SD = 8.96 than non-commercialized 
catchments (mean = 27%, SD = 23.17). Besides, the commercialized catchments have a 
significantly lower (P < 0.01) integrated forest cover and its distribution (RCD) index 
(mean = 0.36, SD = 0.73) compared to the non-commercialized catchments (mean = 1.80, 
SD = 1.46). While forest is very unevenly distributed in the commercialized catchments 
(mean = 63.10, SD = 48), it is in a relatively even distribution in the case of the non-
commercialized catchments (mean = 19.70, SD = 10.81).  
 
Table 6.2  Mann-Whitney t-test for land cover variables across catchments (in %) 
Land cover 
Commercialized (n = 8)  Non-commercialized (n = 12) 
Min-Max Mean SD  Min/Max Mean SD 
Bare ground 0.10-2.5 1.00 0.69  0-1.92 0.58 0.55 
Bamboo 0-7.64 3.10 3.28  0-8.33 3.76 2.82 
Cropland 19-82.3 57.5** 19.52  0-52.20 16.96** 19.40 
Fallow 0-6.20 0.80 2.20  0-17.70 4.03 5.74 
Forest 1.5-26.4 9.10* 8.94  2.6-73.24 27* 23.17 
Savannah 0-16.31 5.6 5.10  0-20.33 9.20 6.24 
Village/Camp 0-5.21 1.80 2.07  0-4.04 0.60 1.23 
Woodland 8.70-41.70 21.20* 12  18.20-68.80 38* 16.26 
Vegetation a 11.10-74.90 38.90** 18.84  47.25-100 78** 20.48 
Kcv 
b 12.30-158.14 63.10* 48  9.20-43 19.70* 10.81 
RCD c 0.03-2.15 0.36** 0.73  0.35-4.57 1.80** 1.46 
a Vegetation : combination of bamboo, forest, savannah, and woodland 
b Kcv : forest distribution index  
c RCD : integrated index of forest cover and its distribution  
Difference between commercialized and non-commercialized catchment areas is significant (* P 
< 0.05, ** P < 0.01) 
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In terms of annual peak discharge (Table 6.3), the catchments exposed to commercial 
farming have a higher (by 51%) CP (mean = 6.91, SD = 1.03) compared to the non-
commercialized (mean = 4.58, SD = 0.82).  
 
For the latter group of the catchments, a higher percentage of vegetation cover has better 
buffering effects among the non-commercialized catchments, a distinct role of forest and 
woodland (Birkinshaw & Bathurst, 2011). Percentage of crop land cover has a significant 
positive correlation with catchment specific runoff response (Cp), with R2 = 0.75, P < 0.01 
(commercialized catchments) and R2 = 0.56, P <0.01 (non-commercialized catchments) 
(Table 6.4). For the non-commercialized catchments, there is a negative correlation 
between Cp and RCD (R2 = 0.63). In addition to forest, low woodland coverage among the 
commercialized catchments has a significant contribution towards a higher peak flow, and 
this is in line with the findings of Guillemette et al. (2005) and (Rowe, 1963).  
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Table 6.3  Peak discharge (Qp), catchment-specific peak discharge coefficients (Cp). 
Catchment Aca Scb Vc nd Qp (m3s-1)e Cpf 
Abreham 5.82 0.01 1.34 0.06 7.78 6.95 
Belay 2.58 0.01 0.93 0.04 2.40 6.00 
Anjakoya 2.49 0.05 3.75 0.04 9.34 7.02 
SP5  7.39 0.03 3.15 0.05 23.27 8.08 
Trakon  4.15 0.02 3.68 0.03 15.26 4.97 
Jura small 3.18 0.02 3.35 0.03 10.65 7.01 
Zeleke 2.34 0.06 4.30 0.04 10.04 7.12 
SP6 4.91 0.03 2.94 0.05 14.43 8.11 
Mean (Commercial, n =8) 4.11 0.03 2.93 0.04* 11.65 6.91** 
SD (Commercial) 1.82 0.02 1.19 0.01 6.16 1.03 
SP2 1.63 0.04 2.03 0.05 3.30 4.23 
Sanchel small 6.94 0.03 3.78 0.04 26.24 5.04 
SP1 1.09 0.02 1.59 0.05 1.73 3.39 
Epinach 10.32 0.02 1.43 0.09 14.74 5.27 
Kodem 13.89 0.02 2.12 0.07 29.46 4.99 
Kemem  19.12 0.05 3.75 0.08 71.75 5.00 
Esinga 2.31 0.04 2.00 0.07 4.61 3.75 
Ekuramtsa 0.67 0.07 2.67 0.04 1.79 4.48 
Aysika 7.23 0.05 4.32 0.05 31.22 3.40 
Datish 4.43 0.02 2.38 0.05 10.54 5.79 
Aymla 7.04 0.03 2.18 0.06 15.32 5.57 
Aybon  7.53 0.02 3.29 0.04 24.82 4.10 
Mean (Non-commercial, n = 12) 6.85 0.03 2.63 0.06* 19.63 4.58** 
SD (Non-commercial) 5.54 0.02 0.94 0.02 19.71 0.82 
aAc: cross-section area of the channel section (m2), bSc: average slope gradient of the channel, cV: 
average velocity (ms-1), dn: Manning’s roughness coefficient. eQp: peak discharge, 
f Cp: catchment-specific 
peak discharge coefficient. Difference between commercialized and non-commercialized catchment areas 
is significant (** P < 0.01, * P < 0.05) 
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Table 6.4  Significant correlation coefficients a 
Commercial catchments Coef. Std.error T R2 P-value 
Crop land 0.046 0.011 4.22 0.75 0.006 
(Constant) 4.25 0.65 6.47 0.001 
Forest -0.10 0.035 2.36 0.45 0.049 
(Constant) 7.61 0.28 17.53 0.000 
Vegetation b -0.048 0.011 -4.19 0.77 0.007 
Constant) 8.74 0.48 18.12 0.000 
Wood land -0.08 0.15 -5.21 0.82 0.002 
(constant) 8.56 0.36 23.70 0.000 
RCD c -1.08 0.40 -2.87 0.78 0.029 
(Constant)  7.28 0.29 15.20 0.000 
Non­commercial catchments Coef. Std.error T R2 P-value 
Crop land 0.03 0.01 3.56 0.56 0.005 
(Constant) 4.05 0.22 18.55 0.000 
Vegetation b -0.03 0.03 -3.21 0.51 0.009 
(Constant) 6.8 0.70 9.51 0.000 
RCD c -0.42 0.133 -2.80 0.63 0.019 
(Constant) 5.25 0.03 14.33 0. 000 
a Dependent variable: catchment-specific peak discharge coefficients (Cp) 
 b Vegetation: the sum of forest, wood land, bamboo, and savannah 
c RCD : integrated index of forest cover and its distribution 
  
6.3.2 Morphometric variability and effect on peak flow 
Based on the comparison made using 14 morphometric variables (Table 6.5), no significant 
difference found between the two groups of the catchments except for one variable (i.e., 
ruggedness number). The non-commercialized catchments have a significantly higher 
ruggedness number (mean = 243, SD = 424) than the commercialized ones (mean = 32.7, 
SD = 32.39). The result implies that commercial farmers were wise enough in choosing 
relatively less rugged terrains (investment land) which are more suitable for mechanized 
farming while traditional farmers were pushed to relatively rugged topographies. With the 
intention of providing improved public services, parallel to the land commercialization 
process, government resettled scattered villages to designated settlement sites through a 
regional villagization programme. Catchments which farmers left following the 
villagization scheme was leased to investors. Later, resettled villagers have begun 
abandoning the resettlement sites and started returning to their original villages and have 
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recently started reclaiming leased lands. Consequently, tension between investors and local 
communities has increased. 
 
Correlation between all the independent variables with catchment-specific peak discharge 
coefficients (Cp) was examined. It was found that none of the morphometric variables have 
significant (P < 0.05) correlation with catchment-specific peak discharge coefficients (Cp). 
This result is different from studies which were conducted in other areas, of course with a 
relatively higher undulating topographic features (El-Hames, 2012) and where the contrast 
in land management is less pronounced than in our case. 
 
Table 6.5  T-test on basic morphometric characteristics of catchments 
Morphometric Commercialized Non-commercialized 
Variable Min-Max Mean (n = 8) SD Min-Max Mean (n = 12) SD 
Area (km²) 0.40-3.07 1.69 0.89 
 
0.32-15.48 4.35 4.46 
Perimeter (km) 2.37-7.71 5.41 1.69 2.77-21 8.85 5.48 
Stream length (km) 0.37-5.48 3.37 1.72 
 
0.60-38.96 9.59 11.14 
Catchment length (km) 0.83-3.09 2.25 0.73 1.14-8.77 3.55 2.33 
Length of main channel 
(km) 0.60-2.98 1.79 0.87 0.60-8.35 3.52 2.53 
Drainage texture 0.16-2.20 1.03 0.66 
 
0.33-3.54 1.36 0.88 
Drainage density 0.93-3.95 2.03 0.91 0.94-3.44 2.24 0.77 
Infiltration number 0.70-35.26 8.95 11.00 2.22-22.06 8.68 6.06 
Overland flow length 0.46-1.97 1.01 0.46 
 
0.47-1.72 1.12 0.38 
Compactness coefficient 1.05-1.30 1.20 0.08 1.1-1.55 1.30 0.15 
Hypsometric integral  0.25-0.52 0.42 0.09 0.17-0.64 0.45 0.12 
Ruggedness number  3.70-82.93 32.70* 32.39 
 
9.51-1550 243* 424 
Catchment slope gradient 
(mean) 0.01-0.01 0.01 00 0.01-0.07 0.03 0.02 
Time of concentration 
(minute) 15.46-43.14 31.2 8.07 8.72-84.60 40.05 25.54 
Difference between commercialized and non-commercialized catchment areas is significant (* P < 0.05) 
 
The percentages of vegetation cover, cropland cover and integrated index of forest cover 
and its distribution (RCD) have substantial control on Cp. These independent variables 
which demonstrated substantially meaningful relations with Cp were combined in multiple 
regression equations. Though ruggedness number (Rn) does not have a significant 
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correlation with Cp and as it is the only variable with which the two groups of catchments 
are significantly different, we consider it for running the multiple regression. Therefore, Cp 
can be explained as a function of RCD, percentage of crop land cover (CL), and 
ruggedness number (Rn). Variance inflation factor (VIF) was checked to avoid any 
multicollinearity problem. The statistical rule of thumb is variance inflation factor (VIF) 
should not be greater than 10 (O’Brien, 2007). We found VIF of 3.45 and 1.41 for equation 
17 and 18 respectively. Finally, the regression equations become: 
Cp, commercial = - 0.23RCD + 0.06CL + 0.16Rn – 3.02, R
2 = 0.90  (17) 
Cp, non-commercial = - 0.16RCD + 0.03CL + 0.001Rn + 4.3, R
2 = 0.81 (18) 
The two regression results reveal that the catchment specific coefficient (Cp) can be 
explained and determined by joint effect of the percentage of the cropland cover, of the 
ruggedness number (Rn), and inversely of the integrated index of forest cover and its 
distribution (RCD). 
6.3.3 Sediment concentration and commercial land clearing 
According to the observation, we had during the sediment sampling endeavour, suspended 
sediment concentration (SSC) values are higher at the beginning of the rainy month (early 
July) and gradually decline (after the first week of August). An important reason for this is 
the combined effect of low vegetation and ploughing at the beginning of the rainy season 
than later. The river draining Abraham, representative for the commercialized catchments 
has a significantly higher SSC (P < 0.01) (mean = 6.44 g l-1, SD = 2.23 than Aybon, a 
typical non-commercialized catchment (mean = 2.77 g l-1, SD = 2.31). At both catchment 
outlets, the sediment concentration increases with increasing rainfall, but it stays smaller, 
on average by 3.67 g-1 for the catchments with traditional farmlands (Figure 6.5). Evidence 
from catchments in semi-arid tropical highlands of northern Ethiopia indicated mean SSC 
of 3.06-11.96 g l-1 (Vanmaercke et al., 2010). Land use is a leading factor which controls 
soil erosion and SSC (Hooke, 2000; Leopold, 1956; Syvitski & Kettner, 2011). 
Availability of bukuna (i.e., fallow lands), better vegetation cover and absence of 
mechanized farming contributed for a significantly lower SSC across catchments of 
traditional farmlands. Besides, the role of roots that remain after burning probably 
contributed to low soil erosion in the traditionally cultivated Gumuz lands whereas, in the 
deeply ploughed commercial farms, the roots are destroyed. There us scientific literature 
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about the role of roots in minimizing soil erosion. For instance, de Baets et al. (2007), 
Ghidey & Alberts (1997), and Mamo & Bubenzer (2001).  
 
Exposition of upstream catchments to commercial agriculture resulted in a higher sediment 
concentration, which is in line with the findings by Mekonnen et al. (2014), Alemayehu 
(1992), Hurni (1983), and Joyce (1943). In contrast, vegetation cover can buffer sediment 
transport into streams in contrast to deforested catchments (Birkinshaw & Bathurst, 2011). 
Therefore, deforestation followed by soil erosion is the primary process which is 
happening along the catchments and resulting in the higher suspended sediment 
concentration of streams in the study areas which results in the threat of siltation to the 
GERD. As we have observed in the field, the application of fire for clearing farmlands 
frequently led to fire in both types of catchments. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Suspended sediment concentration vs event rainfall in the twin catchments 
(Abreham with large commercial farming activities and Aybon with traditional land 
management) 
 
Despite the fact that there is frequent wildfire on traditional farming, sediment 
concentration is higher in catchments draining commercial farms, as in the latter case 
vegetation barriers are almost absent. In addition to a presumed loss of biodiversity, 
wildfire has a long-term alteration of the physical, chemical and biological properties of 
soil (Verma & Jayakumar, 2012). Besides, uncontrolled forest fire results in burnt soils 
which ultimately compromises soil health (Fernández et al., 2007). Though fire is 
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commonly used to clean their farms, traditional farmers, on the contrary, are better in 
applying buffer strips and fallowing. Though commercial farmers agreed to provide proper 
care for the land and to respect contour ploughing and the rule of 50 m buffer strip on their 
plots, a few of them use natural conservation belts and vetiver grass (Chrysopogon 
zizanioides). Companies agreed to conduct environmental impact assessment and deliver 
the report within three months from the signed date of the lease contract, yet none of them 
did it; there is a limitation in enforcing conservation rules. Obligations of rural land users 
are stated in the national constitution (GoE, 1995), the rural land administration and use 
law, Proclamation no.456/2005 (GoE, 2005) and the regional land use proclamation, 
Proclamation no.85/2010 (GBGR, 2010). According to the laws, a rural land holder is 
obliged to protect his land from damage; failure to do so results in an immediate loss of 
land use right 
6.4 Conclusions 
The runoff response and sediment transport in 20 sample catchments with a contrasted 
intensity of commercial farming was investigated. Results indicate that the 
commercialization of Ethiopia’s savannah woodlands to both foreign and domestic 
companies significantly rose annual peak discharges. Catchments which are under pressure 
from commercial farms had a significantly higher suspended sediment concentration 
compared to the non-commercial land uses. While downstream communities are at risk of 
flooding, Ethiopia’s mega hydropower station, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
(GERD) is at a threat of siltation and irregularity in the flow. We have noticed the 
importance of land-cover in effectively predicting peak runoff while morphometric 
parameters are relatively defective in explaining such a response in the catchments with 
undulating topography in the lowlands. We found that the integrated index of forest cover 
and its distribution (RCD) could be a better predictor variable for the catchment-specific 
peak discharge coefficient (Cp) than forest cover alone. 
 
Soil erosion is often considered as one of the central processes of land degradation and can 
be used as a desertification risk indicator (Darkoh, 1998; Sterk, 2003; Vanmaercke et al., 
2011), and hence, the results are parts of the warning to retard desertification. The 
smallholder traditional farmers are still better in controlling erosion than large-scale 
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commercial farmers. “The Ethiopian farmer, however, is erosion minded. Evidence of this 
is visible all over the country” (Joyce, 1943: 36). Land degradation is contextual (Warren, 
2002), and hence, both in-situ conservation and sediment trapping can play a role to 
reverse the situation (Mekonnen et al., 2014). Besides, inclusive and legitimate land deal 
processes with the enforcement of land conservation laws could play a part towards 
sustainable land use practices (Dereje et al., 2015). Further with a continuous gauging and 
the analysis of spatio-temporal variability or runoff and sediment transport will increase 
the understanding of the low-lying catchments at Ethiopia’s western margins and the 
effects of these processes on the GERD. 
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Chapter 7 Commercial land deals and the 
interactions between investors and local 
people:Evidence from Western Ethiopia  
Adapted from Dereje, T., Nyssen, J., Azadi, H., Lanckriet, Mitiku, H., Witlox, F. (2016). 
Commercial land deals and the interactions between investors and local people:Evidence 
from Western Ethiopia. Submitted. 
 
Abstract The study explores transnational land deals from a regional perspective and 
investigates investor-local people interactions and the factors that underpin them. 
Empirical analysis utilizes survey data from the Benishangul-Gumuz region, a 
topographically low-lying region of Ethiopia. Descriptive statistics and an ordinal 
regression model (ORM) was used to analyze data. In this study, we explored the factors 
that determine investor-local people interactions (ILPI) with possible dyadic outcomes, 
which range from confrontation to collaboration. Notwithstanding the conventional centre-
periphery discourses on availability of ‘unutilized’ cultivable lands, findings show that 
land is already under the pressure of competing demands in the region for transnational and 
local, private and government, and small-scale and agro-industrial purposes. We have 
observed that the investor-local people interaction is a complex construct influenced by 
multiple socioeconomic, managerial, and governance-related factors. While community 
consultation, land use class, local employment, and development of water sources (i.e., 
boreholes) have a significant effect upon ILPI, the influence of other factors such as 
compensation for expropriated property and the farm’s distance from a community village 
are observable, but insignificant. Consideration of the factors which underpin investor-
local people collaborative interaction and synchronizing existing land uses and prioritizing 
competing demands for land is important. It is essential to build the regional capacity with 
an outlook that supports inclusive local development. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The soaring global prices for agricultural commodities coupled with the desire to meet the 
needs of domestic consumption in net food importing countries has exacerbated the 
demand for large swatches of arable land (Cotula et al., 2009; Osabuohien, 2014; 
Vandergeten et al., 2016). Likewise, the rising need for clean energy sources in response to 
climate variability (Corson & MacDonald, 2012) has driven companies and governments 
away from advanced and emerging economies in order to mobilize capital and acquire 
large tracts of land. Thus, the inundation of financial market-food-energy-climate crises 
and the desire for biofuel (Hassan & Kalam, 2013) have fuelled the rising interest in land. 
Finally, but most importantly, governments of developing nations wish to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI) as part of their strategy to gain momentum for their growing 
economies (Dereje et al., 2016a; Lavers, 2012a; Vandergeten et al., 2016).  
 
Developing countries, such as Ethiopia, are examples that of when the government has 
played a determining role in promoting the supply of investment land and re-engineering 
the intricacies related to the country’s investment and business licensing (Dereje et al., 
2016b; 2016c). As long as the trend of acquiring further swatches of arable land persists, 
the number of land deals will continue to rise. Large-scale commercial land acquisition, 
however, is rife with debate, hype, and scepticism; most fearing that it may not provide the 
intended results (Boamah, 2014; Hall, 2011). Correspondingly, the debate has received 
widespread attention by media outlets.  
 
In Ethiopia, a case in point for this chapter, preliminary evidence is still emerging. For 
example, Maru & Rutten (2015) explored the supposition that the commercialization of 
farms on a large scale basis adversely affected the local people in Oromia region. The 
contributions made so far, approached the interactions in large-scale land acquisition 
unidirectionally. That is, there was no ‘cooperation’ on the part of local populations in 
terms of commercial land acquisition (Borras & Franco, 2013). However, in reality, 
cooperation is possible between commercial farmers and local people which, in all 
likelihood, would have a positive outcome; a win-win situation as a result of a (Azadi et 
al., 2013) conceivable inclusive land deal (Dereje et al., 2015) scenarios. The types of 
investor-local people dyadic interactions (ILPI) and the factors that underpin them, remain 
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unknown. Knowledge about the local level of interaction between large-scale commercial 
companies and residents is, therefore, necessary to better understand global land deals vis-
à-vis with local development processes. The contribution of local institutional frameworks 
(in our case the regional constitution) in addressing investor-local people interactions is 
also explained. 
7.2 Study area and methodology 
7.2.1 Study area 
The Benishangul-Gumz region of Ethiopia is the case study area. It is a low-lying 
peripheral region, located between the plateau of Injibara, i.e., the western escarpment of 
the Ethiopian highlands, and the Sudanese and South-Sudanese borders; between 9°10′ – 
11°30′N and 34°00′ – 36°00′E (Figure 7.1). The region is one of the nine regional states 
which was established in 1995 according to the federal constitution of Ethiopia (GoE, 
1995). Topographically, the area is 580-3131 meters above sea level (m a.s.l.), and 
predominantly consists of lowland. There are a few mountain ranges, namely, the Belaya 
and Dangure mountains which are isolated from the rest of the Abyssinian highlands by the 
deeply incised Nile valley (Kuls, 1962), as seen in Figure 7.2. Among the big rivers of 
Ethiopia, four cross the region: the Blue Nile, Beles, Dabus, and the Didesa. 
 
Kuls (1962) noticed that the area as quite different from the highlands, which were largely 
deforested and is primarily made up of bare arable land and pasture surfaces, while dense 
savannah woodlands more or less cover the entire lowland closer to Beles river. Recently, 
however, vegetation in the area is under severe pressure, especially following large-scale 
agro-industrial projects and encroachment (Dereje et al., 2016a). Shifting cultivation (with 
slash and burn practices), subsided with gathering, hunting, fishing, and the production of 
honey as the primary livelihood strategies of the indigenous communities (Kuls, 1962, 
Abdussamad, 1995; Dereje et al., 2016b). Furthermore, communities in the region engaged 
in traditional gold mining activities and have recently been able to generate employment 
on commercial farms. 
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Figure 7.1  Location and altitude map of the study area (the Benishangul-Gumuz region) 
 
 
Figure 7.2  Partial view the study area, the Karinchachi ranges located between mount 
Belaya and mount Dangure  
(Approximate elevation is 990 m a.s.l for the Gumuz farmlands in front and 2200 m a.s.l in 
the ridges). 
  
While several ethnic groups inhabit the region, none of them constitutes more than 50% of 
its overall population. With an estimated area of 50,700 km2 (BoFED 2011), the 
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Benishangul-Gumuz region has twenty districts. According to the census in 2007, the 
regional population was 784,345, forming 174, 445 households (CSA 2010). According to 
the regional constitution, there are two broad groups of communities (or ethnic groups), the 
titular and the non-titular community (or ethnic) groups; considering the former as ‘native 
to the region’ and others not. Accordingly, while the Bertha, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao, and 
Komo are titular members of the region, the Amhara, Oromo, Agaw-Awi, Tigrie, and 
many others are non-titular (GBGR, 2002). 
 
7.3 Methodology 
7.3.1 Data sources 
The study used a mixed-method approach that encompasses both quantitative and 
qualitative measurements (Creswell, 2003). There were fifteen key informants (i.e., one 
from each of the fourteen districts where transnational investors operate and one from the 
region) whose responsibilities are attached to both conventional and commercial farming. 
Furthermore, the study triangulated key informant information with survey results which 
were carried out in order to identify investor-local people interactions and to explore the 
factors which determine interaction status. We examined the land deals that are 
transnational (i.e. foreign and Ethiopian diaspora investors) and operated at a large-scale, 
i.e., farmland deals of 200 ha and above (Dereje et al., 2016c; Rulli et al., 2013) and that 
have already started operation. A sample of 64 cases of investor-local people interactive 
were randomly drawn from a list of 76 large-scale transnational investors who held 
certified land deals and who are currently operating. The sample size was determined using 
Yamane’s formula (Yamane, 1967). 
 21
1
1
)(1 eXN
N
n


       
(1) 
Where, n1 is the sample size (number of investors who were considered for the investor-
local people interactive study), N1 is the population of large-scale transnational investors, 
and e = 0.05 (i.e., percentage of the impression of sampling error that can be tolerated).  
 202 
7.3.2 Data analysis 
7.3.2.1 Investor-local people interaction (ILPI) outcome: conceptual and 
operational definition 
Previous studies with ordinal outcome variables heavily relied on multiple regression 
models in order to investigate the relationships between an ordinal outcome variable and 
explanatory variables, as in the case of Ellickson & Logsdon (2002) and Pincus (1986). 
Local resistance to and cooperation with the large-scale land acquisition and stakeholder 
interactions (Dereje et al., 2015; Tsegaye, 2015; Schneider, 2011; Toulmin, 2009; Luo, 
2002) were useful when establishing the framework of our study on a 5-point ordinal scale. 
Furthermore, dyadic relationships can be drawn in an ordinal range of outcomes (Robbins 
& Judge, 2011; Balser, 1999; Luo,2002).  
 
Ordinal outcomes represent the categorical outcomes where there is clear low to high 
natural ranking among the outcomes, but the distance between adjacent categories is 
unknown (Wooldridge, 2009). Furthermore, as explained by Leedy and Ormrod (2016), 
phenomenology is a useful tool to understand perspectives, perceptions, and views of a 
particular phenomenon (in our case the investor-local people interaction) by which the 
researcher(s) can deduce what something looks like based on insider’s point of view. 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2016), a phenomenological study is one that seeks to 
understand people’s perspectives, perceptions, and views of a particular phenomenon. 
Additionally, Creswell (2003) considers phenomenological studies to be a critical approach 
to describe the meanings of the lived experiences of a situation, concept, topic, or issue. 
 
In modelling, numerical values are assigned to such outcomes, but the numerical values are 
ordinal and only reflect the ranking of the results (Mckelvey & Zavoina, 1975). Similarly, 
we can assign a dependent variable, ‘y’, with the values 1 for "disputed", 2 for "latent", 3 
for "conformist" investor-local people interactions in order to define each possible 
categorical outcome. 
 (i) Outcome 1 (dispute): the prevalence of a disagreement or argument between investor 
and local people but that does not reach a level of hostility or conflict. For a disputed 
outcome, at least either one point of dispute or confrontation is recorded locally.  
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(ii) Outcome 2 (latent): a situation between dispute and confirmatory relationship with no 
traceable evidence is scored that indicates the existence of a dispute and confirmatory 
relationship. 
(iii) Outcome 3 (conformist): there is evidence indicating that locals confirm the investors 
as a legal business entity that operates in the farming sector or cooperative or positive 
towards the investor. 
 
We determined the variables (Table 7.1) which could possibly underpin the investor-local 
people interactive outcome. After the reviewing the literature on local reactions to land 
acquisition and a basic understanding of the phenomenology of land acquisition the 
Benishangul-Gumuz region, we synthesized the factors that could possibly determine local 
reactions to the large-scale transnational agricultural investors. In combination with 
repeated field visits, the role of previous contributions of Baum and Helaine (1999), 
Schneider (2011), Borras and Franco (2014), Tsegaye (2015), Dereje et al. (2015), 
Stephens (2013), and World Bank (2010) were indispensable. 
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7.3.2.2 Defining the explanatory variables 
We solicited the variables (Table 7.1) which possibly underpin the investor-local people 
interactive outcome.  
 
Table 7.1  Variables summary and expected sign in relation to the outcome variable-
collaboration 
Variables Expected 
sign 
Explanation for variables 
Administrative variables   
Compensation for displacement or for 
expropriation (comp) 
 
+ 
1 if no displacement or if displacement and  
compensation is made in 6 months, 0 otherwise 
Community consultation (cons) + Number of community consultations made 
Land use before delivered for investor   
Preceding predominant land use classes 
(Lndu) 
 
- 
1=Former village, 2=bukuna (fallow) or crop land, 
3= forest, 4 = woodland, 5 = savannah, 6 = 
bamboo land  
Location variables   
Distance from the nearest 
village (Dnv) 
 
- 
 
 
Distance of the farm’s camp from (km) 
Key personnel’s managerial  
attributes 
  
Level of education (Educ) - Investor’s key personnel’s (i.e. the one who is in 
charge of farm level operations) level of education 
in years (yr) 
Experience in agriculture (Exp1) + Number of years (yr) engaged in farming or 
agriculture 
Managerial experience (Exp2) + Number of years as team leader or above 
Operational variables   
Size of land occupied (Slo) - Size of land the investor occupied (ha) 
Year of operation (Yop) +/- Number of years since the investor has started 
cultivation (years) 
Development of boreholes (Dws)* + 1 if the investor developed a borehole for its farm 
and/or camp, 0 otherwise  
Employment for local people (Elp)* + Number of villagers employed permanently 
Employment for migrant people 
(Emp)* 
 
- 
 
Number of migrant permanent employees 
Community support program   
Road construction (Roc)* + Size of all weather road constructed by the 
investor (km) 
Number of rooms constructed  
(Nrc)* 
 
+ 
 
Number of rooms (school, health post, offices, 
centres, etc) constructed by the investor (s) 
1Arranged based on local key informant; * values are normalized per the size of land occupied (Slo) to 
determine coefficients, ratios and marginal effects of the variables indicated.  
 
 205 
 
7.3.2.3 Model specification  
Ordered models, specially ordered logit and ordered probit models are more suitable to 
predict outcomes of the type we stated above (Greene, 2012). According to the generic 
regression function: 
       (2)  
Where *iy  is the unobservable value of the dependent variable, ix is a vector of variables 
that explains the variation in the observed dependent variable;  is a vector of coefficients; 
and   the disturbance term. If the unobservable (latent) variable *y denotes a natural 
ordering among the possible outcomes, then the observed dependent variable can assume a 
data generating process of the following type: 
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Where iy is the observed score for the dependent variable ‘investor local people interaction 
(ILPI)’, iμ are the threshold parameters to be estimated along with  , and i  is assumed 
normally distributed.  
The probability that 1iy  is presented as  
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The probability that 3iy  is presented as same procedure as equation 7 
Using these probability outcomes, the log-likelihood function for final outcome (i.e., ILPI) 
estimation can be composed as: 
)3Pr()2Pr()1Pr(  iii yyyL  
      )3Pr(ln)2Pr(ln)1Pr(lnln  iii yyyL        (8)
 which gives rise to: 
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Supposing that the probability for the investor-local people interaction (ILPI) outcome 
level is Pi = P (y = i/x). Then the proportional odds model (POM) is useful when 
analyzing ordinal outcomes (Wooldridge, 2009), and involves fitting a set of equations for 
cumulative distribution probabilities of the outcome categories, which is:
 
 
3,2,1),...exp(
)(
)(



jx
xjyP
xjyP r
j          (10) 
Where )( xjyP  denotes the conditional probability of having the most desired j level of 
interaction provided by a vector of covariates x, )( xjyP   is the probability of an 
interaction level being above the level j, r  is a column vector of coefficients and the 
unknown parameters   satisfy .321  
 
The regression coefficient i  for 
the ith explanatory variable xi, is the odds-ratio for the y by xi association, ceteris paribus. 
The model presumes that the relationships between x and the dichotomized y do not 
depend on the category j, the point at which the dichotomization in the POM is 
constructed, and this implies that i  for the i
th explanatory variable, values for xi do not 
depend on j. It is named as the proportional odds model due to the assumption of similar 
odds ratios across the categories (Mccullagh, 1980). Moreover, marginal effects of an 
increase in a covariate, i.e., an explanatory variable xi, on the probability of increasing (or 
decreasing) investor local people interaction (ILPI) outcome level to alternative j was 
derived using: 
     (11) 
Where riij xp  refers to the marginal effect of a change in regressor xi on the probability 
of achieving j level of ILPI outcome and F is the logistic cumulative distribution function 
(cdf), and r is the coefficient.  
 
Stata-11 was used to analyze data. Before interpreting the results, model fitness was 
checked. Including the test for independence of irrelevant alternatives (McFadden, 1987), 
all assumptions relevant to the application of ordered logistic regression were met and 
conceivable explanatory variables were incorporated into the model 
     ,1 rijijriij xFxFxp   
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7.4 Results  
7.4.1 Land deals in the Benishangul-Gumuz region 
Large scale transnational land deals and land supply in the region were provided by two 
lessors: by the federal government through Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and by the 
regional government of Benisangul-Gumuz through its investment bureau.  
 
Table 7.2  Land transferred to federal land bank from the Benishangul-Gumuz region 
Zone/Special district/ District Land size (ha) Time 
 
Metekel 
Dangure 31,000 First round* 
(11December 2008) Pawe 2,200 
 
Asosa 
Sherkole 163,930  
Second round* 
(22 October 2011) 
Kurmuk 81,930 
Menge 52,582 
Kemashe Sirba Abay 44,899 
Mao komo special 
district 
Mao komo 80,527 
Total  457,068  
* Contracts signed between MoA and Government of the Benishangul-Gumuz region 
 
Following the request of the federal government of Ethiopia, the Benishangul-Gumuz 
region is one of the regional states that submitted ‘potentially available unoccupied’ land 
for investment to the federal land bank in two rounds (Table 7.2). The federal land bank 
was supplied with 457,068 ha of land and operates under the Ministry of Agriculture, 
meaning that the ministry leases to investors on behalf of the region. In addition to the 
stated figure, the regional government leased land on its own way to investors, usually 
called ‘non-federal investors.' 
 
Regarding the number of investors and the amount of land commercialized in the region, 
the figures change frequently as data is updated following further land acquisition, 
validation of farmlands on the ground, investors abandonment of investment operations’, 
government decisions on using the land for other purposes, etc. According to data accessed 
in June 2012, a total of 600,254 ha of land was ‘allotted’ to 306 investment projects 
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(Dereje et al., 2016a), as shown in Table 7.3. However, the land was ‘allocated’ with 
limited validation on the ground and with some later changes in figures. 
 
Table 7.3  Distribution of agricultural investment projects the Benishangul-Gumuz region  
Sn 
Project location 
(Districts) 
Number of projects  Land size (ha) 
Domestic Transnational
1 Total  Domestic Transnational Total 
1 Agalo Meti 1 - 1  60 - 60 
2 Asosa 12 4 16   3680 10918 14598 
3 Bambasi 2 5 7   1490 3120 4610 
4 Blojiganfoye 12 2 14   8771 15360 24131 
5 Bulen 3 - 3  9030 - 9030 
6 Dangure 16 15 31   26770 79980 106750  
7 Guba 78 39 117  45246 153174 198420 
8 Homosha 2 1 3  3200 1300 4500 
9 Mandura 4 - 4  2100 - 2100 
10 Maokomo 30 7 37  19735 15015 34750 
11 Menge 10 4 14  16055 8645 24700 
12 Oda Godere 26 4 30  18072 4828 22900 
13 Pawe 6 5 11  13675 114570 128245 
14 Sherkole 2 2 4  1635 9365 11000 
15 Sirba Abay 1 1 2  600 400 1000 
16 Wombera 3 - 3  1160 - 1160 
17 Kurmuk 1 - 1  5000 - 5000 
18 Yaso 5 3 8  7300 - 7300 
Total (June 2012) 214 92 306  180 072 420182 600,254 
Total (March 2015)  198 79 269  89239 189634 278,873 
Source: Own computation from databases at MOA, and Investment Bureau (Benishangul-Gumuz region) 
1Transnational projects comprises both Ethiopian diasporas and foreign companies 
 
While 600, 254 ha (computed to 2012) was allotted to investors, 420,172 ha (i.e.,70%) has 
been put on leasehold by transnational investors and domestic investors have occupied 
180,072 ha (Table 7.3). Later, in 2015, the total amount of land under investors' leasehold 
in the region was 278,873 ha, from which large-scale transnational investors (Ethiopian 
diasporas and foreign companies) occupied 189,634 ha (i.e., 68%), Table 7.4. 
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Table 7.4  Large scale transnational investors in the Benishangul-Gumuz region  
(March 2015) 
SN International companies Origin land(ha) 
1 Sun Biofuel PLC UK (80,000)1 
2 S&P Energy Solutions PLC India 50,000 
3 Halwan Adnan Sudan 5000 
4 Hashim Ismael Farm SaudiArabia 3000 
5 Lotes International  SaudiArabia 3000 
6 Usman Esa Farm SaudiArabia 1000 
7 Yeshimebet Farm UK 1000 
8 Habi Hotel PVT LTD Company USA 700 
9 Feridem Agri Development USA 650 
10 Michael Dismod Agricultural Investment Turkey 377 
11 Horizon Plantation Ethiopia PLC Saudi-Arabia 20,000 
12 CLC Agro-Industry PLC India 25,000 
Land leased by international companies  189,727 
 
Land leased by 71 diaspora investors 
 
169,146 
 
Total land leased to transnational investors2 
 
358,873 
Sun biofuel (quit operation) UK (80,000)1 
 Total land currently leased by transnational investors 
278,873 
Source: Own computation from databases at MOA, and Investment Bureau (Benishangul-Gumuz 
region) 1The company has abandoned operation. 2From 83 transnational investors, 74 are on 
operation, the remaining 9 investors are with unknown status. 
7.4.2 Investor-local people interactions and determinants 
The predicting variables and the investor-local people interactive (ILPI) outcomes are 
summarized in Table 7.5. As shown, there is a large variation regarding the land size 
among investors. Of the cases under confotrmist ILPI, 64% either did not receive land 
compensation for displacement or expropriation within six months of their land being 
appropriated, if expropriation had occurred. In contrast to the 36% of the cases of disputed 
ILPI (Table 7.5), while some other tendencies include that either conformist or 
collaborative relationship increases with distance from village or construction of assets that 
can be used by the community. The significance of such relationships and their combined 
effect will be addressed further in this section.  
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Table 7.5  Averages of predictor variables by Investor-local people interactive outcomes 
Predictor variable 
Investor-local people interaction (ILPI) outcomes 
Disputed Latent Conformist 
ILPI outcome (%) 56 22 22 
Compensation 0.36(0.49) 0.79(0.43) 0.64(0.50) 
Consultation 2.69(1.83) 3.50(2.18) 3.86(1.70) 
Land use class 
2.53(1.32) 4.00(1.36) 4.64(0.74) 
Distance from village (km) 
2.83(2.04) 4.79(2.97) 7.00(2.00) 
Education level (yr) 
6.89(3.99) 10.29(4.29) 13.50(2.71) 
Agricultural experience (yr) 
9.19(4.44) 10.00(4.62) 9.21(4.23) 
Managerial experience (yr) 
1.00(1.64) 1.21(2.39) 1.36(1.08) 
Land size (ha) 
970.64(1177.64) 4051.80(13226.40) 2520.29(6518.90) 
Years of operation 
7.58(1.76) 7.86(1.66) 8.00(1.47) 
Developed borehole 
0.19 (0.40) 0.57(0.85) 0.57(0.51) 
Employees (local)  0.81(0.79) 1.71(1.98) 2.50(1.16) 
Employees (non-locals)  5.00 (2.08) 5.21(4.35) 5.64(2.76) 
Road construction (km) 2.69(1.28) 2.93(3.38) 4.57(2.95) 
Rooms constructed 0.36(0.76) 0.79(1.67) 2.36(1.65) 
The numbers in brackets are standard deviations  
22% of the investors are operating in a conformist relationship with local community, 
implying that there are substantial agreements between them and that, most importantly, 
local communities perceive investors positively and in some cases collaborate with their 
investment operations (Table 7.5). For instance, the local people collaborate by shifting 
their grazing places, contribute labour during land preparation and construction of local 
faculties, such as roads, investor’s camp establishments, etc. 
 
The other type of investor-local people (ILIP) outcome, about 22% are in latent situations, 
i.e., when the relationships are neither in agreement nor disagreement. Such interactions 
may remain as they are or can be improved to conformist stages or may worsen into a 
disputed relationship depending on local conditions and the investors’ activities through 
time. Disputed relationships constitute 56%, implying that more than half of the 
community-investor interactions are characterized by the prevalence of disagreements 
between investors and local people. In the case of disputed relationships, the basic causes 
are sets of unmet interests or postponed promises among the local community as was 
notified to the investor, local, and district administrative bodies. The confrontation scenario 
is characterized by the loss of property, physical attacks, and sometimes the loss of life. 
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Table 7.6  Determinants of investor-local people interaction: ordered model coefficients 
Covariate 
Ordered logit coefficient  Ordered probit coefficient 
Coefficient SE1  Coefficient SE1 
Compensation 0.161 1.453  0.160 0.771 
Consultation 1.260** 0.610  0.557** 0.283 
Land use class 1.124** 0.489  0.512** 0.234 
Distance from village (km) 0.446* 0.345  0.273* 0.176 
Education level (yr) 0.310 0.193  0.143 0.093 
Agricultural experience (yr) -0.188 0.220  -0.084 0.107 
Managerial experience (yr) 0.392 0.534  0.221 0.280 
Land size (ha) -0.0002 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0001 
Years of operation 0.060 0.506  0.019 0.246 
Developed borehole 2.157* 1.155  1.087* 0.587 
Local employment [Le/ Sl2] 2.424** 1.021  1.206** 0.503 
Non-local employment [NLe/Sl] -1.148** 0.546  -0.509 0.255 
Road constructed [Rdc/Sl] 1.062 0.600  0.434 0.276 
Room constructed [Rmc/Sl] 0.032 0.756  0.084 0.386 
Intercept 1 11.517** 5.780  5.803** 2.732 
Intercept 2 18.950** 7.638  9.482** 3.454 
Wald chi-square (14) 99.26***   99.12***  
McFadden's R2 (i.e., Pseudo R2) 0.792   0.781  
1SE = Standard error; 2Sl = size of land leased to an investor; *, **and *** implies significant at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level of significance respectively. 
 
Table 7.6 summarized the results of the investor-local people interactive (ILPI) model 
outcome. The model chi-squares are higher, with 14 degrees of freedom; implying a highly 
significant output and the presence of predictors with a significant effect upon the outcome 
variable, i.e., investor local people interaction (ILPI). As the intercept parameters are 
significantly different from each other, the five categories cannot be combined further. 
Community consultation, land use class, distance of farm from village, development of 
boreholes by investors for its farms, and local employment have a significant effect upon 
the outcomes of investor-local people interaction (Table 7.6). Since the logit and probit 
ordered model coefficients differ by a scale factor, the magnitude of the coefficients is not 
interpretive (Verbeek, 2012).  
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Table 7.7  Determinants of investor-local people interaction: ordered model odds ratio 
Covariate Odds Ratio Standard error 95% CI 
Compensation 1.175 1.707 0.068 – 20.265 
Consultation 3.524** 2.151 1.066 – 11.654 
Land use class 3.077** 1.505 1.180 – 8.025 
Distance from village (km) 1.561* 0.546 0.787 – 3.099 
Education level (yr) 1.363 0.264 0.933 – 1.992 
Agricultural experience (yr) 0.829 0.182 0.539 – 1.274 
Managerial experience (yr) 1.480 0.790 0.520 – 4.215 
Land size (ha) 1.000 0.0002 1.000 – 1.0001 
Years of operation 1.062 0.537 0.394 – 2.861 
Developed borehole 8.643* 9.981 0.899 – 83.103 
Local employment [Le/ Sl1] 11.300* 11.535 1.527 – 83.581 
Non-local employment[NLe/Sl] 0.317 0.173 0.109 – 0.926 
Road constructed [Rdc/Sl] 2.892 1.735 0.892 – 9.371 
Room constructed [Rmc/Sl] 1.033 0.780 0.235 – 4.540 
Intercept 1 11.517** 5.780 -0.195 – 22.840 
Intercept 2 18.947** 7.638 3.977 – 33.917 
Wald chi-square (14) 99.26***   
McFadden's R2 (aka Pseudo R2) 0.792   
1Sl = size of land leased to an investor ;*, **and *** implies significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level of  
significance respectively. 
 
To know the extent of the effects upon the ordinal outcome variable ILPI, an odds ratio is 
determined (Table 7.7). With an increase in the number of community consultation by a 
unit, the odds of achieving a conformist or collaborative investor-local people relationship 
increases by a factor of 3.524 (i.e., an increase of 352. 4%) with varying level of 
significance, ceteris paribus. Keeping other factors constant, land use class, distance from 
village, development of boreholes, and local employment have positive contributions to the 
odds of achieving a desirable investor-local people interaction options by a respective 
factors as indicated by Table 7.7. For instance, respecting local communities’ pre-deal land 
use classes increases the odds of achieving a conformatory or positive investor-local 
people relationship by a factor of 3.077, assuming other variables remained unchanged. 
The level of effect of each variable upon the outcome variable is determined in the form of 
marginal effects (Table 7.8).  
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Table 7.8  Determinants of investor-local people interaction: Ordered logit marginal effects 
Covariate 
Disputed = 1 
(dy/dx) 
Latent = 2 
(dy/dx) 
Conformist = 3 
(dy/dx) 
Compensation -0.033 (0.300) 0.032 (0.294) 0.00 (0.002) 
Consultation -0.255 (0.161)** 0.253 (0.160)* 0.002 (0.004) 
Land use class -0.228 (0.136)* 0.226 (0.136)* 0.002 (0.003)* 
Distance from village (km) -0.090 (0.058)* 0.090 (0.057) 0.001 (0.001) 
Education level (yr) -0.063 (0.041) 0.062 (0.041) 0.001 (0.001) 
Agricultural experience (yr) 0.038 (0.047) -0.038 (0.047) -0.0002 (0.001) 
Managerial experience (yr) -0.080 (0.122) 0.079 (0.122) 0.001 (0.001) 
Land size (ha) 0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) -3.95e-07 (0.000) 
Years of operation -0.012 (0.100) 0.012 (0.100) 0.0001 (0.001) 
Developed borehole -0.437 (0.301)** 0.434 (0.301)** 0.003 (0.006) 
Local employment [Le/ Sl1] -0.491 (0.300)* 0.488(0.295)** 0.004 (0.001) 
Non-local employment[NLe/Sl] 0.233 (0.156) -0.231 (0.156) -0.002 (0.003) 
Road constructed [Rdc/Sl] -0.215 (0.151) 0.214 (0.151) 0.002 (0.003) 
Room constructed [Rmc/Sl] -0.006 (0.152) 0.006 (0.151) 0.0001 (0.001) 
 1Sl = size of land leased to an investor; *, and ** implies significant at 10%, and 5% level of significance respectively. 
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From Table 8, a unit level increment in community consultation helps significantly in 
improving investor-local people interactions through reducing the likelihood for the 
instances of disputes by 25.5%, ceteris paribus. Respecting local community’s land use, 
and increasing investor farm distance from community villages also have contributed in 
reducing the likelihood of investor-local people disputes by 22.8% and 9% respectively, 
keeping other things constant. Development of boreholes by investors to use for their farm 
(rather than competing for water with local communities), and employment of local people 
has a significant positive contribution in establishing better or desirable investor-local 
people relationship. The more local people are employed, the more cooperative other 
community members and most importantly during investor-local people disagreement, 
local employs play important negotiation role before controversies are escalated. 
Employing non-local people has an adverse but insignificant effect on the investor-local 
people relationship, and the reason we got is that the non-local employees also engage in 
encroachment in collaboration with some local people and the issue are much more 
complicated than presumed.  
 
7.5 Discussion 
7.5.1 Context and land deals in the Benishangul-Gumuz region 
Basically, land rights are engines for local economic growth (Rudi et al., 2014). 
Recognizing customary land holdings positively contributes to the promotion of local 
governance (Biitir & Nara, 2016), equitable land management (Ubink & Quan, 2008), and 
less costly dispute resolution procedures (Cecchi & Melesse, 2016). Consequently, it is 
important to renegotiate and reform the formal statutory land regulations with age old 
customary landholding systems that can help in developing confidence among local 
communities (Van Leeuwen, 2014) and encourage optimal land use practices (Rudel & 
Meyfroidt, 2014). 
 
According to the statutory law, there is a maximum and a minimum size of land that is able 
to be held by a household (GBGR, 2011). The minimum peasant holding being 2 ha (for 
rainfed farming) and 0.20 ha (for irrigation). To halt the further fragmentation of holdings, 
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a minimum parcel of 0.25 ha for rainfed and 0.10 ha for irrigation farming was set. The 
maximum peasant holding size is 5 ha ( in the highlands and midlands) while it is 10 ha in 
the lowlands. Furthermore, polygamous lowland households were entitled to hold an 
additional 5 ha per wife. Especially among the Gumuz,, having more than one wife is 
traditional; even wives push their husbands to have more wives. Their justification for 
doing so correlates with Boserup’s explanation of women’s role in economic development 
(Boserup, 1970). 
 
Communities are experiencing a statutorily driven livelihood transformation: changing 
completely from shifting cultivation to sedentary farming. In praxis, however, shifting 
cultivation has not yet been abandoned and local communities have started supporting their 
livelihoods by renting land (mostly without being restricted to their household holdings) to 
others, mainly to the highlanders of neighbouring regions. Though traditional farming 
practices are better at minimizing soil loss (Dereje et al., 2016b), the law favours land 
leases made between peasants and commercial farmers, as compared to leasing to 
traditional farmers. “Duration of land leases between the peasant and the lease shall be up 
to two years for traditional agricultural and ten years for users of modern technology” 
(GBGR, 2010).  
 
Concerning the size of commercialized land, there is a series of variations in the figures. 
Initially, records indicated 600, 254 ha was leased out to private investors and was later 
lowered to 278,873 ha in March 2015 (Table 7.3). Yet, the demand for land in the region is 
rising, behind which there are three basic reasons. First, even if some companies have 
abandoned their investment operations, , land is reallocated to the state driven projects in 
the region, such as the GERD and large-scale sugar development. The UK-based Sun 
Biofuels PLC was one of the companies which abandoned its operations. The company had 
signed an agreement for over 80,000 ha (Table 4) of Jatropha plantation with the initial 
annual lease price of Birr 25 (≈ EUR 2.38) ha-1 for 50 years (Abbink, 2011). The company 
ceased operation after clearing 60 hectares (ha) of the experimental plantation after 
verifying the unsuitability of the soil for the jatropha (Jatropha curcas) plantation. The 
vertisols, i.e., heavy black soil impaired with in-depth and extensive cracks in the dry 
season, was the main reason that they stopped the operation. The Beles Sugar 
Development Project (BSDP), another investor and one of the national projects run by the 
state-owned Ethiopian Sugar Corporation (ESC), took over a significant amount of the 
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land that Sun Biofuel had abandoned (ESC, 2015). In many cases, land that was assumed 
to be free for investment was not actually free, but was under customary community use or 
was forest and wood land (Figure 7.3).  
 
 
Figure 7.3  Partial topographic view of the lowlands with commercial farming at the front. 
 
The second reason; investors who leased land closer to GERD were forced to stop 
investing, was that the land was required for the reservoir and buzzer zone of the dam 
(Figure 7.4). Most of them, however, are being provided a substitute investment land in the 
same region. Salini Impregilo (the Italian company which invested a major share in order 
to construct the dam) announced that 180 km2 of land is required as a reservoir area (Salini 
Impregilo, 2012). According to International Panel of Experts (IPoE, 2013), the dam needs 
187.4 km2 for its lake area, with a reservoir that extends 246 km into the Blue Nile valleys, 
a full supply level of 640 m a.s.l., and a water volume of 74.01 billion m³. Construction is 
making good progress and plans to complete it by 2017. 
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Figure 7.4  Major forces and pressure areas for land in the Benihangul-Gumuz region. 
 
The third reason behind the competing demands for land in the region is the governments’ 
plan to delineate parkland ecosystems in the Dangure and Guba districts of the region. The 
proposed park is intended to be a new biodiversity conservation and wildlife protection 
corridor in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. Conservationists announced the “amazing 
discovery” of a previously unknown lion population closer to Ethiopia’s Alatish game park 
in the neighbouring Amhara region, closer to the Ethio-Sudanese border, in November 
2015 (Bauer and Gebeyehu, 2015). Alatish has recently been set aside as a park by the 
Amhara regional state and it is believed to play a key role in the conservation of a major 
proportion of the Sahelian and Sudan-Guinea biome for birds, mammal fauna, and other 
organisms (Tadesse & Afework, 2008). 
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Both the national government and the international community were less aware of the area 
and considered it only as a ‘possible range’ for the species, implying that they suspected 
the presence of lions yet it was not confirmed (EWCA, 2012; IUCN, 2006). However, 
recent proof indicated the presence of elephants in the region beforehand, even around 
Chagni (Beke, 1844), a town in the neighbouring Amhara region. Currently elephants are 
limited to remote areas closer to Alatish park, which adjoins the Sudanese Dinder National 
Park. While performing field work, the lead author observed the variety of wildlife that 
inhabits the area, such as cheetahs, Mantled guereza (i.e. the Abyssinian black-and-white 
colobus which is found rarely in the remote lower fringes of mount Dangure), antelope, 
porcupines, boars, fox, zebra, varieties of monkeys, and others. Moreover, wild honey bees 
are commonly available in the region, although they are becoming endangered due to the 
ongoing ecological damages. 
 
Since the region is adjacent to a war-ravaged country, i.e., South-Sudan, there is a huge 
influx of South-Sudanese into Ethiopia. The Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz regions are 
the recipients of these refugees and the region holds more than 50,000 South-Sudanese 
refugees in centers located in its four districts (UNHCR, 2016), Figure 7.5. The refugee 
factor has both direct and indirect impacts upon the local people, ecosystem, and the 
refugees (Betts, 2010). Sometimes conflicts break out between refugees and host 
communities regarding the use of local environmental resources, synonymous with the 
explanation provided by Martin (2005). 
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Figure 7.5  One of UNHCR’s refugee camps, Bambasi district (Shewakena & Harris, 
2015) 
7.5.2 Investor-local people interactions 
Community consultation, land use classes that the investor occupies, investors’ effort in 
developing private water sources, and employment of local and non-locals are factors that 
significantly determine the types of investor-local people interactive (ILPI) outcomes in 
the Benishangul-Gumuz region (Table 7.6). Many of our findings reinforce the Group of 
Eight’s (G8’s) call for responsible agricultural investment (World Bank et al., 2010), later 
contextualized and re-examined by Stephens (2013). The more the community holds 
consultations, the less likely they are to compromise the interests of the local community in 
the entire process of land acquisition and investment operations. As a result, investors 
develop goodwill among community members and a higher propensity to develop either a 
confirmatory or collaborative relationship. Occupation of certain land use classes, i.e., 
former villages and bukuna (land used for fallow) contributed significantly to disputes or 
confrontations, as compared to other land use types like the Savannah and bamboo areas. 
Especially the Gumuz, who have been shifting cultivators and have a stronger psycho-
social attachment to their former village sites and fallow lands compared to other land use 
classes.  
 
Compensation for displacement or expropriation of land for investment has a positive (but 
insignificant) contribution to the smooth relationship between investors and their 
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interaction (Tables 7.7 and 7.8). Unlike what other countries, such as Cambodia (Rudel et 
al., 2014), practice, a compensation scheme has been arranged in the case of the 
expropriation of a local person’s holdings. Though there are different options for 
compensation of the expropriated holdings (Qian, 2015), the case in the Benishangul-
Gumuz region is prominently limited to the provision of a substitute land in the vicinity. 
However, for generations among the Gumuz, the land has been owned customarily and 
they consider every parcel of land as their community’s land. ‘Providing’ a substitute land 
for them as compensation is a less motivating factor, as they do not consider it to be actual 
compensation. Which obviously leads to an insignificant positive effect on investor-local 
people interaction.  
 
The development of private water sources by investors is one of the determinants of ILPI 
outcomes. Water shortage is one of the key challenges in the region. An initial observation 
that characterizes the area is 7-8 month dry season, when access to water is a challenge for 
both humans and animals (Kuls, 1962). However, infrastructural limitations and shortages 
of potable water persists. Though there are not many, investors who do not compete with 
the local community for water develop more goodwill and end with a collaborative 
attachment to the local community. Consequently, development of a borehole is one of the 
significant determinant variables for the possible types of interactions between investors 
and local people (Tables 7.6, 7.7, and 7.8). Access to water is often one of the sources of 
conflict for some of the areas. Just as the conflict between an investor and local community 
in Icid kebelle of Guba district involves water.  
 
From Table 7.8, most of the variables (though not significant for all cases) have plausible 
effects upon the ordinal outcomes, except for in collaborative scenarios. For instance, a 
unitary increment in compensation is associated with a likely, but insignificant, reduction 
of disputes by 13.5% and improves latent relationship by 3.2%, ceteris paribus. 
Accordingly, increasing community consultation by unit, reduces the incidence of disputes 
by 25.5.2% and increases latent relationships by 25.3%, but does not have a significant 
effect towards confirmatory outcomes, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, while respecting 
former land use classes (for example, not leasing former village and fallow lands with 
which local communities have a strong attachment) reduces the incidence of disputes by 
22.8% and helps develop latent relationships by 22.6%, keeping other things constant. 
Increasing investor farm distance from community villages contributes in reducing the 
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likelihood of investor-local people disputes 9%, keeping other things constant. Similarly, 
when investors develop of boreholes for their farms, it reduces the chance of disputes 
occurring by 43.7% and increases the likelihood of latent relationships by 4.3%, ceteris 
paribus. By employing locals, rather than non-local, disputes are greatly reduced because 
locals play a key role in reducing tensions and negotiating, while non-locals tends to 
exacerbate (though insignificant) the likelihood of disputes. There are two basic reasons 
for the outcomes associated with employing non-locals. First, non-local employees 
encroach on land resources for their investment in collaboration with informal land lease 
brokers. Second, local communities are keen to undermine the expansion of commercial 
farms by preventing investors’ access to labour. We find that this is the same in preceding 
investigations by Tsegaye (2015) and Dereje et al. (2016a). With an effectively functioning 
local government, the investor-local people relationship is able to reach a more desirable 
level of interaction that may result a better land deal outcomes.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Within this study, we examined large-scale transnational land deals in one of the peripheral 
lowland regions of Ethiopia where ‘the most dramatic changes are taking place’ (Lavers, 
2012b:795). Much of the land considered for lease was assumed to be ‘free and 
underutilized’ peripheral lowland. The Benishangul-Gumuz region, a low-lying western 
region in Ethiopia, is an attractive case in point where the situation, conversely, is entirely 
different from the conventional assumption of ‘underutilized’ peripheral lowlands. There is 
a competitive demand for land from various users that each have divergent interests. Such 
as large-scale commercial farming, hydropower reservoir and buffer zones, state agro-
industrial plantations, smallholder agriculture, delineation of parklands, refugee centers, 
and other purposes. We have found that large-scale transnational commercial land deals 
constituted 68% of the overall commercialized land in the region, higher than the African 
average of 60% (Osabuohien, 2014). 
 
While more than half of the large-scale agricultural investors are in dispute with local 
communities, less than a quarter of them have established a conformist relationship with 
locals. In our pursuit of the factors that underpin investor-local people interactions, we 
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found that compensation for expropriation of land has a positive but not significant effect 
on improving the relationship between investors and residents. Community consultation, 
agricultural experience among investors’ key personnel, types of pre-lease land use classes, 
development of private water sources by investors, and local employment significantly 
determine whether interactions are confrontational, disputed, latent, confirmatory, or 
collaborative. The investor-local people interactions could have been enhanced further, 
forming a sound collaborative relationship that better fulfils the interests of local 
communities and contributes towards win-win land deals. Competition for power among 
titular minority groups entangled the key institutions in the region rather than providing 
adequate attention to resolve investor-community disputes for their timely resolution and 
maximize plausible regional socio-economic achievements from land deals. 
 
While there is a visible commitment from the central government regarding the operation 
of some of the mega projects in the area, private capital leaving the region is just as 
apparent and our findings match the remark by Tom Lavers: ‘...exploitation of the 
periphery for the benefit of the centre’ (Lavers, 2012a:127). So far, land in the region is a 
‘cash cow’, where many private agri-businesses formally and informally compete for land 
for short term gain, but neither with a subsequent reinvestment in the region nor with 
regard to conserving the land. Although nature’s supportive capacity is dynamic (Cohen, 
2011), depletion of land resources could be inevitable so long as Benishangul-Gumuz is 
subject to the common tragedy of individuals behaving contrary to the public good 
(Hardin, 1968). Because if this, it is time to strengthen both the logical and logistic 
dimensions of land administration in the region. 
 
As a result of deforestation and loss of habitat, biodiversity is at stake in the study area 
(Dereje et al., 2016a). While we appreciate the federal and regional governments’ 
commitment to establish a biome conservation zone for the wild fauna and flora, i.e., the 
delineation of a parkland amid competing land users is not an easy undertaking. Hence, the 
process should be carried out through the meaningful participation of key stakeholders, 
such as the local people, scientific groups, decision makers, and the international 
community. Finally, using the generic regression function, we derived and demonstrated 
how an ordinal regression model (ORM) is administered to investigate ordinal categorical 
outcome variables, which can further be applied to related studies in different contexts and 
scales. 
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Chapter 8 Effects of land deals on the 
livelihood of local communities: Evidences 
from Dangure, Ethiopia 
Dereje, T., Azadi, H., Nyssen, J.,Lanckriet,S., Mitiku, H.,Witlox, F. (2016). The effect of 
large­scale commercialization of land upon the livelihood of indigenous communities. 
Working paper. 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Following the soaring food crop prices of 2007-2008 and accompanied economic 
dynamics with in the global agri-food systems, transnational companies and states acquired 
large tracts of farmlands in developing countries (Cotula et al., 2009; Deininger et al., 
2011; GRAIN, 2008). Besides, the rising interests towards biofuels and the surge of carbon 
markets that require clean energy has led companies to acquire land transnational on a 
large-scale basis (Borras & Franco, 2012; Corson & MacDonald, 2012). 
 
According to the Transnational Institute, TNI (2016), the convergence of several crises 
(food, fuel and energy, climate and financial) amid the rise of new hubs of global capital 
(BRICS economies and some middle-income nations) have paved the way for the rise of 
‘flex crops and commodities’. Flex crops and products are those that have multiple or 
flexible uses: food, fodder, fuel, and other commercial-industrial purposes. Destinations for 
large-scale land deals tend to produce those flex crops, e.g. soya, sugarcane, palm oil, corn, 
cassava, industrial trees (Borras et al., 2016; TNI, 2016). Regarding the drivers of 
international land acquisition, it is important to put a figure on the size of each land use. 
From the total number of transnational land deals, the share of particular land use driver is 
computed from databases. According to databases at Land Matrix (2015), while food crops 
(38%) and biofuel (20%) took the bigger share, other drivers constitute non-food 
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agricultural commodities (for instance cotton and the like) (11%), forestry (13%) and 
others (18%). According to recent evidence which verified that 36.5 million ha of land has 
dealt for food (9%), non-food(32%), and flex crops (16%), and multi-use, i.e., several 
crops in different categories (43%) (Land Matrix, 2016).  
 
Different views exist regarding the effects of transnational land acquisitions. According to 
World Bank et al. (2010), transnational land deals are beneficial for both investing and 
host states and it should be encouraged through well-managed processes of the deals. 
However, according to others, for instance De Schutter (2011), transnational land deals 
have less-poverty reducing effect and higher opportunity cost than allocating lands to 
alternatives uses by local communities. 
 
The transnational land acquisition is not free from ideological misconceptions attached to 
large-scale investments. The most commonly traceable misconception that underpins it is 
that, there is availability or opportunity of surplus land which with investment can be 
turned into the generation of attractive profit for companies and jobs for developing 
countries. Globally, the destinations targeted for large-scale investment are commonly 
considered as empty lands. For instance, described it as ‘empty’, ‘idle’, ‘marginal’, 
‘degraded’, ‘unused’, non-forested, unproductive, etc. (Hagmann & Mulugeta, 2008; 
Lavers, 2012; Messerli et al., 2014; Schneider, 2011; World Bank et al., 2010). Global 
institutions such as the FAO and the World Bank has sustained this misconception. For 
example, when the World Bank declares the availability of an enormous ‘reserve’ of 
potentially ‘suitable’ land of between 445 million and 1.4 billion hectares worldwide as 
figures stated in Alexandratos & Bruinsma (2012) and Deininger et al. (2011).  
 
In order to enhance the positive contribution of transnational land deals, the World Bank 
has developed principles, i.e., Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment 
(PRAI)(World Bank et al., 2010). According to De Schutter (2011), however, that PRAI 
are simply instruments to ‘ destroy the peasantry responsibly’ and hence advised 
smallholder agriculture which is a more has a pro-poor. Despite the fact that there are 
arguments in favour of transnational investment in agriculture, its contribution in terms of 
creating employment opportunities is minimal in Ethiopia mainly due to sluggish 
implementation of projects, seasonal nature of the agricultural sector, and law rates of 
wages (Dereje et al., 2016). 
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Though Ethiopia is one of the host countries for transnational land deals, evidences are 
lacking about the contributions of the deals upon the livelihood of local communities. 
Many recommended studies to be conducted about the socio-economic and environmental 
effects of transnational land deals (Borras & Franco, 2013; Cotula et al., 2009; Cotula, 
2016). According to Maru & Rutten (2015), commercialization of land on large-scale basis 
adversely affected local people in Oromia region where the deals resulted lower income 
among affected communities compared with unaffected (i.e., counterfactual) communities.  
 
Land is leased on a large-scale basis to investors both by the federal and regional 
governments in the Benishangul Gumuz region, which is one of the areas of Ethiopia, 
which is considered as a national growth corridor of the country. Therefore, this study aims 
to explore the effects of large-scale commercialization of land upon the livelihood of local 
people in Dangure district. Specifically, the study investigates the effects of land deals on 
the food security status of households. It also explores the factors which determine the 
level of food security among affected groups. In the district, there are 31 investors who 
leased a total of 106,750 ha of land. Of the total 31 investors, 15 are large-scale ( who 
leased a land of > 200 ha) transnational investors (foreign and diaspora ) who leased total 
of 79,980 ha of investment land. It is where bigger transnational companies such as the 
Indian Shaporji-Pallonji (S &P) which leased 50,000 ha of land for producing pongamia 
(Millettia pinnata), a biofuel crop.  
8.2 Study area and methodology 
8.2.1 Study area 
The study was conducted in Dangure district which is one of the districts of Benishangul 
Gumuz National Regional States of Ethiopia. It is located between 100 58′ to 12003′ N 
latitudes, and 35026′ to 36024′E longitudes (Figure 8.1). Manbuk is the administrative 
capital of the district while Gublak is the other growing business town a town. Manbuk is 
located at 856 km far Northwest of Addis Ababa (on the way Addis-Assosa-Mambuk). 
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According to the 2007 National Population and Housing Census, the total population of the 
district was 48,537 of whom 24,360 were male and 24,177 female, with 8,352 (17.21%) of 
its population live in town. According to BoFED (2011), Dangure district has an area of 
4,684.97 km2 with 29 administrative kebeles (one of which is Manbuk town). In 2011, the 
total population figure of the district was 58,566 of whom 29,323 were males and 29,243 
females, implying a population density of 12.5 persons per km2 which is lower in 
comparison with the regional average of 18.5 persons per km2 (ibid).  
 
For years, shifting cultivation, with a slash and burn practice, is the main livelihood 
strategy of the indigenous communities in the region where sorghum is their staple food 
(Wallmark, 1981). They also supplement their living with other subsidiary activities such 
as hunting, fishing, gathering, honey production and collection. The area is in one of the 
administrative states where most dramatic changes are taking place (Lavers, 2012). 
Notwithstanding their age old slash and burn land use practices they have started 
conventional farming methods which is free from shifting cultivation. Recently, especially 
following the acquisition of commercial farmlands by investors and the villagization or 
resettlement program in the region, the communities have started a confined and sedentary 
intensive cultivation. Most of their intensive farming practice is made through renting their 
land mostly to other communities in the region (Amhara, Oromo, and Shinasha) and those 
migrant highlanders who come to the region.  
 
Among the local communities (especially in the Bertha and Gumuz), land and related 
resources are communal properties and the rights to access them are originated from the 
clan. For ages, clans are the ultimate or real owners of land among the indigenious 
communities in the region. Within their clan territory, individual clan members enjoy 
possession right over land. They get land to be cleared and cultivated for 2-3 years and 
when a decrease in yield is observed, they leave it fallow for 3-5 years. In such a land use 
process, sometimes clan members may abandon their village temporarily and move to a 
new fertile place within their clan territory.  
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Figure 8.1  location and altitude map of the study area 
 
Traditionally, the Gumuz communities do not move to new places indefinitely, rather they 
move and stay for some time and return to their original village which they abandoned and 
left it to regenerate. Despite with all such moves, though sometimes there is conflict within 
and across clan members, they resolve it through their customary land non-affected 
practices. The communities have also a very good but almost abandoned culture of 
alternative (indigenous) intraethnic conflict resolution techniques, called Tenba . 
Whenever the Gumuz enter into a conflict with highlanders (Oromo, Amhara, Shinasha, 
and Agaw), the Gumuz called them them all ‘Red’, they involve in another traditional 
conflict resolution technique called Michu. Michu (literally mean friendship) is a 
historically successful traditional interethnic conflict resolution technique which seeks for 
the establishment of an environment of mutual understanding and tolerance. 
8.2.2 Methodology 
8.2.2.1 Study design 
The study used a cross-sectional research design by which data was collected from 
households in the period February to April 2015. The data were collected using a 
structured questionnaire (Appendix III). Before data collection, the questionnaire was 
tested and finally it was approved through face validity and the reliability was confirmed 
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by estimating Cronbach’s alpha ( = 0.77) which is within acceptable range of the 
coefficients of reliability (George & Mallery, 2003).  
 
In addition to survey which was made through a structured questionnaire, key informant 
interview techniques were employed to collect data. A total of 386 households were 
surveyed through classifying them in to ‘affected’ and ‘non-affected groups. Using 
systematic random sampling technique, while a total of 162 households were chosen from 
the ‘affected’ class and 224 households were chosen from the ‘non-affected’ class. The 
‘non-affected’ groups of households are those which reside in kebelles where there are 
neither large-scale commercial farms nor complains in relation to land lease. Kebelles are 
local administrative units in Ethiopia which consisting of at least 500 households in the 
case of Ethiopia in general and on average about 390 households in the case of the study 
area Dangure district(CSA, 2010).  
8.2.2.2 Data analysis 
Two techniques were used to determine effects of land deals upon livelihood. First, a 
general output was developed to portray the overall livelihood transformation occurred as a 
result of an intervention, i.e., leasing out of large tracts of land to companies and investors. 
Second, as food security is a basic element for an over-all human well-being, food security 
status of affected communities and non-affected (i.e, counter factual) community groups 
was determined.  
 
Each of the livelihood capitals have relation with property rights. From these, in the study, 
we focus on the two capitals: natural capital and physical and financial capital. Ultimately 
exploring the effect of commercial land deals regarding access to different assets and food 
security. The modality in which households construct their livelihood strategies depends on 
how the laws, communal, social, and familiar norms affect the ways in what property 
rights are defined (Hinojosa, 2005). Institutions affect the livelihood strategies of people 
indirectly throughout their influence upon property rights (for instance land rights) over 
capitals (Ostrom, 2009; Payne, 2004). As a result, changes in the appropriation of capitals 
(e.g., land) through changes in property regimes most probably would lead to different 
patterns of access (and use) assets and, therefore, to the evolution of their livelihood 
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strategies. On the other hand, the level of the effect of property rights upon livelihood 
strategies would depend on the weight that each asset has to its formation. 
 
Determination of household food security index 
Studies on the multi-factorial behaviour of food security has provided a number of 
analytical insights, yet measurement problems persist as a major challenge, for research, 
program management and evaluation(Maxwell et al., 1999). Though many definitions are 
available, ‘food security’ is defined as a situation “when all people, at all times, have 
physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 1996:3). Later in 
2009, the World Submit of Food Security conceptualized it as the “four pillars of food 
security are availability, access, utilization, and stability” and stated that “the nutritional 
dimension is integral to the concept” (FAO, 2009:1). Note: throughout this chapter, 
poverty refers to the food poverty, i.e level of poverty referenced from predetermined 
minimum calorie intake of 2200 Kcal. 
 
Analysing the livelihood effects of interventions in a community predominantly involves 
the comparison of living standards across households. It starts by selecting a welfare 
measure, and usually a household income or which is adjusted for the size or/and 
composition of a household. It extends to setting a poverty line (or it can be a food poverty 
line) at a specific level of welfare corresponding to a certain minimum acceptable standard 
of living. The line is used as a threshold where households falling below the line 
categorised as poor and those falling above the line as non-poor. Once the poor (where 
poverty expressed in terms of poverty line or food poverty line) have been identified, 
different specific measures like the headcount ratio, food poverty gap, and squared food 
poverty gap can be estimated and overall food poverty structure can be determined. In the 
analysis of poverty in general and food poverty in particular is not the precise 
determination and location of food poverty lines, rather the implied comparison across 
time or between different groups (Alkire & Foster, 2011). 
 
Absolute poverty lines typically represent the level of expenditure (or income or 
consumption) required to achieve a minimum level of welfare, which means the line 
reflects the cost of attaining a given reference level of standard of living or utility that 
defines the poverty threshold. Among the alternative methods to define poverty line are the 
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Cost of Basic Needs (CBN), Food Energy Intake (FEI), social subjective poverty line, and 
a specific amount of dollar a day criterion applied for international comparison by the 
World Bank (for instance $1/day till 2008, $1.25/day in 2008-2015, and $1.90 after 
October 2015) (Jefferson, 202; World Bank, 2015). In the current study, we used the CBN 
approach to estimate food poverty lines. We considered both purchased and imputed value 
of non-purchased items for own consumption were used to construct food security 
indicators. In doing so, consumption expenditure is described in adult equivalence as 
adapted from Dercon & Krishnan (1998) (Appendix IV). To determine the food poverty 
line, the following steps were folowed.  
 
Step 1: To determine the food poverty line by choosing an appropriate bundle of food this 
is typically consumed by the poor households. To this end, the poorest 50% were identified 
as a reference household group considered as typical to the poor sections of the 
community.  
 
Step 2: The identification of the food items which are commonly consumed by a reference 
household group so as to establish the food bundle. In our case study areas, a total of 18 
food items were chosen and their quantity was determined in a way that they aggregately 
supply 2200 Kcal, the required level of minimum calorie intake. 
 
Step 3: After selecting the bundle of consumable items, they were valued using an average 
price for each food item applying internal price data. Prices for the basket of food items 
were valued by taking the average local market price at Manbuk and Gublak towns. 
 
Step 4: Determination of poverty indices (in our case determination of food poverty 
indices). The commonly applied poverty indices are the head count index, the poverty gap 
index, and the squared poverty gap index. The head count index measures the incidence of 
poverty. It provides the proportion of a household population with a per capita 
consumption below a defined poverty line. The poverty gap index measures the intensity of 
poverty and it is the mean poverty gap in a population as a proportion of the poverty line. It 
is the average distance below the poverty line expressed as a proportion of that line, where 
the average is established over the whole population, considering the non-poor as having a 
zero poverty gap. It provides information regarding how far is a household in terms of 
average per adult consumption/income is from the defined poverty line and measures depth 
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of poverty. The squared poverty gap index takes into account not only the poverty gap (i.e., 
how far the poor is from the poverty line) but also the level of inequality which persist 
among the poor.  
 
To the incidence, depth, and severity of food insecurity, a decomposable procedure of 
Foster et al (1984; 2010), i.e, Foster­Greer­Thorbecke measure (FGT), as stated as follows 
was applied. 
 
 
Where: 
n = sample size, i.e number of households 
yi = per adult equivalent calorie intake for the ith household 
c = a cutoff point between households who are food secured and who are not as 
adapted in terms of caloric requirements of 2200 Kcal (MoFED, 2013) 
q = the number of food insecure households 
α = the weight associated to the level of severity of food security 
in the FGT index, if yi is greater than or equal to c, it implies that the specified 
household is not food secure.  
To determine the effects of independent variables on the household food security (HFS), a 
binary logit model is employed wherein HFS = 1 if a household is food secure and HFS=0, 
otherwise. A household above 2200kcal is considered as food secure, otherwise it is not. 
 
Besides, determinants of food security are determined. Applying the Cumulative 
Distribution Function (CDF), i.e., Logit or Probit models(Gujarati & Porter, 2009), the 
estimate form can be described as: 
Li=ln[Pi/(1-Pi)]= α0+α1.A1+α2.A2+α3.A3+α4.A4+α5.A5+α6.A6+α7.A7+α8.A8 +α9.A9+α10.A10+ 
α11.A11+α12.A12+ α13.A13+α14.A14 +Ui 
Li= logit/or log of the odds ratio/, which is linear both in Ai and the parameters, indicating 
the change in food security per a change in a respective dependent variable by a unit  
Ai = individual i, where i = 1, 2, 3, 4….14; are independent variables  
Pi = the probability that an individual is food secure, and (1-Pi) = the probability that a 
household is not food secure 
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α0 = constant term or intercept, indicating the aggregate effect of constant factors on 
household food security 
A1 = Age (Age of household head) 
A2 = Education (literacy status of the household head) 
A3 = Family size (in number) 
A4 = Amount of land size cultivated (ha) 
A5 = Ratio (family size in Adult Equivalent consuming unit) 
A6 = Distance to market (km) 
A7 = Gender (sex of the household head; Male = 1, Female = 0) 
A8 = Labor involvement in the activities of commercial farms (involve = 1, not-involve= 0) 
A9 = Livestock size (considered in tropical livestock unit – TLU). TLU conversion units 
adapted are as follows: Calf =0.25, Heifer=0.75, Cow/Ox=1.00, Horse=1.10, 
Donkey=0.70, Sheep/Goat=0.13, Chicken=0.013, Bull=1.00, Camel=1.00 and Mule=0.70 
(Storck, Bezabih, Berhanu, & Shimelis, 1991) 
A10 = Total annual farm income (Birr) 
A11 = Aggregate off-farm income (Birr) 
A12 = Credit use or not (User = 1; non-use = 0) 
A13 = Food aid obtained by a household (Birr) 
A14 = Access to local forest products (timber and/or NTFPs) (secured=1; otherwise=0) 
Ui = error term 
 
The model is built on the basis of the following assumptions: 
1. Land size owned, labor involvement (i.e, employment) in the investors’ commercial 
farms, amount of land cultivated, farm income, amount of off-farm income, and 
availability of food aid are positively contributing factors for food security 
2. Use of credit opportunities, and access to local forest products are among the 
institutional factors that can have positive contribution to food security. 
3. Age and sex are demographic variables which can influence food security 
4. Education as a proxy variable influencing household’s food security 
5. Family size and distance to market influence household’s food security negatively 
 
Before determining or estimating the logistic regression model, test for multicolliearity was 
made using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for explanatory variables which are 
 237 
 
continuous and Contingency Coefficients (C) for those variables which are dummy. 
Adapting Gujarati (1995), VIF is defined as: 
  
Where, 
Ai = the i
th quantitative independent (explanatory) variable regressed on the other 
quantitative independent (explanatory) variable 
R2 = the coefficient of determination when the variable Ai regressed on the remaining 
independent variable. If VIF (Ai) > 10, it is an indication for the existence of strong 
multicollinearity between those continuous independent (explanatory) variables. For each 
the qualitative variables, Contingency Coefficients (C) is determined as follows: 
 
Where, 
C= Contingency coefficient, 0 < C < 1 
A2 = A chi-square random variable 
n = Sample size 
As a rule of thumb, C > 0.75 indicates strong association of variables, and C< 0.75 implies 
weak association of variables (Gujarati, 1995). 
 
Descriptive statistics and relevant statistical tests such as the paired sample t-test were used 
to make important comparisons. STATA (version 11) software was used to conduct 
statistical computations and tests (with a significant level of α = 0.05). Available 
institutional frameworks such as land holding systems give rise to a set of property right 
systems have a strong bearing upon the different livelihood capitals though with a different 
degree of influence (Derman & Hellum, 2007; Niehof, 2004; Wiebe & Meinzen-Dick, 
1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C =  
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8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Livelihood outcomes and changes 
Under this sub-section, we can see how the rising demands for land in general and the 
large-scale commercialization of land in a ‘peripheral’ region (i.e., more than 600 km away 
from a national capital) has forced the regional government to develop new land laws. The 
situation also forced local communities (which were used to customary land holdings for 
ages) to a complete change in their livelihood as a result of restricted access to land 
resources.  
8.3.2 Pre-land deal livelihood 
With specific reference to the study area, Kuls (1962) noticed that the area as quite 
different from the highlands which were largely deforested and mostly occupied by bare 
arable land and pasture surfaces, dense savannah woodlands more or less cover the entire 
lowland closer to Beles river. However, recently vegetation in the area is under severe 
pressure especially following large-scale agro-industrial projects and encroachment 
(Tsegaye, 2015; Dereje et al., 2016). Shifting cultivation (with a slash and burn practice), 
subsided with gathering, hunting, fishing, and production of honey is the primary 
livelihood strategy of the indigenous communities (Kuls, 1962, Abdussamad, 1995). 
Besides, communities in the region engage in traditional gold mining activities and 
recently some employment is generated in commercial farms. 
 
In the pre-deal (i.e pre land deal) situation, the Gumuz often talk about two categories of 
people in their traditional wealth ranking system: the poor and the rich. The rich are those 
who have more than 20 cattle, more than 15 goats and over 10 sheep and 5 or more 
chicken. Besides, they should have a good deal of grain reserve to be used during bad 
seasons. On the other, the poor may have a cow, 5 goats and no sheep and 5 chickens while 
the household remains deficient of grain reserves to withstand occasional shocks in times 
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of crisis. The poor are more vulnerable to environmental hazards and find it difficult to 
cope with the economic and social impacts. 
 
According to the traditional seasonal calendar of the Gumuz, most people are engaged in 
agriculture in the months between June and November. Between December and March/ 
April, most people especially adult men tend to be occupied in off-farm and non-farm 
activities such as gold mining and wage employment while taking care of their land and 
preparing it for next agricultural season starting from as early as February or March. By 
May sowing of some cereals such as sorghum begins. The highest decline in household 
food grain reserve is expected in the months of March and April during which declining 
food shortage and income is augmented through other means. 
 
According to Gumuz traditional division of labor, the father is responsible for major 
income earning and agricultural activities: farming (recently using oxen), Clearing of the 
land, sowing, trade, and traditional gold mining activities. and The mother is preoccupied 
with domestic household chores such as cooking, fetching water and fire wood, but is also 
actively involved in hoe agriculture, weeding , preparing local brewed alcoholic drinks 
called bordie, while the male child looks after goats, assist his father in many of the 
activities including gold mining, looking after the cattle and goats. The female child does 
activities similar to her mother’s: fetching water, fire wood and assist her mom in other 
activities such as cooking. Men are often responsible for marketing of agricultural 
produces. According to traditional gender hierarchy, women occupy lower status despite 
the fact that they shoulder high workload. They have little access to improved technologies 
and decision making at a household and community levels. 
 
The social relations between the different cultural groups in the region are generally good 
despite differences in social structure and religious creed (most of the Mao Komo groups 
are Muslims while the majority of Gumuz, Berta, and Shinsha tend to be Christians). Often 
there is a physical boundary (such as rivers and mountains) separating these people. 
Relations with neighboring ethnic such as the Amhara and Oromo are also generally good 
except in certain instances of disagreements between farmers where occasional elements of 
mistrust and low intensity conflict develops over land use contacts. 
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Conflict resolution among the Gumuz take the form of reconciliations (mangma and 
michu). Serious offences such as killings often lead to retaliations. The peaceful resolution 
often involves exchange marriage in which the perpetrator of the killings provides one of 
his sisters to the brother of the deceased. If he does not have sisters to offer as wives, he 
asks his fathers’ brother to help by “lending” him a potential wife for the other party. 
Otherwise, blood money has to be arranged to be apportioned among the brothers of the 
deceased. This may sometimes amount to about 12,000 Ethiopian Birr (500-600 Euro) 
depending the economic conditions of the family. Often this is facilitated by elders from 
another clan. The elders are elected based on age, impartiality, ability to convince others 
and rhetoric ability as well as experience and wisdom in conflict resolution. The 
perpetrator hides for over a fortnight until formal resettlement procedures are initiated by 
elders. Not only the killer but also the entire family members will have to make themselves 
less visible for fear of reprisals: women, children under 5 and the old are often not targeted. 
Elders then organize dispute processing meetings in order to arrive as a mutually binding 
settlement often expressed in the form of arbitration. Perpetrators often remain in hiding 
during the discussion and their close relatives (often his brother or/and his uncle) represent 
him in such important meetings. Often they have to submit to decisions made by the elders. 
The deceased will also be represented by his brothers or uncles who appear with slight hair 
shave to symbolize grief.  
 
After major settlements are reached another meeting is arranged to embark on yet another 
very important ritual in the resolution process. A goat is slaughtered and the brothers of the 
killer and the deceased are given a blood stain on the hands and are asked to hold the thigh 
bone on both sides and the bone are broken by the elders in the middle using a stone. Then 
people enjoy the meat of the goat is consumed by the elders while members of the 
conflicting parties are excluded from such the ritual. The resolution is not over until 
another goat is given to the elders as a reward for their role in the peace-making process. 
Today, such traditional structures have been linked to the formal structure and a mixture of 
tradition and modern court litigation prevails. Perpetrators remain under custody and are 
asked to pay blood compensation before formal court cases start. Then, the killer is 
punished under the penal code and may serve up to 15 years in prison.  
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8.3.3 Post-land deal livelihood 
Before the arrival of commercial farms, communities administer land on the basis of 
customary holdings of land for ages. However, such forms of landholdings were not 
formally recognized by the statutory laws of which were declared in 2010. The region’s 
statutory land laws were made following the experience of other regions which have been 
developed in a different context than the Benishangul-Gumuz region where land was held 
customarily. According to the proclamation, ‘...any peasant who occupied before this 
proclamation and will occupy land illegally shall have no holding right’ (GBGR, 2010; 
Art. 5.3). The implication is that, all the land in the region which was held customarily 
(either for farming or settlement) by the indigenous communities is considered as illegal. 
In effect, the proclamation put local communities who live there for ages on a similar plate 
with those newcomer investors. Communities were formally requested to present their 
official request to local administration. Convincing communities to adhere the statutory 
land law remains one of the key challenges in the region. 
 
According to the law ‘Rural lands hold communally or jointly may be changed to private 
holding by the government....private investors shall have the right to acquire land, to use 
on, by rent from the government or any other rural land holder based on the agreement to 
be made’ (Art.6.3-5). In doing so, while private holdings got a relatively better institutional 
backup, communal and customary holdings were ignored officially. A situation 
strengthening the claim that capturing of communal resources is among the pressing 
challenges facing African customary landholding systems (Sulieman, 2015). 
 
According to the satutory low, there is a maximum and minim size of land to be held by a 
household (GBGR, 2011). Minimum peasant holding of 2 ha (for rainfed farming) and 
0.20 ha (for irrigation). To halt further fragmentation of holdings, a minimum parcel of 
0.25 ha for rainfed and 0.10 ha for irrigation farming is set. The maximum peasant holding 
size is 5 ha ( in the highlands and midlands) while it is 10 ha in the lowlands. Besides, 
lowland polygamous households were entitled to get additional 5 ha per wife. Though the 
law says so, there are households with holdings as low as 1.6 ha especially around 
resettlement villages though the average land holding is 8.4 ha. Traditionally, having more 
than one wife was a tradition, especially among the Gumuz and even wives push their 
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husbands to have more wives. Their justification for doing so correlates with Boserup’s 
explanations about women’s role economic development (Boserup, 1970). 
 
Communities are in statutorily driven livelihood transformation: from shifting cultivation 
to a complete sedentary farming. In praxis, however, shifting cultivation has not yet 
abandoned, and local communities started supporting their livelihood though renting land 
(mostly without being restricted to their household holdings ) to others, mainly to 
highlanders of neighbouring regions.  
 
Table 8.1  Major changes within the livelihood structure of Gumuz communities 
Livelihood capital assets 
and related factors 
Pre-land deal scenario 
(2010 as reference year) 
 
Post land lead scenario 
(2015) 
Land administration Customary by clans 
By region through 
certification of holdings 
Access to land Almost free Restricted 
Crop land 
Diffeent land in different 
locations 
Predominantly single land in 
one location 
Fallow land 
Atleast 2 fallow lands per 
household 
No fallow land 
Grazing land Free and large Restricted and small 
Garden Large 
Small and some times no 
garden in resettlement villages 
Average land holding 
Custmarily owned and as 
much land as a community 
membr needs 
8.4 ha per household 
 
Local labour 
Labour for own farm, 
collection of forest resources 
Some labour employment in 
commercial farms, restricted 
collection of forest 
Incidence of conflicts Rare Some times 
Traditional conflict 
resolution (eg.michu ) 
Commonly applied 
Rarely applied, substituted by 
formal hearings 
Road Limited access 
Limited access and better in 
few places 
Local price of leased land 
(ha-1yr-1) 
Birr 200-300 (€ 10- 15) 
1 quintal of sesame or 
equivalent to it. In cash, 
Birr 2700-3200 (€ 108- 128) 
 
Though traditional farming practices are better in minimizing soil loss (Dereje et al., 
2016), the law favours land leases made between peasants and commercial farmers as 
compared to leasing for traditional farming. “Duration of land leases between the peasant 
and the lease shall be up to two years for traditional agricultural and ten years for users of 
modern technology” (GBGR, 2010). A complete shift in the livelihood structure has 
observed, especially among the indigenous Gumuz communities. Figure 3 has summarized 
the situation well. 
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As a result of increasing arrival of commercial farmers, there is a parallel increase to the 
advent of small-scale commercial farmers who mostly come from highlands of Ethiopia to 
get lease land from local Gumuz households. Consequently, the local land lease price has 
increased for about ten folds compared to the pre-land scenario (Table 2). As the Gumuz 
communities were prominently shifting cultivators who use so traditional and simple 
farming tools, they were not used to farm using oxen or other animals like in the case of 
other parts of Ethiopia. 
 
Although few have started farming using animal power (either oxen or donkeys), more 
than 90% of the households rented at least half of the land they got from the state to 
highland migrant farmers. Especially, in the years 2012-2014, most of the households in 
the communities leased land with a varying price of € 108- 128 per ha per year. At a local 
level, there are some arrangements in using land between Highlanders (who are familiar 
with conventional cultivation) and lowlanders (the Gumuz). For instance, if a Gumuz 
household has 7 ha of farm land suitable for sesame, usually he leased 4 hectares to 
Highlanders and requests the Highlanders to assist him in the cultivation of the remaining 2 
ha, while the last 1 ha can be used for other crops than sesame such as corn and beans. 
There are also local land brokers with a wider and trans-regional network. These all lead to 
further encroachment of lowland forest and woodlands which were considered to be 
parkland area and conservation corridors.  
 
As a result of the surging economic advantage of holding extra land locally, competition 
for more land sometimes lead to disputes and conflicts. Disputes are stronger especially 
over a land which either has not yet classified and assigned to a user or for a land which 
was provided for investors. Conflicts usually exist between investors and local people, 
investors and highlanders who leased land from the local community, among local 
households, between highlanders and lowlanders and even among highlanders. Local 
communities survived and somehow ‘enjoyed’ renting of their holdings to highlanders in 
the short run. However, since rent holders (highlanders) are looking the short term benefits 
from land and at least to reach a production break-even point, they usually cultivate the 
land without adequate care and conservation. As a result, after few years, the lease price 
for ‘degraded’ farmlands will be minimal, and the overall livelihood of Gumuz 
communities is at an apparent risk.  
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The Gumuz people perceive animals are the source of insurance and economic security. 
Animals are like “banks”, a Gumuz elder once said. Sale of animals is the basis of their 
adaptation to environmental stress. The Gumuz use them to escape shocks during 
economic stress. However, from time to time, due to scarcity of grazing land, households 
have lower livestock than the pre-deal scenario, and lower compared to the counterfactual 
groups. Due to all these, the capacity of households in resisting upcoming livelihood 
shocks is low. 
8.4 Household food security and its determinants 
Table 2 was developed using the procedure of determining food security index, Foster­
Greer­Thorbecke (FGT) measure (Foster et al, 1984). It summarizes the level of food 
security or insecurity. More specifically, the food insecurity index is further decomposed 
into the incidence, depth and severity of food insecurity both in affected and non-affected 
groups of households. The result indicated that by the year 2009/2010, 56% of the 
households in affected areas and 54% of the households in non-affected areas are food 
secured. This implies that, 44% of the households in affected areas and 48% of the 
households in non-affected areas were not food secure, i.e, their consumption was below 
the recommended level of daily caloric intake (2200kcal).After four years, by the year 
2014/2015, while household food security in affected areas is increasing 72%, the level of 
food security among non-affected groups of households was improved to 78% in non-
affected areas which is much closer to the target set by the government of Ethiopia 
(MoFED, 2010). This indicates that the food security gap between affected and non-
affected groups is not much in the short run. However, in the future, affected households 
(i.e., households affected by land deals) are much susceptible to risk as they are with less 
shock absorption potential as discussed under section 8.3.1. 
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Table 8.2  Level of food security (food security index) 
 
Type of food insecurity 
Affected groups 
 (n1=162) 
Non-affected groups 
(n2=224) 
2009/2010 
(recall)* 
2014/2015 2009/2010 
(recall)* 
2014/2015 
Food secured 91 (56) 117 (72) 121(54) 175(78) 
Food insecure (incidence) 36(22) 26(16) 63 (28) 38(17) 
Food insecure (depth) 19 (12) 13 (8)  29 (13) 7(3) 
Food insecure (severity) 16 (10) 6 (4) 11(5) 4 (2) 
* in cross reference with district level (safety net) data. Numbers in the bracket are percentages 
 
From Table 8.2, it clear that food security has improved in both affected and non-affected 
communities. However, as indicated in Figure 8.2, the improvement among affected 
communities (16%, i.e 72-56) is less than the improvement scored among non-affected 
communities (24%, i.e 78-24). The severity of food insecurity for the year 2014/2015 is 
4% for affected group and 2% for the non-affected group of households. Similarly, the 
summary also indicated that the depth of food insecurity, theoretically called food 
insecurity gap, among affected group of households is relatively higher (8%) than the 
depth of food insecurity in non-affected group (3%). Food insecurity gap indicates the 
possibility to approximate resources required to eradicate food insecurity. That is, based on 
the computed food insecurity gap (depth) for the year 2014/2015, if efforts are made to 
meet 8% caloric requirement (of insecure households in affected areas), and 3% caloric 
requirement (of insecure households in non-affected areas), food insecurity can be 
eradicated. 
 
Figure 8.2 Changes and improvements in food poverty line for affected and non-affected 
groups of households 
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 Table 8.3 indicated the model output which shows the determinant factors of household 
food security in the non-affected areas where there are commercial farming practices. 
Before fitting the logistic regression model, test for multicolinearity was made using the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for explanatory variables which are continuous and 
Contingency Coefficients (C) for those variables which are dummy. The VIF value for 
each explanatory variable was found to be less than 10, implying that there was no problem 
of multicollinearity among those hypothesized continuous variables fitted in the model. 
The value computed for C is below 0.75, indicating that there was no multicolliearity 
problem among those discrete variables. As a result, all the hypothesized explanatory 
variables were incorporated in the logistic regression model. The quality of the model was 
assessed using further indicators such as goodness of fit in the model measured by count 
R2 which is a favourable output as far as it is above 50% (Maddala and Lahiri, 2010).  
 
Table 8.3  Logit model estimates (maximum likelihood estimates) for the affected group 
Variables Coefficients Odds ratio P-value 
Age 0.0341 1.2603 0.1004 
Sex (Male headed household) 0.179 1.3852 0.7020 
Education 0.0457 1.8940 0.3230 
Family size (AE) -0.501 1.0086 0.0329** 
Cultivated land size(ha) 0.3564 1.7829** 0.3706 
Dependency ratio of hh -0.4931 0.7162 0.4505 
Distance to market 0.0002 1.0010 0.7719 
Labour involvement 0.2755 1.2534 0.5972 
Livestock size (TLU) 0.2142 1.7321 0.0418** 
Total annual farm income 0.1116 1.1223 0.0392** 
Aggregate off-farm income 0.1859 1.0067 0.0704* 
Credit use (access) 0.4255 1.9560 0.3201 
Food aid  0.0309 0.9488 0.2675 
Access to forest resource 0.0052 1.1206 0.0364** 
Constant -2.231  0.1852 
Pearson Chi-square  81**  
Log.hood  -53.61  
R2  76%  
Sensitivity  80.72%  
Specificity  71.04%  
***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10 % probability level 
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Family size, amount of land cultivated by a household, livestock size owned, total annual 
farm income, aggregate off-farm income, and access to forest resources are the variables 
that determine the food security status of households in affected areas. Family size is 
significant at 5% probability level, indicating that households with smaller family size tend 
to be food secure compared to larger family size households. Ceteris paribus, as family 
size increases by one adult equivalent, food security of a household on average decrease by 
a factor of 1.0086. The probability of households’ food security increases with the 
increased amount of cultivated land at 5% level of significance. Conceivably, cultivated 
farm size is a proxy for a host of factors such as capital ownership, farm input use, credit 
access, and capability to resist livelihood shocks. The larger the cultivated farm size is 
associated with better wealth and household income and increased access to capital, which 
in turn increase the probability of household’s investment on better farm equipment and a 
shift from hoe-based cultivation to cultivation of land using animal power, i.e oxen or 
donkeys). Ceteris paribus, as cultivated farm size increases by one hectare, the odds ratio 
that is being in favour of food security increase by a factor of 1.7829. 
 
Size of livestock is indicated to have positive contribution to households’ food security at 
5% of significance. Normally, through the provision of consumable items such as milk, 
meat, and milk products livestock can have positive contribution for households’ food 
security. However, incorporating such consumable items in a household’s diet is not usual 
in local communities. For example, milk and its products are not appreciated and almost 
are not consumed among local Gumuz households because of cultural reasons. Therefore, 
the livestock contribution for food security is most presumably through selling them and 
purchasing food items, farm equipment and inputs. Ceteris paribus, as the total livestock 
ownership increases by one Tropical Livestock Unit(TLU), the odds ratio that is being in 
favour of food security increase by a factor of 1.7321.  
 
Total annual farm income and aggregate off-farm income are also in favour of food 
security at 5% and 10% probability level respectively. Ceteris paribus, as the farm and off-
farm income respectively increase by one Birr, the odds ratio that is being in favour of 
food security increase by a factor of 1.1223 and 1.0067 respectively. Finally, access to 
forest resource is an institutional factor that has positive contribution to a household’s food 
security at 10% probability level. Households or communities who are accessed and able to 
use forest resources (which are timber and mainly non-timber products) are able to support 
 248 
their food security requirements as there are a number of local non-timber forestry 
products (NTFPs). Ceteris paribus, access to a local forest resource favours household 
food security by a factor of 1.1206.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Land deals have resulted in competition for local land resources. In the pre-land deal 
periods, local communities were wholly dependent on nature and engaged in shifting 
cultivation with a slash and burn practices. Before the arrival of commercial farms, 
communities administer land by customary holdings. However, such forms of landholdings 
were not formally recognized by the regional land laws which were approved in 2010. 
Following the advent of commercial farmers, there has been a parallel increase in the 
arrival of small-scale commercial farmers who mostly come from highlands of Ethiopia to 
get lease land from local Gumuz households. Consequently, the local land lease price has 
increased for about ten folds compared to the pre-land scenario. As the Gumuz 
communities were prominently shifting cultivators who use so traditional and simple 
farming tools such as hoes, they were not used to farm using oxen or other animals like in 
the case of other parts of Ethiopia. 
 
A complete shift in livelihood or transformation has occurred among local communities. 
As a result of the surging economic advantage of holding extra land locally, competition 
for more land sometimes lead to disputes and conflicts. Disputes are stronger especially 
over a land which either has not yet classified and assigned to a user or for a land which 
was provided for investors. Conflicts usually exist between investors and local people, 
investors and highlanders who leased land from the local community, among local 
households, between highlanders and lowlanders and even among highlanders.  
 
Local communities survived the pressure from large-scale commercial farmers through 
renting of their holdings to highlanders in the short run. However, a rented land is used 
without conservation. Consequently, after the few years, the lease price for ‘degraded’ 
farmlands will be minimal, and the overall livelihood of Gumuz communities is at an 
apparent risk. It is time to diversify the sources of income among Gumuz households 
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parallel to building their capacity in many directions ranging from financial saving to 
conservation of land. There should be a mechanism to monitor brokers’ driven local 
informal land lease markets which are mostly distortive to normal land rental prices. 
Finally, as traditional local conflict resolutions are getting abandoned in almost all cases, 
local administration structures are busy with resolving disputes even for minor issues. 
Therefore, it is important to maintain some of the constructive components of the local 
conflict resolution procedures, for example through modifying the michu and mangma. 
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Chapter 9 Summary and Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction  
Emerging evidence about the transnational land acquisition reflects profound global 
economic and social transformations with broad implications for both the future of land 
resources in general and the fate of world agriculture in particular. Decisions taken today 
will have considerable repercussions on the livelihood of many communities and the 
natural environment in the coming decades.  
 
The transnational land deal which many call it ‘land grabbing’ has gained momentum 
across many continents since the end of the first decade of the 21st century. While 
transnational land deals and land acquisition are unfolding fast, policy responses, 
governance responsiveness to public concerns, and accompanied business and ecological 
ethics have not yet that much. Many of the scientific contributions made since recently are 
prominently limited to the drivers of transnational land deals, restricting themselves to the 
2007-2008 global economic crises and accompanied business speculations. Few justify it 
from a broader dimension and long-run time frame, i.e., considering it not as a new 
phenomenon. Post-land deal effects almost remained as if it is a subject left to socio-
environmental activists. The aim of the dissertation was to analyze the features and level of 
inclusiveness of large-scale transnational commercial land deals, and investigate their 
effects on environment and livelihood with cases from the Benishangul-Gumuz region of 
Ethiopia.  
 
This chapter summarized the major results and findings from the different empirical 
analyses made. Accordingly, while section 9.2 relates the major findings to the research 
questions, section 9.3 describes overarching conclusion, Section 9.4 points out 
misconceptions attached to ‘ land-grabbing.' Section 9.5 states avenues for further studies. 
Eventually, Section 9.6 concludes with the policy implications of transnational land deals, 
land use, rural development and (agro-industrial) investment. 
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9.2 Summary of results 
Under this section results are presented for each of the seven research questions. Each of 
the questions are handled in the form of academic papers which have either been published 
in a web of science journals, submitted, or under review. The contribution related to the 7th 
question is a working paper.  
1. Which conceptual land deal framework better justify for the governance of 
transnational land deals? 
Chapter 2 dealt with the search for land deal framework better justify the governance of 
transnational land deals. Scholarly contributions on transnational land acquisition argue 
towards participatory and win-win land deals (Anseeuw et al., 2013; Azadi et al.,2013; 
Fao, 2009). However, a ‘win-win’ situation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
land deals to become inclusive or effective green deals. To result in an inclusive land deal, 
the need exists to broaden the groups of stakeholders (i.e., in addition to the investor and 
investee) according to various but relevant parameters. Handling of competing interests 
without a comprehensive land deal framework in an effort to incorporate the diversified 
interests of land use and powers of stakeholders is a major challenge (Borras et al., 2013; 
Margulis et al., 2013). Which stakeholders with what power and interest should be framed 
within the broader ‘transnational land deal’ scenario? The indispensable role of strategic 
management tools in mapping stakeholders with possible power-interest combinations is 
crucial to the prevailing multi-polar governance challenges of transnational land grabbing. 
Consequently, the ‘power-interest grid’, a conceptual map that disaggregates the 
stakeholders, their power, and the magnitude of interests they are likely to reflect is 
relevant ( Agle et al., 1999; James et al., 1986; Freeman, 1994; Ackermann and Eden, 
2003). Therefore, while the recommendations made towards inclusive land deals is 
acknowledged, resolving conceptualisation limitations in relation to inclusive transnational 
land governance is so crucial.  
 
In Chapter 2 it was tried to establish the context, i.e., a conceptual land deal framework 
which could further be refined and adapted at differing space and time scales. In order to 
arrive at an inclusive land deal framework, it was necessary to categorized stakeholders 
using power, interest, and legitimacy as the bases for classifying stakeholders. In a 
nutshell, the process was an effort made to extend the stakeholder approach of strategic 
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management (Freeman, 1984, 1994) to the contemporary transnational land deal which has 
plagued with governance-related conceptual deficiencies.  
 
Using the power and interest, the land deal power-interest clustering (LD-PIC) framework 
was developed which classified stakeholders into four groups (‘objects’, ‘players’, ‘leaders 
and context setters’, and 'crowd’). Alternatively, by introducing ‘legitimacy’ in to the 
‘power’ and ‘interest’ bases of classification, stakeholders in relation to land deal are 
further disaggregated into seven groups; according to the legitimacy-interest-power (LIP) 
land deal framework. It tried to resolve conceptualisation limitations for inclusive 
transnational land governance. Accordingly, actors in land deals are characterised and 
disaggregated into seven generic groups, i.e., ‘inactive’, ‘discretionary’, ‘exigent’, 
‘dominant’, ‘dangerous’, ‘dependent’, and ‘definitive’ stakeholders. New frameworks that 
assist towards the advancement of inclusive or participatory land deal frameworks, i.e., the 
‘land deal power-interest clustering (LD-PIC)’ and ‘legitimacy-interest-power (LIP)’ 
frameworks were developed. The chapter also suggested how to integrate the biophysical 
environment, stakeholders, governance, and institutions to deal the challenges of ‘land 
grabbing’.  
 
Employing the conceptual models into the real world land governance platform 
necessitates the revision of the conventional land deal policy frameworks. According to the 
conventional land policy framework, land deals are carried out with two principal actors 
who conclude land deal agreements; i.e., the owner of the land (usually the state, private 
owners or communities) and the investor who want the land. However, land is not like a 
mere commodity but a strategic resource and how to use it is not decided solely with 
‘buyer-seller’ agreement, but with the participation of all relevant stakeholders irrespective 
of the power and interest they are endowed. To this end, the concepts explained about the 
two frameworks (i.e., LD-PIC and LIP) are important in evaluating land deals and their 
effects upon different social groups. For instance recently, the European Parliament start 
realizing that when land deals are executed on the ground their impact upon different social 
group is not uniform but in a considerably different manner whereby some benefit while 
other are on lose (Borras et al., 2016).  
 
After analyzing the involvement of EU-based corporate and financial entities in 
transnational land transactions, the Directorate General for External Policies at the 
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European Parliament offered a series of recommendations on how to deal with emerging 
issues of land acquisitions outside the European Union (Cotula, 2016; Borras et al., 2016).  
In the end, the chapter concluded that land deals should be inclusive, demonstrating 
inclusive land deal (ILD) framework as a function of the biophysical environment, 
governance and institutions, stakeholders, land use and other latent factors such as peculiar 
local variables.  
 
2. Given the three dimensions of sustainability, the ‘social acceptability’, ‘economic 
viability’ and ‘environmental conservation’ of the TLDs have been studied, how 
much sustainable are transnational land deals (TLDs) for investors, host 
governments, and local communities? 
Based on the three main aspects of sustainability, sustainable TLDs are described in the 
following equation: SLD = f (SOS+ ENS+ ECS) + e. Thus, the sustainability of land deals 
(SLD) is a function of the three main aspects: social (SoS), environmental (EnS) and 
economic (EcS) sustainability, and error term (e). How ‘sustainable’ are transnational land 
deals for the investor, the host country and the local communities in terms of social, 
economic and environmental aspects?” and “What are the main sub-indicators that lead to 
gain or loss in the social, economic and environmental aspects?” To answer the questions, 
descriptive meta-analysis was used to investigate the sustainability of the TLDs (Chapter 
3). Trikalinos et al. (2008: 312) defined meta-analysis as “the quantitative synthesis of 
information from several studies”.  
 
With respect to social sustainability, the main drivers responsible for the social 
(un)sustainability of the TLDs, are the ‘tenure arrangements’ (TA) and the ‘livelihood’ (L). 
Accordingly, ‘tenure arrangements’ counts 98% wins for the investors, 100% wins for the 
government and only 5% win for the local communities. From this, it is clearly visible that 
the land deals made so far considerably favour governments and investors, it lead local 
communities to a total loss. Frome the land lease cases reviewed, 94% of them indicated 
unsustainability in the livelihoods of the local communities and small-scale farmers. Most 
often, the loss of (farm) land is accompanied by eviction or replacement, in some cases 
including violent actions from the government or the investor (Kenney-Lazar, 2012; 
Levien, 2012). When investors come and clear the land, contaminate water sources, or start 
hunting the local animals, this causes major damage to the local livelihood of many 
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communities. Pastoralists are especially affected by ‘land grabbing’ due to losing their 
grazing lands and the rise of fencing of territories that interferes with their lifestyle.  
 
In terms of providing soft infrastructure to local communities (i.e., contribution in terms of 
health and education) what is promised by investors and the actual implementation on the 
ground is different. Though much is promised from investors and hence government and 
communities were considered as winners only a few case studies have documented the 
implementation of promises in terms of providing soft infrastructure parallel to their 
business investment. loss in social sustainability in security for the local communities as 
well as the investor(s). For almost 50% of the cases, TLDs resulted expropriation of land 
and hence community’s evictions which often resulted in social conflicts and violence, for 
instance as described in Levien (2012). In terms of social differentiation the majority of the 
case studies show the collaboration between governments and the elite, diaspora or high 
class society: they win for almost all of the cases. On the contrary, the local communities 
face the loss in social differentiation for majority of the cases. 
 
With respect to economic sustainability, the investor(s) gain in 90% of the studies by 
investing in TLDs and thus introduce foreign capital into the host country, by which the 
government gains economic sustainability in 97% of the cases. The local community and 
small-scale farmers lose in almost three-fourth (71%) of the cases reviewed, for instance, 
in terms of getting less incentives from the government, e.g. having to pay more for land 
than foreign investors, getting less tax free incentives, credit, etc. In terms of hard-
infrastructure which is a more common compensation used by investors to benefit local 
communities, who gain in almost two-third (62%) of the cases reviewed and investigated. 
However, the benefit is also valid for the investors (89%) themselves and other people.  
 
In terms of employment, the results of the meta-analysis show almost two-thirds (65%) of 
the cases evidenced TLDs did not generate the desired level (quantity and quality) of local 
employment. On the other hand, The majority (88%) of investors, gain from the cheap 
labour that is abundant in host countries. For the local community, the TLDs provide an 
increase in employment, but the jobs are often poorly paid, take place in harsh and 
sometimes unsafe environments, with little security (contracts) and hard working 
conditions (Grandia, 2013; Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012). Generally, both host 
governments and local communities experience loss in transnational land deals resulting in 
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a win-loss-loss status of the TLDs. Establishing good land governance is required so that 
local communities will share the benefits from TLDs. If not, the future state and life 
supporting systems for local communities will be ruined. 
 
With respect to environmental sustainability, the most commonly affected environmental 
sub-indicator is forestry, or flora in general. It was also noticed that water and forests are 
also an among the factors that attract investors. The loss of fauna could therefore be linked 
with the loss of flora, e.g. the clearing of forests. With an increasing monoculture 
production system, intense application of pesticides and other environmentally less 
friendly practices, for instance as indicated in Azadi et al. (2012), biodiversity is also 
affected adversely. ‘...monoculture is eliminating the rich biodiversity of the Cerrados, 
which is only now becoming an object of conservation policies (Wilkinson et al., 2012: 
432).  
 
The search for land governance that can bring equitable benefit among investors, 
government and local people has continued. As stated by Peluso & Lund (2011: 669) 
‘There is no one grand land grab, but a series of changing contexts, emergent processes 
and forces, and contestations’. The global surge in large-scale land investments is 
increasingly linked to the significant risks of negative impacts on access to and control 
over natural resources, food security, human rights, and the environment. A need arises to 
establish better investment business models that should promote inclusive land 
governance(Dereje et al., 2015), integration with corporate social responsibility of 
operations (D’Amato & Roome, 2009; Kolk & van Tulder, 2010), and fit-to-purpose land 
administration systems (Enemark et al., 2014). 
 
3. What are the features of large­scale transnational land deals (LSTLDs) in the South 
(where Ethiopia is a case in point), and what are the emerging consequences?  
 
To have a further understanding of land deals, in addition to the reintegration and synthesis 
of the findings from different countries through meta-analysis (as it is discussed under the 
second research question), it is essential to investigate them in a more particular context. 
Consequently, Chapter 4 discussed the features and ongoing consequences of large-scale 
transnational land deals (LSTLDs) from the scene of a country from the global south, i.e. 
Ethiopia is a case in point. It is a chapter which justified that LSTLDs are not only the 
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result of global push factors (such as the 2007-2008 world food price crises) but also 
domestic pull factors where governments of developing countries offered tracts of ‘free’ 
and unutilized lands to transnational investors. 
 
In order to meet national development objectives (pull factors), the government of Ethiopia 
promoted the availability of more than 11.5 million ha of land and was able to attract many 
transnational investors. In the period of 2005 - 2015, it commercialized nearly 2.47 million 
ha. We found a significant variation among transnational investors regarding the land size 
they hold, at F(2,335) = 56.22, p < 0.0001): foreign companies (mean = 17,018 ha, SE = 
2,293), joint-ventures (mean= 5,143, SE = 1, 368), and diaspora (mean = 1,062, SE= 129). 
The government leased large swatches of land without conducting land valuation, 
feasibility studies, cost-benefit analysis, environmental impact assessment, and without 
adequately scrutinizing investors. Consequently, there is small investment performance 
progress, and many of the investors engage in speculation in the sector by using available 
policy loopholes. The land rental prices are between € 1.40 and 37.00 ha-1yr-1 for a lease 
period of 25-50 years, with the most common condition that the lease rates are negotiable 
and amenable after ten years from the first date of the rental agreement. The lease prices 
are extremely low even compared with local land rental lease rates. The lease agreements 
did not consider both the time value of money and appreciative value of land, which are 
important variables in investment decisions. 
 
LSTLDs deals in Ethiopia are dominated by companies of the Global South, particularly 
entrepreneurs from India. Ethiopia is a good case in point that indicate the rising (at least 
the emergence) of South-South investment deals rather than the conventional explanations 
about North-South capital flows (Margulis et al., 2013; Messerli et al., 2014). Investment 
capital is flowing from Europe and North-America to the developing countries of the south 
where ‘land grabbing’ is carried on. However, three-fourths of the land deals show scant 
levels of performance. The contribution of LSTLDs is between 4.5 – 6% in raising 
domestic agricultural production but have resulted in non-performing loans for banks of 
the host country as well. The land deals are probably leading to financial-grabbing, where 
Ethiopian banks are end up with non-performing loans and then must hustle with chasing 
‘investors’ to settle millions of loan that investors borrowed in order to run their projects. 
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The findings substantiate the dynamics in the usual North-South investment capital flow 
and the rise of South-South investment deals (Margulis et al., 2013). However, with the 
context of moving capital, speculation drove non-performing loans and resulted in 
companies engaging in financial grabbing. Applying Ethiopia’s policy of using agricultural 
land lease holding as collateral for investors (but not for small-scale farmers), banks in the 
country lent billions, which has resulted in an outstanding loan of 18.6 billion Eth Birr (≈ € 
791 million). So far, less than one-third of the LSTDs are operational, and the whole 
commercial sector has only contributed in raising the agricultural production of the country 
by 6%. Had it been managed well, it could have significantly contributed to the national 
economy.  
 
Emerging disputes between transnational investors and the government of Ethiopia can be 
worth mentioned (for instance the case of Karuturi Global Plc and Ethiopian government 
explained in Chapter 3). On the other hand, the pressure from transnational agricultural 
investments upon national economies, contracting parties, local communities, land and 
natural resources becomes visible. Hence, it is time for governments and stakeholders to 
work towards the formulation of effective legal frameworks to ensure the positive 
contribution of transnational agricultural and related investments to sustainable 
development. Furthermore, institutions started examinig transnational land deals from 
different dimensions. For instance, examining the involvement of EU-based corporate and 
financial entities in transnational land transactions, European Parliament offered a series of 
recommendations on how to deal with emerging issues of land acquisitions outside the 
European Union (Borras et al., 2016). 
 
4. How much effective is the commercialization process of farmlands so far concerning the 
expected payoffs from agricultural investment in the Benishangul­Gumuz region of 
Ethiopia? 
 
According to the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (GoE, 
1997), the right of land ownership and other natural resources of the country exclusively 
belong to the State and the peoples of Ethiopia. Meaning, all subsidiary laws and 
regulations of the country which could be issued either by the federal or regional state 
bodies recognize usufructuary rights to land which can be in the form of state, communal 
or group, and private holdings. While the right to use and inherit land is preserved, private 
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ownership of land is prohibited. The main justification given for this system is that if land 
is privatized, small-holder farmers may sell it when they face financial difficulties 
(desperation sales) and ultimately the country’s land would be in the hands of a few rich 
farmers. As regions are given the power to administer land, regional states in the country 
have enacted their regional rural land administration laws, regulations, and guidelines. As a 
result, land is leased to investors both by the federal and regional governments.  
The division of power in administering land into federal and regional governments lacks 
clarity and hence there is a challenge in harmonizing the allocation of land for both 
commercial farming and government owned (federal or regional) development projects. 
For example, while the Benishangul-Gumuz regional government set 20–35 years as the 
maximum lease periods for investment lands in the region, there are companies in the same 
region with contracts of 50 years which agreed with Ministry of Agriculture, a federal 
government institution. Lease prices also vary, € 1.40 – 37 ha-1 yr-1 (by the federal 
government), € 3.14 – 4.4 ha-1 yr-1 ( by the regional government. In the Benishangul-
Gumuz region, until 2012, the total amount of land delivered to both foreign and domestic 
investors has taken the lead with 600,254 hectares. Land has leased without Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) which was a requirement for any investment according to the 
law of the country. As a result, there has been deforestation and woodland degradation. 
While more than 63% of the investors started operation on agreed time, the rest are either 
requesting renewal of contracts due to various reasons, with unknown status, canceled 
agreements or ceased operation.  
 
The average land size developed (or cultivated) by investors (158.32 ha) is significantly (α 
≤ 0.05) lower than that of the average land size on which investors agreed to develop 
(461.45 ha) in a period agreed in the land lease contract. There is a higher variation among 
the amount of land delivered to investors (with standard deviation of 774.73) as compared 
to the variation among the amount of land developed so far (with standard deviation of 
232.60 and α ≤ 0.05). The average land size developed by investors is significantly lower 
than that of the average land size on which investors agreed for development and hence the 
level of employment generated and other socio-economic contribution of investors is so 
limited. Investors either lack the capacity to develop the land that they took or they are 
discouraged to cultivate as agreed upon in the contract due to various reasons. On the other 
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hand, it gives a lesson that before leasing land to investors, adequate preparation should be 
made especially in ensuring the right type and size of land are leased to the right investors. 
 
5. What are the environmental responses on land deals? That is, what are the effects of 
commercial farms on peak discharge and suspended sediment concentration (SSC)? 
 
The runoff response and sediment transport in 20 sample catchments with a contrasted 
intensity of commercial farming was investigated. Results indicated that commercial farms 
have 51% higher peak runoff compared to traditionally managed lands. According to the 
results from the comparison we made on suspended sediment concentration (SSC), 
catchments dominated by commercial farms have a significantly higher SSC (mean = 6.44 
± 2.23 g l-1) compared to catchments without commercial farms (mean = 2.77 ± 2.31 g l-1). 
It was noticed that forests and woodlands have strong buffering effect but croplands are 
generating higher peak discharges and sediment transport. Leasing forests and woodland to 
agricultural companies has resulted in deforestation. Consequently, the increased runoff 
response may lead to downstream bank erosion, affects downstream communities, and the 
increased sediment transport poses a siltation threat to the 4.8 billion dollars hydropower 
reservoir of the GERD. 
 
Furthermore, it was checked that the integrated index of forest cover and its distribution 
(RCD) as a better predictor variable for the catchment-specific peak discharge coefficient 
(Cp) than forest cover alone. Soil erosion is often considered as one of the central 
processes of land degradation and can be used as a desertification risk indicator (Sterk, 
2003; Vanmaercke et al., 2011), and hence, the results are parts of the warning to retard 
desertification. The smallholder traditional farmers are still better in controlling erosion 
than large-scale commercial farmers. “The Ethiopian farmer, however, is erosion minded. 
Evidence of this is visible all over the country” (Joyce, 1943: 36). Land degradation is 
contextual (Warren, 2002), and hence, both in-situ conservation and sediment trapping can 
play a role to reverse the situation.  
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6. What determines the investor­local people interactive (ILPI) outcomes? 
Investigation was made about large-scale transnational land deals in one of the peripheral 
lowland regions of Ethiopia where ‘the most dramatic changes are taking place’(Lavers, 
2012b:795). Much of the land considered for lease was assumed as a ‘free and 
underutilized’ peripheral lowland. The Benishangul-Gumuz region, a low-lying western 
Ethiopian region is an attractive case in point where the situation, however, is entirely 
different from the conventional assumption of ‘underutilized’ peripheral lowlands. There is 
a competitive demand for land from various users with divergent interests. For instance, 
for large-scale commercial farming, hydropower reservoir and buffer zones, state agro-
industrial plantations, smallholder agriculture, delineation of parklands, refugee centers, 
and other purposes. Results indicated that large-scale transnational commercial land deals 
constituted 68% of the overall commercialized land in the region, higher than the African 
average of 60% (Osabuohien, 2014). 
 
While more than half of the large-scale agricultural investors are either in dispute or 
confrontation status with local communities, less than a quarter of them have established a 
conformist or collaborative relationship with locals. In our pursuit of the factors which 
underpin investor-local people interactions, compensation for expropriation of land has a 
positive but not significant effect upon improving the relationship between investors and 
residents. Community consultation, agricultural experience among investors’ key 
personnel, types of pre-lease land use classes, development of own water source by 
investors, and local employment significantly determine interactions to be either disputed, 
latent, or confirmatory. The investor-local people interaction could have been enhanced 
further towards a sound collaborative relation that better fulfils the interests of local 
communities and contribute towards win-win land deals. Competition for power among 
titular minority groups entangled key regional institutions from paying adequate attention 
towards timely resolution of investor-community disputes and maximization of plausible 
regional socio-economic achievements from land deals. 
 
While there is a visible commitment from the central government regarding running some 
mega projects in the area, a flight of private capital out of the region is equally observable 
and our finding goes in line with the remark by Tom Lavers: ‘...exploitation of the 
periphery for the benefit of the centre’ (Lavers, 2012a:127). So far, land in the region is a 
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‘cash cow’ where many private agri-businesses formally and informally compete for land 
for short term gain but neither with a subsequent reinvestment in the region nor with 
conservation of land. Although nature’s supportive capacity is dynamic (Cohen, 2011), 
depletion of land resources could be inevitable so long as Benishangul-Gumuz region is in 
a situation analogous to the commons tragedy where individuals behave contrary to the 
public good (Hardin, 1968). It is time to strengthen both the logical and logistic dimensions 
of land administration in the region. 
 
Revising the regional constitution from the perspectives of complementary institutional 
instruments which strive for a more reasonable protection of minorities with the inclusive 
developmental mindset is essential (Lawson, 2010; UNDP, 2016). Instead of nullifying age 
old customary landholding systems, integrating them with emerging statutory land 
regulations is indispensable (Van Leeuwen, 2014). There is a need to prioritize and 
synchronize the competing demands for land in the region; we recommend a 
comprehensive cross-disciplinary, regional land use study to ensure sustainable and fit-for-
purpose land administration (Enemark et al., 2014).  
 
As a result of deforestation and loss of habitat, biodiversity has been at stake in the study 
area (Dereje et al., 2016a). While we appreciate the federal and regional governments’ 
commitment in establishing a biome conservation zone for the wild fauna and flora, the 
delineation of a parkland amid competing land users will not be a straightforward mission. 
Hence, the process should be made through meaningful participation of key stakeholders 
such as the local people, scientific groups, decision makers and the international 
community. Finally, using the generic regression function, we derived and demonstrated 
how an ordinal regression model (ORM) is administered to investigate ordinal categorical 
outcome variables, which can further be applied to related studies with different context 
and scale. 
 
7. What is the effect of Large­scale transnational land deals (LSTLDs) upon the 
livelihood of indigenous communities? 
Commercialization of land resulted in competition for local land resources. In the pre-land 
deal periods, local communities were wholly dependent on nature and engaged in shifting 
cultivation with a slash and burn practices. Before the arrival of commercial farms, 
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communities administer land by customary holdings. However, such forms of landholdings 
were not formally recognized by the regional land laws which were approved in 2010. 
Following the advent of commercial farmers, there has been a parallel increase in the 
arrival of small-scale commercial farmers who mostly come from highlands of Ethiopia to 
get lease land from local Gumuz households. Consequently, the local land lease price has 
increased for about ten folds compared to the pre-land scenario. As the Gumuz 
communities were prominently shifting cultivators who use so traditional and simple 
farming tools such as hoes, they were not used to farm using oxen or other animals like in 
the case of other parts of Ethiopia. 
A radical shift in livelihood or transformation has occurred among local communities. As a 
result of the surging economic advantage of holding extra land locally, competition for 
more land sometimes lead to disputes and conflicts. Disputes are stronger especially over a 
land which either has not yet classified and assigned to a user or for a land which was 
provided for investors. Local communities survived the pressure from large-scale 
commercial farmers through renting of their holdings to highlanders in the short run. 
However, a rented land is being cultivated without conservation. Consequently, the lease 
price for ‘degraded’ farmlands will be minimal in the future, and the overall livelihood of 
Gumuz communities is at an apparent risk. It is time to diversify the sources of income 
among Gumuz households parallel to building their capacity in many directions ranging 
from financial saving to conservation of land. There should be a mechanism to monitor 
brokers’ driven local informal land lease markets which are mostly distortive to normal 
land rental prices. As traditional local conflict resolutions are getting abandoned in almost 
all cases, local administration structures are busy with resolving disputes even for minor 
issues. It is important to maintain some of the constructive aspects of the local conflict 
resolution procedures, for example through modifying the michu and mangma.  
Finally, it is important to note about the attitudinal change which came among local 
indigenous people as a result of commercialization of land. Previously, like the advisors in 
the World Bank, Western Ethiopian Gumuz communities had a long survived notion of 
‘abundant’ land around them until they were restricted through a formal land holding 
certificate and observe competition for land.With all their limitations , probably land deals 
resulted in one of the most notable changes in the agrarian history of Ethiopia which 
transform citizens from shifting cultivators to sedentary farming communities though much 
has to be done interms of ensuring sustainable livelihood. 
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9.3 General conclusion  
Although with an increasing plethora of literature, the term ‘land grabbing’ is full of 
ideological misconceptions and lack of factual information. The sustainability of 
transnational land deals as viewed from social, economic and environmental dimensions is 
in question. Land deals accomplished so far are prominently less inclusive and concluded 
with insufficient preparation, feasibility study, and analysis of available alternative. 
Although multinational investment has the potential to contribute positively towards 
economic growth and development, it is essential to ensure equity and sustainability. The 
major players in the global governance, particularly governments of countries in the 
developing South should reconsider their decision to engage in large-scale transnational 
land deals, and the way how they are doing it. It is also the time to evaluate their 
investment laws and land tenure arrangements from the perspectives of ensuring equitable 
and inclusive development. 
 
While the desire for appropriate governance of transnational land deals is looming, 
conceptual deficiencies associated with land deals remains unresolved. It is also necessary 
to broaden the contemporary win-win land deal recommendations to an inclusive land deal 
framework. Win-win land deal recommendations usually acknowledge land deals as 
‘buyer-seller’ ventures and land as a ‘commodity.' However, in the dissertation, it is argued 
that land is a strategic resource with many functions and spatiotemporal values. Hence, 
land deals need be considered as multi-stakeholder inclusive investment arrangements 
which should be made with a sound understanding of the possible economic, social and 
biophysical effects and alternatives values of land.  
 
Transnational land deals may play a favorable role in the host countries, investors and to a 
broader economic development if: (i) they are made with adequate preparation before 
concluding the deals (for instance, in terms of, land use planning, land resources valuation, 
and cost-benefit analysis), and (ii) the deals are inclusive and made with greater 
accountability and public transparency. To have a supportive role, they should also go in 
line with the fit-to-purpose land administration, sound business feasibility study, vigorous 
socio-environmental impact assessment, professionally negotiated contracts, and effective 
regulatory (and monitoring) frameworks. Integrated and catchment-based land resources 
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conservation is indispensable regardless of how land is dealt and who the user or owner of 
the land would be.  
 
The study contributes to a better understanding of the nexus among large-scale 
commercialization of land, the natural environment, and local communities. The study 
pinpointed and critically explained the different misconceptions associated with ‘land 
grabbing, and proposed further areas of study. Moreover, it suggested policy inputs to be 
considered so that economically feasible, socially acceptable and environmentally friendly 
agricultural investments thrive. Collaboration between local and international institutions 
in further research and development programs can play a prominent role in generating 
further evidence which will have both scientific and policy importance. 
 
9.4 Critical perspectives: ‘land-grabbing’ misconceptions  
The transnational land acquisition is not free from ideological misconceptions attached to 
large-scale investments. The most commonly traceable misconception that underpins it is 
that, there is availability or opportunity of surplus land which with investment can be 
turned into the generation of attractive profit for companies and jobs for developing 
countries. Globally, the destinations targeted for large-scale investment are commonly 
considered as empty lands. For instance, described as ‘empty’, ‘idle’, ‘marginal’, 
‘degraded’, ‘unused’, non-forested, unproductive, etc. (Hagmann & Mulugeta, 2008; 
Lavers, 2012; Messerli et al., 2014; Schneider, 2011; World Bank et al., 2010). 
International Institutions such as the World Bank and FAO have sustained this 
misconception. For example, when the World Bank declares the availability of an 
enormous ‘reserve’ of potentially ‘suitable’ land of between 445 million and 1.4 billion 
hectares worldwide as figures stated in Alexandratos & Bruinsma (2012) and Deininger et 
al. (2011).  
 
The second ideological misconception is the assumption that the chronic rural poverty and 
widespread hunger was based on a crisis of lack of agricultural investment, particularly 
foreign investment and the focus is given on agricultural production. Besides, vast 
advocation was in the making that investments should need to be large-scale, agribusiness-
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oriented, and corporate controlled so as to be capable of achieving higher international 
competitiveness in the increasingly integrated value chains of global agricultural 
production (World Bank, 2008). Making large-scale farms at the core, link the whole value 
chain through options, such as out-grower schemes (according to the World Bank) has 
been considered as an inevitable and ‘logical’ framework in extending the global capital 
towards rural economies. Consequently, it created ambition among governments of 
developing countries about the benefits of large-scale agricultural investment. However, 
agricultural investment should have seen from broader perspectives of making agriculture 
suitable for the small-scale farmers as well which require investment in small farming 
technologies and facilities. 
 
The third ideological misconception associated with the transnational land deal is the 
consideration of land like other commodities, as a ‘thing’ solely with economic value. This 
supposition has led to the promotion of ‘greater land security ‘ with an implication that 
land deals are beneficial provided that they based on the framework of secured property 
rights. ‘Security’ in a land use policy for a such a case mean providing, protecting/or 
promoting property rights of the exclusive users/owners of land; mainly referring to private 
and individual rights. However, with such a mindset land tenure security could also imply 
the property security of bigger landowners (i.e., 'modern' landlords) living in cities and 
relying on farm workers or tenants in making the land productive. The notion ‘security’ 
could also mean capital institutions such as the banks which sell liquid capital for profit, 
and are usually in need of collateral as a protection for payment default. In the present 
context of the large-scale land deal and global land acquisition ‘security ‘is nothing but 
referring to the security of transnational capital invested on land. Therefore, 
recommendations about ‘land tenure security’ require much care and scrutiny than thought. 
Land is a strategic resource which should be seen beyond the level of commodity and 
managed strategically with short-term, mid-term and long run societal needs. 
 
The fourth misconception is that large-scale land deals are essential to approach scarcity, 
shortage of food and oil, i.e., to meet both food system needs and the need for ‘cleaner and 
greener’ fuels required to mitigate climate change. The arguments usually provided to both 
types of scarcities are mere oversimplifications of complex realities as they undermined 
enormous challenges to simple supply side deficiency or shortage and propose production 
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increment through large-scale investment as a solution. However, the sustainability of 
large-scale investment is in question.  
 
Arguments which favor large-scale farming to resolve food scarcity undermined an already 
existed potential for food adequacy and the challenges in it such as the waste within the 
food supply chain and loss of harvests. Besides, they underestimated the food security 
consequences of diverting of land towards the production of non-food products, for 
instance, agro-fuels, feed, flower, fiber, and 'forests' such as rubber, pulp, timber, 
woodchips industrial tree plantations. Likewise, arguments about oil scarcity and the motto 
towards large-scale investment to secure agrofuels for ‘green clean’ energy has two basic 
limitations. First, the argument ignored that industrial agriculture (i.e., industrial biofuel 
crop farming and industrial livestock production) is among the leading emitters of carbon 
dioxide, nitrous oxide and methane which are key greenhouse gasses. Second, it ignored 
the current inefficiency as to how the global finite supply of fossil fuel is consumed. That 
is, a widely growing world’s commercial transport sector so as to carry the bulk outputs of 
large-scale farm production, i.e., industrial food and non-food products over long distances 
across the world.  
 
Discussions on transnational land acquisitions as a North-South investment deal is the 
other misconception which is rebutted at least in the case of Ethiopia where South-South 
land deals dominate. Although much of land is supplied to investors, the majority of the 
land dealt has not yet developed. The last misconception is about limiting the actors in a 
land deal to the’ buyer and seller’ or a ‘lessor and lessee’ though there are many actors in 
the system that consciously or unconsciously play decisive roles in the process of 
transnational land deals. Consequently, it is essential to reconsider land deals from an 
inclusive and strategic perspective.  
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9.5 Avenues for further study 
Under the conclusion section of each chapter, issues for further investigation are stated. 
However, under this sub-section, the major ones are stated. Ensuring upstream-
downstream ecological restoration and land resources conservation through incentive 
arrangements such as the Payment for Environmental Services (PES) may play important 
role both for the safety of GERD, welfare of local communities, and conservation of 
nature. How to establish a PES arrangement so that GERD, local communities, and the 
natural environment thrive? is an intersting area of future research and development 
cooperation.  
 
Land resource valuation, cost-benefit analysis for alterrative land uses, and land use policy 
analysis can be promising areas of future research. River profiles, catchment 
caracterization, upstream-downstream linkages of hydrological processes, and the hydro-
physical interactions with the future manmade lake (i.e, the GERD reservoir) can be also 
be useful areas of studies in Benishangul-Gumuz.  
 
1. How to govern transnational land deals so that they can have desirable contribution 
at local, national, and transnational levels ?  
2. What is the agricultural production contribution of land deals in general and LSTLDs 
in particular?  
3. What are the land use land cover effects of land commercialization? 
4. How much is the level and effect of land acquisition by domestic investors (for 
instance in Ethiopia?) 
5. How to harmonize the different land uses and competing interests for land? For 
instance, in the case of Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region where there are 
commercial farms, small-scale farms, state-sponsored agro-industrial projects, and 
parklands in the upper catchments while hydropower dam in the lower catchment?  
6. The Benishangul-Gumuz region has an enormous variety of flora and fauna species 
which are under a threat of ecological degradation. For instance, woodlands which 
are dominated with a number of multipurpose tree species and are under a 
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continued threat of encroachment. However, due to the continuous pressure, the 
trees are on the verge of disappearance. Therefore, it is the time to map and 
establish a regional database for remaining tree species and their conservation. Tree 
species mapping and function identification study can play an important role. 
9.6 Policy implications 
Transnational agricultural and agro-industrial investment is increasing with a subsequently 
rising pressure over land resources and local people. It may play a supportive (but not a 
fundamental) role to promote national and local economic growth for developing countries 
which host transnational investment. Transnational land deals can have a favourable role to 
the host countries and investors if: (i) they are made with adequate preparation before the 
deals are concluded (example, land use planning, land resources valuation, and cost-benefit 
analysis), and (ii) the deals are inclusive and made with greater accountability and public 
transparency. To have a supportive role, they should also go in line with the fit-to-purpose 
land administration, sound business feasibility study, vigorous socio-environmental impact 
assessment, professionally negotiated contracts, and effective regulatory (and monitoring) 
frameworks. Besides, an integrated and catchment-based land resources conservation is 
crucial regardless of who the user and owner of the land would be. 
 
Placing profit-oriented companies in charge of employment generation and national food 
security is not a wise policy decision. Furthermore, stronger national agri-industrial 
development policies and strategies which consider socio-economical, agro-ecological and 
spatiotemporal variability within a nation are required to strengthen the sustainable 
production capacity of smallholder farmers. More preferably, sound land resources use 
strategies and land use decisions should arise from within through national debates and 
strategy building processes that involve farmers of all type and in consideration of context-
specific needs and demands. More importantly, better employment is opportunity is not 
generated by leasing large-tracts of land to capital-intensive commercial farmers. Rather, 
encouraging the unemployeed youth and providing the necessary support to invest on 
labour intensive cooperative farms can absorb much labour and raise the income levels of 
millions of citizens in Ethiopia. 
 
 272 
With specific reference to the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia, first it was 
important to conduct baseline survey and valuation of resources before reaching a 
decission to commercialize large tracts of land. In any of the times in its history, there are 
competing interests for land resources and pressurres upon local communities and ecology. 
While constructing a multibillion hydroelectric power dam (i.e., the GERD) at the lower 
catchment, commercialization of large tracts of land in the closer upper catchments is not 
feasible and requires reconsideration. Recently, government has decided to establish a park 
(i.e., biome conservation zones for the wild fauna and flora) amid competing land users. 
Deleanating a park is not a mild undertaking, and hence it necessitates meaningful 
participation of key stakeholders such as the local people, the scientific group, decision 
makers at different levels and the international community. 
 
Irrespective of the current level of influence and degree of interest, many stakeholders 
should be considered in land use decisions. Land deals should be made with an inclusive 
decision and participatory leasing processes. The ambitious promotion by the government 
about the ‘availability’ of more than 11.5 million ha of land is invalid and hence before 
striving for commercialization of land, it is important to be realistic and develop an 
integrated land information system. Valuation of a resource precede its marketing. Land 
valuation should be held before making investment decisions. While agricultural 
investment has its own unique features, challenges, and business style and handing it with 
the same investment policy tools with other areas of investment (such as construction, 
services, and manufacturing) is not feasible. It is time for Ethiopia to formulate a separate 
policy and implementation guidelines for agricultural investment.There is a need for a 
framework that help to resolve land lease disputes.  
According to the national investment proclamation, Proclamation No.456/2005, (GoE, 
2005a), an investor who has leased rural land can present his use right as collateral to 
borrow capital from financial institutions in the country. It is leading banks to a higher 
level of outstanding loans, and neither investors are seen in allocating the finance on 
agriculture as they promised nor they settled the loan within the agreed period. An investor 
is assumed to come with an own financial resource to deploy on a leased land than 
competing for finance from financial institutions of a developing country where there is 
scarcity of capital. 
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Expropriation law of landholdings for public purposes and payment of compensations 
proclamation, i.e. Proclamation No.455/2005 (GoE, 2005b) which disfavours smallholder 
farmers while considering investors as landlords should be revised to be a more inclusive 
proclamation. Besides, the law related to the payments of compensation for property 
situated on landholdings expropriated, Regulation No. 135/2007 (GoE, 2007), lacks equity 
and hence should be revised. Beyond the formal laws and procedures, corporate social 
responsibility of businesses and ethical business operations should be promoted parallel to 
investment decisions in general and agricultural investment processes in particular. Finally, 
diversification of income sources, provision of infrastructure and improving access to 
financial institutions to local people is essential.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: The major evolutions of land use-land governance 
institutional frameworks in Ethiopia. 
Proclamation(Regulation) Basic content related to land 
1955: Revised Constitution 
of Ethiopia(article 130) 
All natural resources of the country (water , forest, 
land, etc) became state domain. Land was part of the 
sacred trust and meant for the ‘benefit of both the 
present and succeeding generations of people’ in 
Ethiopia (IGE 1955). However the imperial system 
was characterized with feudal lords who possessed 
land and the majority citizens were tenants. Until the 
end of the imperial government in 1974, the land 
tenure system of the country was complex and 
intricate, it varied from region to region following 
the occurrence of different socio-political events in 
the country. Generally, the tenure system could be 
classified as private tenures and usufructuary 
tenures. Usufructuary tenure system is mainly based 
on the type of institutions which hold the eventual 
reversionary right over the land and could be 
classified as rist, semon, and maderia, or yemengist 
(Cohen 1973; Dessalegn 1984). Later in 1974, 
ownership for land became one of the major causes 
for the socialist driven revolution in the country 
which overthrew the imperial/feudal system in the 
country. ‘Land to the tiller’ was one of the mottos of 
the revolution. 
1975-1982: Public 
Ownership of Rural Lands 
proclamation, proclamation 
no. 31/1975; Peasant 
Association Organization and 
Consolidation Proclamation 
no.71/1975; amended by 
Peasant Associations 
Consolidation Proclamation 
Abolished (without compensation) all forms of 
private ownership, and all land used for agriculture 
or grazing purposes throughout the country declared 
to became the collective property of Ethiopian 
people. The law stipulated that no compensation 
would be paid for rural land or tree crops or any 
forest on such land (GOE 1975a). In the same year, 
the proclamation was strengthened by the 
establishment of peasant associations to ensure 
  
no.223/1982 
 
 
equitable distribution of land and to expand the base 
of socialist relations that would work for the built up 
of democracy in the country (GOE 1975b). Later in 
1982, local peasant associations (i.e, kebelle peasant 
associations) were given the powers and duties to 
distribute land within their territorial delimitations 
(GOE 1982). 
1995: The constitution of 
Ethiopia, proclamation 
no.1/1995, article 40.2; 
article 50.2 
The 1995 constitution of Ethiopia is the existing 
supreme law of the country, its land and all other 
natural resources. Land is commonly owned by the 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and it 
is not subject to sale or to other means of exchange. 
Regional states are given the power and mandate to 
administer land and other natural resources in 
accordance with federal laws. Peasants and 
pastoralists have usufruct right over land without any 
charge and without time limit including the 
safeguard against expulsion from ‘their’ land except 
if it is intended for public purposes which is subject 
to compensation commensurate with the value of the 
property on the land (GOE 1997).  
1997: Rural Land 
Administration Proclamation 
no.89/1997, Later repealed 
by proclamation no. 
456/2005. 
Stated general guidelines and set broader principles 
about the contents of land administration law to be 
enacted by each regional council, such as ensuring 
free assignment of landholding rights to peasants and 
nomads without any discrimination of sexes but with 
transparency, fairness and participation (GOE, 1995; 
1997).  
2002: Investment 
proclamation. 280/2002. 
Later repealed by investment 
proclamation no.769/2012 
So as to widen the participation of foreign investors 
in addition to the domestic ones. Stated four forms of 
investment and set minimum capital requirements for 
foreign investors (100,000 USD for single 
investment; 60,000 USD jointly with domestic 
investors), allocation of land, and further rights and 
privileges for different forms and types of investors 
(GOE 2002a).  
2004: Reorganization of 
government organs of 
Ethiopia, proclamation 
no.380/2004 
Restructured the powers and duties of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development mandated with 
the power to draft land use policy, land 
administration guidelines, conservation and use of 
forest and related resources such as wildlife (GOE 
2004).  
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2005:Expropriation of 
landholdings for public 
purposes and payment of 
compensation Proclamation 
no.455/2005 
Defined the key principles that should be considered 
to determine a person whose landholding has 
expropriated for various development purposes. It 
also stated the state bodies that have the mandate to 
determine the responsibility to pay the compensation 
for land. Generally, it is part of the constitutional 
requirements of the constitution of the country, 
article 51/ (5) and article 40/ (8) to enact laws 
concerning the utilization of land. A district 
(woreda) or urban administrations are given mandate 
to expropriate rural or urban landholdings for public 
objectives (GOE 2005a). 
2005: Federal Rural Land 
Administration and Land Use 
Proclamation no. 
456/2005(which repealed the 
Federal Land Administration 
Proclamation, 89/1997) 
Targeted to increase the land tenure security, 
enhance farm land productivity, and circumvent 
expectation of land redistribution among citizens. 
Farmers hold a perpetual use right on their farm 
holdings, and this use right should be strengthened 
through the issuance of land holding-land use 
certificates and registration, followed by cadastre. A 
federal framework for rural land administration and 
land use proclamation, each regional state is 
mandated to arrange its own legal framework to 
register land in a region (GOE 2005b). Security of 
land tenure versus agricultural investment has been a 
point argument which requires further investigation. 
Although the relationship between tenure security of 
land and agricultural investment varies, tenure 
security has a significant effect upon farmers’ 
investment in certain counties in Ethiopia (Dereje 
and Abebe, 2011). 
2007: Payment for 
compensation for property 
situated on landholding 
expropriated for public 
purposes, Council of 
Ministers regulation 
no.135/2007  
The amount of compensation for a property situated 
on a land to be expropriated should be determined on 
the basis of current market prices. Provisions are set 
concerning compensation for a building, fences, non-
crops, perennial crops, trees, protected grass, and 
permanent improvement on rural land, relocated 
property, a mining license, and burial ground are . 
Furthermore, formulas for calculating the amount of 
compensation for the stated properties are set (GOE 
2007).  
2009: Benishangul Gumuz 
Region Rural Investment 
Land Use Regulation, 
Explains investment land supply procedures, 
investment landholding, lease system and duration of 
land use, forest protection, land evaluation, land use 
  
Regional Council’s 
Regulation no.29/2009 
contract, land lease price in the different districts 
(woreda’s) of the region, rights and obligations of 
investors, etc (GBGR 2009) 
2010: Definition of power 
and duties of executive 
organs, proclamation 
no.691/2010  
The proclamation established twenty ministries one 
of which was Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) is 
dissolved and replaced with Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA). Powers and duties which had formerly given 
to the MARD were transferred to the MoA. The 
MoA is mandated to ensure conservation of 
biodiversity, and ‘the administration of agricultural 
investment lands entrusted to the federal government 
on the basis of powers of delegation obtained from 
regional states’ (GOE 2010b:17) 
2010: Agricultural 
Transformation Council and 
Agency Establishment, 
Council of Ministers 
regulation no.198/2010 
Lead the identification, design and effective 
implementation of solutions to the challenges of 
agricultural development, for instance, identification 
of soil fertility problems and solutions for the same 
(GOE 2010a). 
2012: Investment 
proclamation no. 769/2012, it 
repealed investment 
proclamation no.280/2002  
Stated provisions which could enhance investment 
not only in the agriculture but also in the 
manufacturing sector and improves some laws stated 
in the previous investment proclamation. Areas of 
investment for domestic investors, foreign investors, 
and investments to undertaken jointly are delineated. 
Amendment on minimum capital requirements for 
foreign investors are set (GOE 2012a)  
2012: Investment Incentives 
and Investment Areas 
Reserved for Domestic 
Investors, Council of 
Ministers regulation, 
regulation no.270/2012 
Specified various types of incentives for investors 
depending on different criteria such as type of 
investment, location of investment, performance of 
investment or progress. Excerptions for income tax 
and exemptions from custom duty for 2 to 9 years. 
Specifically, investors who invest in Afar, 
Benishangul Gumuz, Gambela, and Somale Regions 
are entitled with 30% income tax reduction. Similar 
income tax reduction will be made if companies 
invest in Guji and Borena zones of Oromia Region 
and in many of the areas in the State of Southern 
Nations and Nationalities People (GOE 2012b). 
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Appendix II: Computation sheet for Manning’s Roughness 
Coefficient: Cowan’s (1956) method 
 
Objective: To determine peak discharge in lowland where both commercial and 
conventional farming practices exist: Evidences from Western Blue Nile Catchment 
 
Factor Description Recommended 
value 
Material involved (n0) 
Earth Bottom/sides of channel composed of soil 0.020 
Rock cut Rock cut in sides of channel  0.025 
Fine gravel Bottom/sides of channel composed of fine gravel 0.024 
Coarse gravel Bottom/sides of channel composed of course gravel 0.028 
Cobble Bottom/sides of channel composed of cobbles 0.030-0.050 
Boulder Bottom/ sides of channel composed of boulders 0.040-0.070 
Degree of irregularity(n1) 
Smooth Smoothest channel in a given bed material. 
 
0.000 
Minor (slight scour) Having slightly eroded or scoured side slopes. 0.005 
Moderate (slumping) Channels having moderate to considerable bed roughness and 
moderately eroded sides  
0.010 
Severe 
(eroded banks) 
badly eroded sides of canals or drainage channels; irregular 
surfaces of channel 
0.020 
Variation in channel cross section(location of thalweg) (n2) 
Gradual Size/shape of cross sections change gradually 0.000 
Alternating 
occasionally 
Cross sections alternate occasionally, or the main flow 
occasionally shifts from side to side owing to changes in 
cross-sectional shape 
0.005 
Alternating frequency Cross sections alternate frequently, or the main flow 
frequently shifts from side to side owing to changes in cross-
sectional shape 
0.010-0.015 
Effect of obstructions(n3) 
Negligible Scattered obstructions occupy <5 % of the cross section 0.000 
Minor Obstructions occupy < 15% of the cross section 0.010-0.015 
Appreciable Obstructions occupy from 15% to 50% of the cross-section 
 
0.020-0.030 
Severe Obstructions occupy more than 50% of the cross-section 0.040-0.060 
Effect of vegetation(n4) 
None No vegetation cover 0.000 
Low  Grass/weeds 0.005-0.010 
Medium  Brush, none in streambed 0.010-0.025 
High (young trees) Young trees 0.025-0.050 
Very high  Brush in streams, mature trees 0.050-0.100 
Degree of meandering (m) 
Minor Ratio of the channel length to valley length is 1.0 to 1.2 1.00 
Appreciable Ratio of the channel length to valley length is 1.2 to 1.5 1.15 
Severe Ratio of the channel length to valley length is > 1.5 1.30 
 
  
Appendix III: Questionnaire 
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Appendix IV: Adult equivalence scales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Dercon & Krishnan (1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year of age Men Women 
0-1 0.33 0.33 
1-2 0.46 0.46 
2-3 0.54 0.54 
3-5 0.62 0.62 
5-7 0.74 0.70 
7-10 0.84 0.72 
10-12 0.88 0.78 
12-14 0.96 0.84 
14-16 1.06 0.86 
16-18 1.14 0.86 
18-30 1.04 0.80 
30-60 1.00 0.82 
60 + 0.84 0.74 
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